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The practice of International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) has undergone several 
developments in the legislative history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) largely 
influenced by the surrounding political, economic and legal circumstance. This was 
evident in the welcoming approach to ICA at the time of its establishment, which 
later changed to a hostile approach following the Aramco case. This hostile attitude 
hindered the development of the KSA arbitration framework up until the 1970s when 
it realised the importance of ICA in creating a reliable formwork for international 
commerce. Since then, the KSA has gradually developed a cautious and welcoming 
approaching to ICA, while at the same time reserving its sovereign rights over local 
disputes. 
 
This thesis critically assesses the development of the KSA arbitration regulation 
and the influence of both Sharia and the KSA culture in its development. In this 
regard, this thesis discusses the influence of the various Sharia sources on the KSA 
legal system and how such sources could be reconciled with current Islamic law 
theories. Such reconciliation will help remove issues evident in the KSA’s 
interpretation and application of Sharia principles. This is particularly necessary 
when ascertaining the limits of KSA public policy, which is primarily based on Sharia 
rules.  The Islamic natural law theory and Maqasid Al Sharia theory provide an 
effective rationale for resolving issues arising under Islamic law. If such theories 
are well utilised by the KSA lawmakers, the issue of public policy and any other 
upcoming issues will be effectively resolved within the boundary of Sharia. 
 
This thesis additionally discusses the 2012 Saudi Arbitration Regulation SAR and 
how it develops the earlier practice of ICA in the KSA. It draws comparisons, where 
relevant, with the UNICTRAL Model Law and other institutional and developed 
states’ rules in order to compare the new regulation’s provisions with those of 
internationally recognised standards. This is particularly important in light of the 
KSA’s aims in attracting international commerce, which requires a system of 
developed and reliable legal regulations capable of governing disputes. In this 
regard, this thesis examines the influence of the 2012 SAR on the KSA practice of 
ICA through the researcher’s collected interviews and enforcement cases. It also 
examines the influence of the 2013 Saudi Enforcement Regulation (SER) on the 
enforcement of both local and international awards. This regulation, alongside the 
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2012 SAR, governs the process of ICA from its start until its enforcement, requiring 
such processes to be of international standard in order to achieve the KSA goal of 
attracting foreign commerce.  
 
This thesis concludes by acknowledging the development introduced by the 2012 
SAR into the KSA arbitration framework. It also acknowledges the 2012 SAR’s 
failures to address some of the important issues inherited from the predecessor 
regulation. The author additionally recommends certain steps that should be taken 
by the KSA in order to develop the 2012 SAR and the 2013 SER. The contentious 
issues in the KSA’s interpretation of Sharia rules are also addressed and specific 
recommendations are put forward to help clarify these issues. Finally, the author 
believes that the KSA arbitration framework, as it currently stands, is much more 
attractive than any predecessor regulation, but it is nevertheless not attractive 
enough to draw foreign commerce. Therefore, this thesis puts forward several 
recommendations aimed at making the KSA’s arbitration framework more attractive 
to both local and foreign commerce. These recommendations include: embracing 
a hybrid view of ICA, clarifying the ambiguities present in the 2012 SAR, developing 
the consultative council’s role, codifying the general provisions of Sharia, refining 
the scope of the KSA’s public policy and reconsidering the scope of interest in the 
KSA’s legal practice. The implementation of these recommendations will create an 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
Arbitration may be defined as “a mode of resolving disputes by one or more third 
persons who derive their power from agreement of the parties and whose decision 
is binding upon them” (de Vries, 1982, p.43). It is 'based on contract, rather than on 
legal norms established by the states for the creation of judicial settlement of 
disputes' (de Vries, 1982, p.42). International commercial arbitration (ICA) is 
arbitration between two commercial parties where the nature of the contract the 
parties or their commercial practice creates a transnational context for the dispute. 
 
As an alternative to resolving a dispute by litigation, arbitration is nevertheless 
dependent on the domestic, national laws of the jurisdiction hosting the arbitration. 
The relationship between national law and ICA is both a cause and a reflection of 
the tension between the autonomy of the parties to self-determine the arbitration 
process and the sovereignty-based interest of the nation-state in retaining control 
and ultimate authority over the resolution of disputes within its territory (Paulsson, 
2011, p.292). In theory, the appropriate balance between state control and the 
autonomy of ICA is modelled by four main approaches: the jurisdictional, which 
emphasises the importance of national laws; the contractual, which rejects the 
importance of national law; the hybrid, which balances these two extremes; and the 
autonomous, which sees ICA as supra-national and hence independent of any 
national law (Hong-lin Yu, 2008). In practice, the balance is influenced by a number 
of factors, including the nation-state's relations with other states, its historical 
experience of ICA and the commercial pressure to attract and facilitate ICA within 
its borders. 
 
While the economic advantages of ICA motivate states to liberalise domestic laws 
to provide a legal framework that supports an arbitration-friendly environment, this 
motivation is tempered by the opposing force of the state's interest in sovereignty 
and the protection of the values crucial to the identity of the state and its citizens. 
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In Islamic countries such as the KSA, the most important value that impacts ICA is 
the need to comply with Sharia. Furthermore, alongside the cultural and political 
context, the development of ICA within the KSA must be historically situated. 
 
The KSA has been comparatively slow to respond to the commercial pressure of 
liberalising its domestic law of arbitration. Brower and Sharpe, following the end of 
World War II, identify three phrases in analysing the development of international 
arbitration in Islamic countries. During the first phase, which lasted until the 1970s, 
international arbitration was primarily concerned with disputes over oil concessions. 
The second phase, which lasted from the 1970s into the early 1980s, was marked 
by a rise in power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),1 
alongside the end of colonialism, a renewed interest in forging an Islamic identity 
and economy in opposition to Western capitalist ideology,2 and the use of oil as an 
"economic weapon". During these first two phases, Islamic oil-producing states 
were encumbered by long-term concessions to foreign investors, which were seen 
as an 'unwelcome legacy of a repudiated era'. This resulted in a number of disputes 
that were resolved unfavourably for the Islamic country involved (Petroleum Dev 
(Trucial Coast) Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1952) L. Q. 247; Ruler of Qatar v 
International Marine Oil Co (1957) 20 ILR 534; Saudi Arabia v Arabian American 
Oil Co (ARAMCO)) 27 ILR 117, creating and entrenching a distrust of international 
arbitration, conceived as a tool of an unjust "Western" system. The third, and 
present, phase reflects the ongoing impact of global commerce as a motivation for 
engaging more meaningfully with ICA (Brower and Sharpe, 2003, pp.643-646). 
 
In the KSA, the 1958 ARAMCO case, which directly involved the KSA, had a 
prolonged impact and resulted in an abstention from international arbitration that 
lasted for decades (Schwebel, 2010, p.255). The tribunal in this case stated that 
Saudi law had to be either construed or enhanced by the general principles of law, 
the custom and practice in the oil trade and the “pure jurisprudence,” notions. This 
resulted in a dramatic shift in the KSA government’s view of international arbitration, 
which had regarded it as a tool used to safeguard Western corporations’ interests 
(Al Saman 1994).  
                                                 
1 OPEC was first formed in September 1960 (OPEC, 2015). 
2 A major expansion of Islamic finance in the mid 1970s followed the increase in energy prices and the oil-
based growth of Arab wealth (Wilson, 1995). 
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In 1983, the KSA began a process of liberalisation by enacting the regulation on 
Arbitration 1403H (1983), which provided a more 'comprehensive' and 'accessible' 
system of rules for international arbitration, but still allowed the state to maintain 
significant control over the system (Sayen, 1987, pp.216-217). This was followed 
by accession to the New York Convention in 1994 (The New York Convention, 
1958) and most recently by the enactment of the 2012 SAR. This new regulation is 
based on the UNCITRAL3 Model Law 1985 (as amended), but under the Basic Law 
of Governance 1412H (1992), it remains subject to the authority of Sharia (see 
articles 8, 23, 26, 46, 48, 55). Beyond this, Sharia, as a comprehensive Islamic way 
of life, is a crucial part of the culture of the KSA and will necessarily influence Saudi 
arbiters and arbitration. The relevance of Sharia to both law and public policy cannot 
be ignored (Elsaman, 2011). 
 
While it is arguable that “ultimately, arbitration must always take into account the 
existence of national legal systems and the limits or interference that may derive 
from them” (Di Brozolo, 2013, p.42), one of the main criticisms of the old rules of 
arbitration in the KSA is that it was too conservatively dependent on national law 
and the “extensive supervision of arbitral proceedings by the Saudi judiciary” 
(Zegers, 2011, p.4). Other criticisms crucially included a reliance on public policy 
and Sharia to refuse the enforcement of foreign awards (Zegers, 2011, p.46)4, 
restrictions on who may act as arbitrator, and the procedural requirements 
necessary to avoid Sharia-prohibited gharar (uncertainty) (Thomas, 2006, pp.233-
235). Prior to the introduction of the new regulation, Baamir and Bantekas (2009, 
p.239) observed that: 
“Unlike other Arab nations, particularly the United Arab Emirates 
and Egypt, which have successfully instilled trust in the minds of 
foreign and local investors with regard to [arbitration and] ... 
enforcement ... the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has notably failed in 
both respects.” 
The question, then, is to what extent the relatively recent legal forms address the 
problems of the previous regulation, particularly given the ongoing cultural and 
                                                 
3 The United Nations Commission on International Trade and Law. 
4 The Sharia prohibition of riba (interest) is particularly problematic. 
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religious context of Sharia (Kutty, 2006). The 2012 SAR is approaching its seventh 
birthday and has had the opportunity to bed-in. Its impact on the arbitration culture 
of the KSA has been facilitated by the establishment of a new commercial centre 
for arbitration, based in Riyadh (Al-Zamil, 2014).  It is, therefore, a good time to 
consider its provisions, its impact and the perception held by relevant judicial bodies 
of arbitration in the KSA since the enactment of the statute. 
 
1.2. Aims and Objectives 
1.2.1. Working Research Question 
How well does the current arbitration Regulation in the KSA achieve an appropriate 




Aim: The aim is to produce a critique of the current Saudi Arbitration Regulation 
which considers, in an Islamic country context, how well the recent amendments 
meet the needs of international commerce. 
 
1.2.3. Objectives 
1. To assess the nature of Sharia and its influence on international arbitration. 
2. To critically analyse the relationship between arbitration, domestic law and the 
interests of the state. 
3. To analyse the arbitration regulations in the KSA given the cultural and religious 
context of Sharia. 
4. To empirically examine the extent to which the current arbitration regulation has 
succeeded in overcoming the deficiencies of the old arbitration regulation.  
5. To consider the possible future development of the law and the practice of 
arbitration in the KSA. 
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1.3. Contribution to the Literature 
 
The present literature may be divided into three: those pieces that address 
arbitration in the KSA prior to the new regulation (Alkhamees, 2011; Baamir, 2010), 
those that examine the impact of the new regulation, and those that focus on issues 
which transcend recent legal developments (Kutty, 2006; Fadlallah, 2009). This 
thesis will primarily add to the body of literature focused on the new regulation, but 
will also contribute to the transcendent issues of religion, culture and the needs and 
interests of international commerce. It should also contribute to the debate 
regarding the most appropriate way to conceive the nature of ICA and its 
relationship with the laws and interests of individual nations (Yu, 2008). 
 
Since the new regulation is only Seven years old, the body of literature that 
specifically examines this specific law is small, but growing. Although there is 
inevitably some engagement with arbitration theory, the focus of such literature is 
mostly doctrinal (Al-Ammari and Martin, 2014; Harb and Leventhal, 2013), with a 
particular emphasis on the general relevance of Sharia rather than on the specific 
law of the KSA (Badawy, 2012). Understandably, the bulk of the literature consists 
of journal articles (e.g. Alnowaiser, 2012 and Nesheiwat, 2015), with only a limited 
number of more sustained analyses available through completed PhD theses, and 
these tend to focus on specific and limited aspects of the new regulation, such as 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards (Almuhaidib, 2013, Zaid, 2014, 
and Aleisa, 2016).  
 
There is, therefore, ample scope for this thesis to contribute to this body of literature.  
Such contribution has been achieved through a sustained analysis of the 2012 SAR 
that goes beyond a comparative doctrinal analysis with the 1983 Arbitration 
Regulation. This thesis explores the interests, needs and perspectives of 
international commercial actors balanced against the religious, cultural, economic 
and sovereignty interests of the KSA. It also adds to the body of literature focused 
on the new regulation and contributes to the transcendent issues of religion, culture 
and the needs and interests of international commerce. Additionally, it contributes 
to the debate regarding the most appropriate way to conceive of the nature of ICA 
and its relationship with the laws and interests of individual nations (Yu, 2008).  
Finally, unlike any previous research to date (to the best of the author’s knowledge), 
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this thesis considers the practical influence of the 2012 SAR, the 2013 Saudi 
Enforcement Regulation SER and the 2012 SAR implementation act of 2017 on the 
KSA arbitration practice. Such analysis provides a clear picture of how arbitration 
is dealt with in practice, from the moment the disputing parties choose to arbitrate 
their dispute, up until the dispute is either enforced or rejected by the KSA 
enforcement courts. 
 
1.4. Methods and Methodology 
This thesis relies on both text-based resources and original empirical data. Material 
for the text-based analysis has been retrieved by structured keyword search using 
electronic databases such as Westlaw, Heinonline and Lexis. Sources included 
journals, monographs, textbooks, statutory material, case reports, as well as 
national and international documents. Both hard and soft copies of legal material 
related to the KSA have been collected from Arabic books, periodicals, official 
documents and reports, as well as other sources. These materials were retrieved 
from the central library of King Abdul-Aziz University in Jeddah, the central library 
of King Saud University in Riyadh and the library of Umm-Alqura University in 
Makkah.  
 
The author also explored court cases taking place after the enactment of the 2012 
SAR in order to examine the extent to which the new regulation fulfils its promise 
of making a tangible change. The collection of these cases was challenging since 
judicial decisions are not available to the general public. Nevertheless, the author 
was able to attain them through personal contacts and visits to the enforcement 
courts, which are the competent authorities for reviewing and enforcing foreign 
arbitral awards. Although the names of individuals and entities were removed from 
the transcripts, the cases have nevertheless been of great benefit for the author’s 
research, as illustrated in chapter eight. 
 
As a result of the limited literature and small number of reported court cases 
examining the 2012 Arbitration Regulation, the research relied on empirical work to 
enrich the currently available data. The empirical research utilised qualitative 
methods of data collection and analysing (Dobinson and Johns, 2010). The data 
was obtained by semi-structured interview, whereby a representative sample of 
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judges from both Diwan Al mazalim, the enforcement courts and the Saudi 
commercial arbitration centre were approached. This approach provided an 
accurate insight into how the 2012 arbitration is interpreted by the relevant 
authorities. The interviews were taped and transcribed before being incorporated 
into the analysis of chapters six and seven.  
 
The research methodology may be broadly described as a qualitative sociolegal 
analysis.  This approach allowed the researcher to analyse the 2012 Regulation 
and directly link it to the social context of the KSA. This research engaged a mix of 
methodologies, including doctrinal and normative, which helped to analyse and 
compare the new arbitration regulation with its predecessor. This empirical 
research was subject to the methodology of discourse analysis (Jorgensen and 
Phillips, 2002, p.196), which is well suited to the qualitative elucidation of meaning 
from interviews (Savago, 2015). 
 
1.5. Limitation 
This thesis studies the 2012 SAR and the influence it has on arbitration practice in 
the KSA. In doing so, the author relies on both primary and secondary sources of 
data to help enrich the study and make it as reflective of the practice as possible. 
This study considers the influence of KSA culture, religious belief and legal 
practices in perceiving any new regulation. Such study was nevertheless limited to 
the Sunni branch of Muslims with particular focus on the Hanbali school of 
jurisprudence since it is the official school of jurisprudence in the KSA. The author 
also considers the 2013 SER only in as far as the enforcement of arbitral awards is 
concerned.   
 
1.6. Thesis Structure 
Chapter One: Introduction  
This chapter provides an introduction to the whole thesis and outlines its Aims, 
Objectives and Research question. Chapter One also considers the contribution 
this thesis makes to existing literature, as well as outlines the researcher’s adopted 
methods and methodology for conducting such research. This chapter also 
provides a brief literature review of the main studies available in the field of 
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arbitration in the KSA and the extent to which each of these studies contributes to 
the aforementioned field.  
Chapter Two: Sharia Law and Islamic Legal Theories 
This chapter considers Islamic law from a Sunni perspective since the KSA follows 
the Sunni views of Figh. This lead to the consideration of the main sources of 
Islamic law and their influence on the law of Muslim states such as the KSA. 
Chapter Two also considers the main schools of Islamic jurisprudence and briefly 
discusses their differences. It then discusses two of the most important theories in 
Islamic law, the natural law theory and Maqaisd Al Sharia, which have both enriched 
the Islamic side of this thesis’ framework. Both theories are discussed in detail and 
their influence on the development of Islamic law is addressed. 
 
Chapter Three: General Background of the KSA Legal System 
This chapter provides a general overview of the background of the KSA legal 
framework and its judicial system. It starts by providing a brief description of the 
establishment of the KSA and its cultural values and belief. The chapter then moves 
on to provide a discussion of the main constitutional development initiatives since 
the KSA was established. Chapter Three discusses judiciary law in terms of the 
court’s hierarchy and the different judicial organs currently working in the KSA, 
namely: Sharia courts, Diwan Al mazalim and quasi-judicial committees. Last but 
not least, the sources of the KSA legal system are discussed, including Sharia law, 
state-issued regulations, international treaties and others. The hierarchy of these 
sources is also addressed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter Four: Arbitration Theory and Practice. 
This chapter considers the relationship between the state’s interest in preserving 
its sovereignty in relation to disputes taking place within its jurisdiction and the 
parties’ autonomy with respect to only being bound by their arbitration agreement. 
This chapter discusses the four most popular arbitration theories: the jurisdictional, 
contractual, hybrid or mixed, and autonomous. This chapter also discusses the 
principles of party autonomy and state sovereignty and the variety of opinions that 
arise when trying to determine which of these principles should preside over the 
other. This chapter, alongside Chapter Two, form the basis of this thesis’ theoretical 
framework, which analyses the 2012 Saudi Arbitration Regulation.  
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Chapter Five: The Development of the KSA Arbitration System 
The history of arbitration development in the KSA is covered in depth. The 
discussion of these development initiatives will lead to a critical examination of the 
old arbitration regulation of 1983 and its main deficiencies that led to the enactment 
of the new regulation aimed at producing a more developed legal framework. 
Chapter Five also provides a clear picture of the KSA’s attitude towards arbitration, 
which changed over time dependant on various circumstances.  
 
 
Chapter Six: Critical Assessment of the 2012 Saudi Arbitration Regulation 
SAR 
This chapter critically assesses the new arbitration regulation and whether it has 
succeeded in overcoming the deficiencies inherent in the old regulation. This 
chapter refers continuously to the 1983 Arbitration Regulation to help highlight the 
development of the new arbitration regulation. It makes reference to the UNCTRAL 
model and some other institutional rules to emphasise the suitability of the new 
arbitration regulation in governing international commercial disputes. The author 
relies on interviews conducted solely for the purpose of this study to assist in 
providing a practical insight into how the new regulation is interpreted and applied 
by relevant stakeholders.  
 
Chapter Seven: The Enforcement of Awards Under the 2012 Saudi Arbitration 
Regulation 
This chapter builds on the analysis in Chapter Six of the 2012 Regulation, placing 
particular emphasis on the recognition and enforcement stage of arbitral awards. 
This chapter addresses some of the developments introduced aimed at ensuring 
both national and international awards are effectively enforced within the KSA. The 
chapter also addresses the 2012 SAR implementation rule of 2017 and the extent 
to which it succeeds in clarifying some of the ambiguities that were not clarified by 
the regulation. 
 
Chapter Eight: A Practical Study on the Enforcement of Foreign Awards 
Under the 2012 SAR 
This chapter critically analyses the enforcement of five foreign awards which sought 
enforcement in the KSA following the enactment of the 2012 SAR and the SER 
2013. This matter is of importance because the difficulty inherent in enforcing 
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foreign awards was one of the main obstacles facing foreign commerce operating 
within the KSA. Therefore, in order for the new regulation to reach its goal of 
providing an attractive system for international commerce, the legal obstacles in 
regard to enforcing foreign awards had to be eliminated.  
 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the thesis by identifying its main findings, as per the 
previous chapters’ discussions of the KSA arbitration regulations. In addition, it 
provides specific recommendations for further developing the SAR and increasing 
both its reliability and attractiveness. Additionally, Chapter Nine addresses whether 
the 2012 SAR Regulation has succeeded in creating an attractive legal framework 
for international commerce. Finally, this chapter discusses areas within this field 
which require further research and which were omitted by the researcher due to the 




















Chapter Two: Sharia Law and Islamic Legal Theories 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses Islamic Sharia and its sources, schools, theories, as well as 
their views of how arbitration should be applied in the context of a Muslim state. 
Such discussion enriches this thesis’s analysis of the 2012 SAR and its relation 
with foreign commerce. This is because Sharia is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s 
(KSA) constitution and, as such, is the basis for all of the KSA’s legal legislations. 
Sharia influences all stages of International commercial arbitration ICA in the KSA 
because it determines arbitrable disputes, arbitrators’ qualification, award 
recognition and enforcement. Before discussing Sharia and its sources and 
theories, it is important to provide a brief background of the religion of Islam in 
general.   
 
Islam is a religion that caters to both the spiritual and material needs of people, 
irrespective of their race, colour, nationality and language (Amin, 1996). It provides 
a comprehensive legal framework that addresses people’s relationships with their 
fellow human beings and their relationship with their creator. As such it could be 
divided into Devotional and Transaction Laws. The first deal with matters that are 
concerned with achieving closeness to the creator such as prayers, fasting and 
charity. The second category is concerned with regulating people’s actions at both 
the individual and national levels (Ramadan, 2006).  While the first category has 
remained the same since the birth of Islam because it is related to God’s rights, the 
latter is susceptible to evolution and modification as time passes because it is 
related to people’s rights (Kamali, 2008). The second category is also concerned 
with providing a legal framework for the governance of people’s commercial, 
personal and other legal dealings (Ahmad, 2010). As a result, Islamic law, to varying 
degrees, has shaped the national legal systems of 45 Muslim-majority states and it 
is, by all standards, among the world’s most significant legal systems (Amin, 1996). 
In addition to these Muslim-majority states, Islam is now emerging as the fastest 
spreading religion in the world (Escobed, 2017). Along with the wide spread of 
Muslims across the globe, there is a real desire by some of them to base their 
contractual agreements on Islamic legal principles (Sisson, 2015). Therefore, 
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arbitration offers ample opportunity for Islamic law to be applied as the mutually 
agreed rule for resolving disputes between Muslims, regardless of their 
geographical location.  
 
This chapter will consider the Islamic theories of Maqasid and the natural law 
theory. The natural law theory will be discussed from an Islamic perspective and 
with respect to how such a theory may help in the application of the Islamic rules of 
arbitration. In addition, the theory of Maqasid Al Sharia will be extensively discussed 
from its origins to the recent contributions made to it by Islamic jurists. Before 
considering such theories, this chapter provides a brief background to Sharia, 
Islamic Jurisprudence and Islamic law, highlighting their differences. This will be 
followed by a consideration of the primary sources of Islamic law and the different 
schools of thought as per the Sunni branch of Islam. This chapter will also argue 
that Islamic law is a flexible and operational law that possesses several legal 
methods that empower scholars to make new rulings in accordance with developing 
needs and situations. This will be highlighted by a discussion of Islamic 
jurisprudence, Usul Al Fiqh and other secondary sources of Islamic law.  
 
2.1.1. Sharia  
Sharia is the most significant and comprehensive concept for describing how Islam 
works. It literally means the road to be followed, or the road to be followed by the 
believer in pursuance of his spiritual belief (Ramadan, 2006).This concept was 
described by Professor Weiss as the “path to the water hole” (Weiss, 1998, p. 17). 
To the literal interpretation he added that “when we consider the importance of a 
well-trodden path to a source of water for man and beast in the arid desert 
environment, we can readily appreciate why this term in Muslim usage should have 
become a metaphor for a whole way of life ordained by God” (ibid). The concept of 
Sharia is technically viewed by Muslims as the only right road toward the worship 
of God and this is clearly stated in the following Quranic verse: “Then we put thee 
on the (right) Way of religion so follow thou that (Way), and follow not the desires 
of those who know not” (Qur'an 45:18). The concept of Sharia is a practical one 
since it governs all of a Muslims’ spiritual and physical behaviours. Therefore, the 
fact that the believer has spiritually accepted Allah as the only God is as much a 
part of Sharia as the performance of other religious practices such as prayer, Zakah 
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and Hajj (Rahman, 2006). In addition, Sharia can be viewed as a comprehensive 
framework for regulating all private and public aspects of Muslims’ lives (Standke, 
2008). Muslims are broadly defined into Sunnis, Shia and Mutazila, with each 
having its own followers. The biggest of these groups is the Sunni, which includes 
the KSA, as well as most of the Arab Muslims. For the propose of this thesis, Sharia 
and its sources and schools are discussed from a solely Sunni perspective because 
it is the most relevant branch of Islam to this thesis’s scope and subject matter. 
 
2.1.2. Fiqh 
Fiqh, in Arabic, literally means "deep understanding" or "full comprehension" 
(Zulkiple, 2014, p. 286). Technically speaking, Fiqh means the science of Islamic 
law as derived from various Islamic sources. This term also refers to the process of 
studying Islam via jurisprudence in order to reach a legal solution (Singh, 2015). 
Ibn Khaldun also considered Fiqh as the  
“knowledge of the rules of God which concern the actions of persons 
who are themselves bound to obey the law respecting what is 
required (wajib), forbidden (haraam), recommended (mandub), 
disapproved (makrūh) or merely permitted (mubah)" (Ruben, 1957, 
p. 150).  
The burdens corresponding to these actions are illustrated in the below table.  
Table 1: Burdens of Actions(Ali, 2000, p.32) 
Action 
Corresponding burden 
Wajib or Fardh Omission is punishable 
Mandub or Mustahab Omission is not punishable, while an 
action is rewardable 
Mubah or Jaiez Neither rewardable nor punishable 
Makruh A disliked action that has not 
punishable consequences 
Haram Commission is punishable 
 
Fiqh was later recognised by Arabic standards as jurisprudence in general, whether 
it be Islamic or not (Mustafa and Agbaria, 2016). Thus, it can be said that any expert 
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in a particular legal jurisdiction could be referred to as a faqih (jurist) within the law 
of that jurisdiction. 
 
Islamic jurisprudence developed during Prophet Mohammed’s PBUH era when 
explicit rules were not relied upon. Reliance was, instead, placed upon the 
understanding of the Prophet’s companions since they had already seen the 
revelation of the Quran to the Prophet Mohammed and the situation in which it was 
revealed (Daghbouche and Nadra, 2016). Along with a growth in Islamic 
responsibility, the Muslim community also grew to embrace the world’s cultural and 
intellectual diversity. Simultaneously, the link with the Prophet (PBUH), and his 
companions’ understanding of Fiqh became more distanced (Motzki, 2002). New 
situations were reported in these eras and occasionally scholars were faced with a 
lack of unequivocally clear answers in either the Quran or Sunnah on how to deal 
with such situations (Kamali, 2003). At these times, Muslim jurists attempted to 
reach decisions on these emerging issues by utilising other methods. At this stage, 
Islamic jurisprudence needed to be developed further through a deep and rational 
study of the Arabic language. This is the case because Arabic is the language of 
Quran and Sunnah and the rationale behind Quranic texts, as well as the Sunnah 
of Prophet Mohammed and other sources of Islamic law (Kamali, 2003). Classical 
Muslim scholars have classified Figh into the following two categories: Usul Al Fiqh 
and Furu’ Al Fiqh. 
 
Usul Al Fiqh, which is the plural of Asl, represents Islamic law roots through which 
the tools and methods used to examine Islamic sources are studied and from which 
the fiqh rules are derived (Hallaq, 1999). Such tools exist mostly in the Quran and 
Sunnah, which are Sharia’s primary sources (ibid). Usul Al Fiqh has also been 
utilised in designing the tools for studying legal evidence and proof. When utilised 
effectively, these tools result in a greater awareness of Sharia rulings or, at a 
minimum, they result in the emergence of rational assumptions regarding Sharia 
rules, as well as the method through which the evidence is to be adduced and, in 
addition, the adducer’s status (Alalwani, Ali and DeLorenzo, 2003). The second 
branch of Fiqh is Furu’ Al Fiqh, which focuses on the branches of Fiqh that are 
related to the real practices of law. It is also concerned with reaching conclusions 
that are derived from applying Usul Al Fiqh (Fitzpatrick and Walker, 2014). Furu’ is 
the plural of Far‘, which literally means something that does not stand alone but is 
based and built on another thing. In order to understand this concept further, it is 
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important to note that Aṣl in the Arabic language is the basis upon which the Far’ is 
built (Jokisch, 2007). For instance, a tree’s roots are normally called Usul and its 
branches are called Furu’. Likewise, the Fiqh principles are named Usul and the 
decisions and conclusions adduced from these principles are named Furu’ 
(Lancioni and Giovanna, 2017).  
 
The interchangeable use by western academics of the terms ‘Sharia’ and ‘Islamic 
jurisprudence’ may result in confusion over their nature (Kutty, 2006). In practice, 
removing the line between Islamic jurisprudence and Sharia opens the door to 
claims of ‘divinity’ and ‘sanctity’ for people’s juridical ijtihad. It has been historically 
demonstrated that such claims have led to two serious accusations; deviation from 
Sharia and opposition to any efforts to update and renew Islamic law (Auda, 2008). 
Therefore, more attention should be focused on the differences between these 
terms, because Sharia is the basis upon which all of the Fiqh rules have been 
formed and developed, and Fiqh is a method through which Sharia sources are 
understood (Kamali, 2008). In this regard Shaheen Ali had a contrary view of 
Sharia, claiming that Sharia is an “overreaching umbrella of rules, regulations, 
values and normative frameworks covering all aspects and spheres of life for 
Muslims as developed over time” (Ali, 2016, p22). Ali further believes that the 
human interpretation of Sharia has contributed to its development and, as a result, 
Sharia reflects the principle of Islamic law rather than the law itself (ibid). This line 
of thought is very significant to the understanding of how the principles of Sharia 
are viewed by different Muslim legal systems. For example, the KSA interprets 
Sharia to be the law rather than the principle from which Islamic law is to be derived. 
This interpretation of Sharia has resulted in its rigid application within the KSA legal 
system. This was particularly apparent in the application of Sharia to the 
enforcement of foreign awards in the KSA, as illustrated in Chapters Seven and 
Eight.  
 
2.2. Islamic Law 
Islam advocates that God alone is the ultimate source of authority. It is ideally 
recognised in Islamic law that every Islamic source of authority, including Prophet 
Mohammed PBUH, is subordinate to God’s law, which stems from the holy 
revelation, i.e. the Quran (Malik, 2005). All of the sources of Islamic law originate 
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from God and their main goal is to discover and formulate God’s will. His will is not 
limited to a defined and fixed framework, but rather it encompasses all aspects of 
people’s lives and is continuously rediscovered (Hassan, 1982). Since Islam 
provides directions in all of life’s aspects, Fiqh is the mechanism that has developed 
an Islamic law capable of addressing all of these aspects in both current and future 
related matters. 
 
In this context, the law involves both moral law and legal legislations. Therefore, it 
is more precise to argue that since the moral aspects of the law by the will of God 
exist in both the Quran and Sunnah, Muslims and more specifically Muslim states, 
are under a religious obligation to embody it in their legal legislation within their 
jurisdictions (Hasan, 1994). Embodying God’s enactment requires Muslim scholars 
to utilise Fiqh to deduce the right rulings for the legal issues encountered. Since 
legal issues vary over time because of global development, Muslim states should 
embody a corresponding legal development within their jurisdictions (Bearman, 
2016).  
 
2.2.1. Sources of Islamic Law 
Islamic law sources have evolved over a period of 14 centuries, which represents 
a vast expanse of time since the divine revelation. During Prophet Mohammed’s 
PBUH era, the only sources of law were what the Prophet said or did and the 
revelations he received from God, i.e. primary sources (Jan Michiel, 2010). Since 
that time, Muslims’ numbers have increased dramatically to cover more nations and 
continents; furthermore, Muslims no longer have the Prophet or any of his 
companions to help make decisions regarding legal matters (Rohe, 2014). As a 
result, a number of secondary sources were developed by pre-modern Islamic 
jurists to help fill this legal vacuum. Both primary and secondary sources are 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.2.1.1. Quran 
The Quran is Islam’s holy book and the supreme source of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Muslims believe that the Quran is the actual revelations of God, revealed to Prophet 
Mohammed PBUH over a period of twenty-three years. The Quran contains 114 
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chapters of different lengths and subject matters. The chapters are composed of 
6,616 verses and 77,934 words (Faruqi and Faruqi, 1986). There is a situational 
context for the majority of God’s revelations to his Prophet and these are called the 
revelations’ situational causes (Vogel, 2000). The Quran governs the moral, 
spiritual and social lives of Muslims; specifically, it governs the relationship between 
the creator and creation, and between the creations themselves (Pearl, 1979). This 
holy book does not create a formal system of law offering particular remedies to all 
legal issues within a society, but rather it includes general principles from which 
those issues’ remedies are derived (Seaman, 1979). This view is supported in the 
Quran, which directs Muslims to utilise its guidance to regulate their lives, even in 
the absence of Quranic rulings on a specific matter: “Now there has come to you a 
clear sign from your Lord, guidance and mercy” (Chapter 6, verse 157).  
 
Furthermore, fewer than 500 verses of the Quran refer to legal issues. It could be 
argued that even these verses have gaps and uncertainties with regard to the extent 
to which their provided legal injunctions are compulsory or optional and the extent 
to which they are considered to be objective or subjective sanctions (Abd-Alhaqq, 
1997). In fact, the existence of these gaps is viewed as advantageous since they 
have enabled the Quranic injunctions to be flexible and reliable across time and in 
all situations. This is clearly demonstrated by the current scholarly conflict over 
various matters, which are due to differences in how various parties conceive and 
interpret the Quranic verses (Hitti, 2002). Hence, when the Quran is silent on a 
specific legal matter, Islamic scholars refer to Sunnah and other sources of Islamic 
law to reach a decision. 
 
2.2.1.2. Sunnah 
The second primary source of Islam is Sunnah, which means ‘habitual practice’. 
This is the Prophet’s PBUH statements, deeds, and tacit confirmation or 
condemnation of someone’s acts or practices (Abdal-Haqq, 2002). There are three 
categories of Sunnah: oral Sunnah, which is derived from the Prophet’s speeches 
and/or statements; practical Sunnah, which is focused on the Prophet’s actions; 
and Al Taqririah, which is related to the silences on, or tacit approvals of, deeds 
that occurred with the Prophet’s awareness (Kamali, 2003). The question of 
whether Sunnah is a direct divine revelation or just the Prophet’s reasoning has 
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prompted much scholarly debate. It was argued that the Sunnah is not the direct 
revelation of God, as with the Quran, but rather the reasoning of the Prophet 
Muhammad (Baamir, 2010). Nevertheless, this view clashes with the Quranic verse 
that states: “He, Prophet Muhammad, does not speak out of his own desire. It is 
but a revelation revealed to him” (Chapter 53, verses 3-4). Most Muslims believe 
that the Quran is direct divine revelation, while Sunnah represents the Prophet 
Mohammed’s actions and statements, which were simply inspired by God (Hourani, 
1991). Therefore, Sunnah was "heard, witnessed, memorised, recorded, and 
transmitted" from scholar to scholar via the Arabian significant oral tradition (Faruqi, 
1986, p.114). Since the 3rd century, the Prophet Mohammed’s reported Sunnah 
was compiled into certain collections. As time passed, six of these collections were 
considered to be the authoritative sources of Sunnah.5 Particularly, Al-Bukhari and 
Muslim’s collections are viewed by Sunni Muslims as the most authoritative 
collections of the six (Faruqi, 1986). They were classified as such by Muslim 
scholars in accordance with both the collectors’ method of collection and Isnad, 
namely scrutiny of references and witness cross-checking (Vogel, 2000). Isnad 
refers to the chain of authorities’ credibility when confirming the accuracy of a 
specific Hadith. Hadith and Sunnah are sometime used interchangeably; however, 
Hadith refers only to the reports of narrations which are not the only source of 
Sunnah. Sunnah was also derived from the practices of the people of Madinah at 
the time and imam Malik would reject hadiths if they contradicted with such 
practices (Abdal-Haqq and Ramadan, 2006). In other words, Sunnah clarifies the 
Quran and interprets its general provisions (ibid). Consequently, when the Quran is 
silent regarding a rule for a specific problem, Muslims rely on the Sunnah ruling 
(Christian, 2007). 
 
2.2.1.3. Secondary Sources 
The secondary sources of Islamic law involve but are not limited to Ijtihad, Ijma and 
Qiyas, which play a critical role in Islamic jurisprudence. Following the Prophet 
Mohammed’s PBUH death, and as Islam spread to various parts of the globe, 
issues arose to which the primary sources of Sharia did not provide clear solutions 
(Bassiouni and Gamal, 2002). 
                                                 




Ijma is Muslim scholars’ consensus over specific rulings where there is uncertainty 
in the current rule, or if a matter is not covered by the Quran and Sunnah. Ijma has 
been followed and applied in such situations ever since the Prophet PBUH passed 
away (Brian, 2011). This mechanism has its roots in the Quran, which states: “O ye 
who believe! Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority 
among you. If ye differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His 
Prophet, if ye do believe in God and the Last Day: That is best and most suitable 
for final determination” (Chapter 4, verse 59). Ijma participants are called scholars 
or Fugaha’ – they must be fully knowledgeable of the primary sources and their 
related sciences, most significantly, the Arabic language. Such knowledge is 
essential in order to extract and perceive the intention behind certain Sharia texts 
(Aghndies, 2005). In theory, Ijma has been described by some scholars as the most 
significant Islamic legal notion because it enables Muslim communities to create 
lasting legislative institutions (Abd-Alhaqq, 2002). However, in practice, Islamic 
scholars have failed to reach any successful Ijma since the time of the companions 
of the Prophet Mohammad because of political disunity and cultural differences 
(Ibid).  Even though complete Ijma’ is practically difficult, a partial Ijma’ could take 




Qiyas, which means ‘analogy’, has been used by Muslim scholars to reach a ruling 
when the Quran, Sunnah and Ijma are vague about a rule on a new issue (Vogel, 
2000). They enable scholars to apply the same rule in situations where a new issue 
is similar to an old issue in terms of its cause or effect (Makdisi, 1985). In other 
words, Qiyas enables scholars to extend the Quran and Sunnah rulings to new 
issues, as long as the precedent (Asl) and the upcoming problem (Far’) have a 
similar operational cause (Illah) (Ibid). Qiyas is clearly seen in the Quranic ban on 
alcohol, which was extended by scholars to a ban drug use, although this was not 
mentioned in the primary sources. An extension to include drugs was possible 
because drugs result in a similar outcome to that of alcohol intoxication (Kermeli, 
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2001). As stated earlier, the Quran does not provide laws and regulations for every 
matter; however, when reading, it is important to know that all things are legal as 
long as there are no prohibitive injunctions from the primary sources of Sharia 
(Weiss, 2002).Qiyas was initially recognised by the primary sources as a flexible 
concept of reasoning via analogical arguments (Gleave and Kermeli, 2001). Such 
arguments allowed Qiyas reasoning to be sufficiently wide to allow the law to 
develop in a flexible manner since it allowed restrictions and expansions of the 
current norms through a wide range of techniques (Aghndies, 2005). Over time, 
Qiyas was limited due to a lack of understanding of its actual sense and literal 
interpretations with respect to the law. Ijtihad was developed as a mechanism for 
solving this limitation. It encouraged the spiritual and fundamental societal purpose 
of the law, in order to guarantee that human interests were satisfied (Makdisi, 1985). 
 
2.2.1.3.3. Ijtihad 
Ijtihad is the intellectual effort made by juris-consults (Mujtahideen) to reach rules 
that are consistent with Islamic principles (Weiss, 1978). It also refers to the 
utilisation of Qiyas in relation to a legal issue, or acts done by Mujtahideen, taking 
into account Maqasid Al-Sharia, which will be discussed later. Before employing 
such methods, it is vital for mujtahids to "be familiar with the broad purposes of the 
Law, so that when choices are to be made they will be able to choose interpretations 
which accord with the spirit of the Law” (Weiss, 1978, p.210). In principle, Sharia 
allows for the changing and amending of legal rules in line with changes in 
situations. Iqbal referred to ijtihad as "[t]he principle of movement in the structure of 
Islam” (Iqbal, 1974, p 203). According to scholars, Ijtihad can operate in three ways. 
Firstly, in relation to speculative (zann) textual rulings in the primary sources of 
Sharia because of either meaning or transmission. Ijtihad could then be used to 
decide on the right interpretation, taking into account Maqasid Al-Sharia. Secondly, 
where there is an obvious injunction or Ijma, ijtihad could be used providing that 
Maqasid Al-Sharia is taken into account. This dynamic is known as ijtihad based on 
opinion. Thirdly, ijtihad can be used with regard to the current rules of Fiqh, 
originating from Qiyas or istihsan (juristic preference) and in addition to other types 
of ijtihad (Kamali, 1989). In such cases, mujtahid may carry out a new ijtihad if such 
rulings no longer serve Maqasid Al-Sharia, at the same time taking into account 
any relevant developing social, political, and cultural issues (ibid). Before pursuing 
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Maqasid Al-Sharia, certain factors identified by Sharia must be taken into account: 
individual education to strengthen faith and instil reliability and virtue; establishing 
justice, which is among the most widely covered themes in the Quran; and finally, 
public interest, which must be taken into account before reaching a specific decision 
(Weiss, 1978).  
 
Although ijtihad is done individually, as soon as the result of that ijtihad gets 
approved by other mujtahids then such ijtihad becomes ijma. This ijma is essentially 
a collective exercise in law-making which exists to meet the developing legal 
matters. This exercise of ijtihad is the Islamic way of legislating laws based on 
primary sources of Islamic law (Harasani, 2013). ijtihad is the gate through which 
Muslims continue to live by the Islamic code, despite unprecedented developing 
legal issues (Harasani, 2013).  Therefore, Muslim states such as the KSA 
continuously develop their legal process by relying on the Council of Senior 
Scholars to exercise ijtihad to reach fatwas on developing legal issues (see Chapter 
3).  
 
2.3. Sunni Schools of Jurisprudence (Madhahib) 
The Muslim world is largely divided into Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslim who agree 
on the main pillars of Islam and disagree on th other areas such as Islamic 
jurisprudence. This thesis is focused on the Sunni views because the KSA and its 
people are Sunnis and Practice the Sunni form of Islam. Therefore, it is important 
to note that the various backgrounds, circumstances and individual perceptions of 
Sharia manuscripts and Usul Al fiqh applications in the Sunni form of Islam have 
had a considerable impact on legal interpretations in real life. Certain Islamic 
scholars have relied only on the wording of the primary sources, while others have 
considered sources such as analogies, reasoning and sometimes their individual 
views in order to reach a greater understanding of a matter (Al-Jaziri, 2009). The 
distinction between these schools is important for both individuals and corporations 
since some schools are more flexible than others when it comes to commercial 
transactions, dress codes and the role of women within dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The Sunni branch of Islam has four main established schools of 
thought: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafie and Hanbali (Madhahib) (Vogel, 2005). 
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2.3.1. Hanafi School 
This school of thought was established by Numan Bin Thabit, also called Abu 
Hanifah who died in 767 AD (Cornell, 2006). The Hanafi School is the first Sunni 
school of thought and it differs from other schools in its tendency to place less 
reliance on oral traditions when it comes to legal sources (Burak, 2015). This school 
developed Quranic interpretations by relying on analogical reasoning. Additionally, 
through Ijma, this school developed the principle of the global concurrence of the 
Islamic nation on particular matters of law (Kamali, 2008). It views the concurrence 
of legal and religious scholars, acting as national representatives in this context, as 
evidence of God’s will. Thus, this school’s teachings recognise the secondary 
sources of Islamic law but always afford priority to the primary sources and then to 
its founder’s opinion (Zaman, 2013). This school has been recognised for providing 
legal views or fatwas in suggested or occasionally imaginative scenarios, which 
have not yet actually taken place (Hallaq, 2009). It was also the official school of 
the Ottoman Empire and a subset of its rulings were incorporated into the Majalla 
in an initiative to collect the financial provisions of the Hanafi teachings (Burak, 
2015). 
 
This school believes that arbitration agreements are valid, arguing that such validity 
is evident in both the primary and secondary sources of Islamic Law (Gemmell, 
2011). The Hanafi scholars believe in the importance of this dispute mechanism for 
fulfilling a significant social need, since its procedures are less complicated than 
those of a judicial court (El-Ahdab, 2011). The Hanafi School considers arbitration 
to be similar to both agency and conciliation and arbitrators thought to bare the 
same functions as a court judge (ibid). This is the most widely followed school of 
thought and its followers mostly reside in Turkey, Albania, the Balkans, Central 
Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, India and Iraq (Al-Jaziri, 2009). 
 
2.3.2. Maliki School 
This school was founded by Malik Ibn Anas, one of the legal experts in Madinah at 
the time (Khadduri, 2010). Imam Malik was born in 711 AD and died at the age of 
eighty-four in 795 AD (Omran, 2012). His school is mostly followed by people in 
Algeria, Sudan, Morocco, Libya and countries in western and northern Africa 
(Mansour, 1995).  In addition to relying on primary and secondary sources of Islamic 
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law (the same as other schools), Malik Ibn Anas additionally relied on the practices 
of the people of Madinah as a source of Islamic law (Melchert, 1997). This was 
evident in his major academic contributions to Al-Muwatta, which included a code 
of law founded, at the time, on the people of Madinah’s functional legal practices 
(Aisha, 1989). This school is different from other schools mainly in minor matters, 
such as the best way of performing a prayer and how one’s hands should be 
positioned when praying (ibid). 
 
The scholars of this madhhab have great faith in the arbitration process, to the 
extent that they allow one party to act as an arbitrator if appointed by the other party 
(El-Ahdab, 2011). The apparent bias in this situation has been justified by viewing 
it as similar to one of the parties relying on the conscience of the other party when 
it comes to taking the oath (ibid). The Maliki scholars believe that arbitrators’ 
decisions are final as long as they do not constitute flagrant injustice. In order to 
ensure this is not the case, this school enables judges to review arbitrators’ awards 
(Rafeeq, 2010). Although this may seem contradictory, since final awards should 
not be subject to any further reviews by courts, the judge’s review is not about the 
merits of the case but is limited to ensuring that there have been no flagrant 
injustices. 
 
2.3.3. Shafie School 
This school, like other Sunni schools, is named after its founder Abu Abdullah 
Mohammad bin Idrees, also known as Imam Alshafie. Imam Alshafie was born in 
767 AD and died at the age of seventy-five in 820 AD (Omran, 2012). He was taught 
by a number of prominent Muslim figures of his time, such as Imam Malik (Melchert, 
1997). He has not only benefited from their jurisprudence, but also from the variety 
of local thoughts that were passed to him through his teachers, who were from 
varying parts of the Islamic world (ibid). This is the third Islamic school and it is 
based on the Quran and Sunnah, which are its principal sources of legal authority 
(Lowry, 2015). This school views Ijma’ and Ijtihad – which are conducted through 
Qiyas – to be of reduced authority. Therefore, when faced with interpreting unclear 
passages of the Quran, a Shafie School jurist would first try to interpret them in 
accordance with the consensus among Muslim scholars and, if no consensus were 
available, the jurist would resort to Qiyas (Abdul-Raof, 2013). Usul Al fiqh was first 
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considered by Imam Alshafie in his book Alresalah (Bakar, 1993). The Shafie 
School is primarily followed in Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines and a number of 
other Asian countries (Abbasi-Shavazi and Jones, 2001). 
 
Shafie scholars believe that arbitration is legal and a valid path of dispute resolution, 
since, in Islamic history, arbitrations were conducted by both the Prophet and his 
companions (Black, Esmaeili and Hosen, 2013). The followers of this school believe 
that arbitrators have a lesser role and lower status than those of a judge since an 
arbitrators’ appointments can be revoked, unlike judges, who cannot be dismissed 
unless certain serious conditions are met (Islam, 2012). The Shafie School 
recommends the use of arbitration where there is no court in that area; however, 
where a court exists, a number of Shafie scholars reject the validity of arbitration 
on the basis that the practice may weaken the court’s power (Chern, 2016). This 
being said, different Shafie scholars have different views about this issue and some 
of them allow arbitration regardless of the subject matter, as long as it does not 
involve a criminal dispute (Farhoun, 1986). 
 
2.3.4. Hanbali School 
Imam Ahmed Bin Hanbal was a major theologian of the 9th century and the founder 
of the Hanbali school of thought. Imam Ahmed was born in 780 AD and died at the 
age of seventy-five in 855 AD (Omran, 2012).  His school adduced its rulings from 
the primary sources of Islamic law prior to the formation of any scholarly consensus 
or views (Melchert, 1997). It also recognises the authoritative opinions of the 
prophet’s companions as long as they do not clash with the authoritative opinion of 
another companion. However, where there is a conflict of opinions between 
companions, those opinions will be evaluated under the scale of the primary 
sources and the opinion closest to the teachings of these sources will be followed 
(Al-Matroudi, 2006). This school began in the 9th century as a strict, traditionalist 
school. It refused the rationalist opinions which, over time, developed into the 
mainstream legal theory of Usul Al-Fiqh (Venardos, 2012). The Hanbali School has, 
nevertheless, gradually recognised Usul Al Fiqh theory and, in the 11th century, the 
School fully adopted it as developed by both the Shafie and Hanafi Schools 
(Melchert, 1997). Therefore, two hundred years after the death of Imam Ahmed Bin 
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Hanbal, the Hanbali School finally emerged as a fully formed school of 
jurisprudence (Schimmel, 1984).  
 
While the Hanbali School is strict with regard to religious rituals, it is nevertheless 
flexible when it comes to commercial dealings (Vogel, 1998).  For example, in ICA, 
the Hanbali scholars provide arbitrators with similar powers to those enjoyed by 
court judges. Therefore, an award issued by an arbitrator will have the same effect 
on the parties as a court decision, since they are the ones who appointed the 
arbitrator (El-Ahdab, 2011). However, some scholars of this school, such as Ibn 
Taymiyah, believe that arbitral awards are of no value until they are reviewed by 
the judicial system (Al-Matroudi, 2006). This school allows arbitration in all disputes, 
other than those that are criminal; the nature of the latter generally requires a court 
judge’s decision (Alqurashi, 2003). This school is mostly followed by the people of 
Saudi Arabia and other neighbouring Gulf states. 
 
2.4. Summary 
The above primary sources of Sharia are the foundations of Islamic law and are not 
subject to change. The secondary sources are subject to change since they are the 
driving force behind the development of the Islamic legal system. These secondary 
sources rely on Sharia scholars’ interpretations of the primary sources to legislate 
new laws that address newly developing issues. This guarantees that, as time 
passes, Islamic law develops alongside, as does the way of interpreting and 
applying certain texts from the primary sources. This variety of interpretations has 
resulted in the formation of the above Sunni schools of jurisprudence and, from 
within these schools, scholars have been addressing the issues that arose after the 
era of the school’s founder. The Hanbali school is of most relevance to the scope 
of this thesis and it is the school upon which the KSA arbitration regulation is 
established. Although the Hanbali school is the official school in the KSA, its 
legislators and judges have, in many instances, relied on other schools’ views for 
particular legal matters (See Chapter seven). Having considered these sources and 
the various schools of jurisprudence, it is now imperative to consider the theoretical 
grounding through which such sources could be applied. 
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2.5. Natural Law Theory 
As stated above, all secondary sources must be based on the primary sources and 
this process of referring each aspect of the law to its natural order is fundamental 
in the development of the Islamic legal system. Therefore, natural law theory is 
addressed in this thesis to help explore the natural order of Islamic law rulings.  
The term ‘law’ signifies order and refers to the way in which things are organised. 
Thus, the concept of natural law signifies the natural way in which things are 
ordered within the law. The term ‘law’ also refers to the natural order people are 
obliged to abide by (Van Dun, 2003). With respect to human matters, natural law 
theory elucidates both the natural order of people’s lives and how are they are 
expected to abide by it (Finnis, 2011). John Finnis, a leading theorist in natural law, 
explains that natural law “claims to be able to identify conditions and principles of 
practical right-mindedness, of good and proper order among men and in individual 
conduct” (ibid, p.18). Natural law is also viewed as an analytical and evaluative 
theoretical framework that assists in differentiating between both good and bad 
behaviours, and helps those who are interested to act based on practical reflections 
(Emon, 2011). The jurisprudence of this theory covers a broad range of matters, 
such as determining the existence of principles or investigating what authority of 
reason helps with ascertaining such principles. When viewed in a religious context, 
some theorists have attempted to use this theory to help identify the relationship 
between God and the philosophy of natural law (ibid).  
 
This theory was divided by Aquinas into four kinds of law: eternal, divine, natural 
and man-made. According to this theorist, God’s impressive design for the universe 
is revealed by eternal law. On the other hand, divine law is reflected by the different 
principles derived from the Scriptures (Aquinas, 1993). The application of eternal 
law to people’s behaviours resulted in the formation of natural law. Last but not 
least is man-made law, which is constructed by people to fulfil the requirements of 
natural law within the context of continuously changing societal needs and settings. 
Aquinas uses nature to form the basis for the authority of natural rationality about 
eternal law (Aquinas, 1993). Westerman argues that God's law was not viewed by 
Aquinas as a fixed form of concepts and codes. Instead, Aquinas viewed eternal 
law as focused on the divine style, since the divine demonstrates a style of doing 
things and adheres to it when creating. Natural reasoning results from adherence 
to this style and demonstrates its impact on how the globe is ordered: “The eternal 
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law is an ordering principle regulating God's creation rather than a set of coercive 
precepts” (Westerman, 1983, p 29). It is important to take into account that natural 
law theorists such as Aquinas linked the authority of reason to God’s mind through 
the medium of the designed globe, which is considered to be a reflection of God’s 
will. Theorists’ ability to develop the authority of reason was based upon the fusion 
of both fact and value, which made use of the world as designed by God in reaching 
its goal and forming normative grounding for reasonable analysis regarding human 
behaviour norms (Emon, 2011). 
 
2.5.1. Islamic Natural Law Theory 
Before considering the existence of natural law within the Islamic law tradition, it 
must be noted that some leading Islamic theorists such as Makdisi and Crone reject 
the existence of such a theory in Islamic law (Makdisi, 1999; Crone, 2004). Their 
views are justified if what they were actually referring to was the non-existence of 
an orthodox tradition enabling classical Muslim scholars to refer something to God’s 
will without basing it on texts from the Quran or Sunnah (Emon, 2011). It has been 
the tradition of many classical scholars not to assume any ontological authority 
equal to that of the Quran and Sunnah, since this may lead to justifying its use in 
determining and building duties that stem from God (Makdisi, 1999). This belief is 
clearly shown in the dominant argument of positivists, as is illustrated by the 
classical Usul Al-Fiqh theory. This theory holds that, in the absence of a clear 
Quranic or Sunnah text on a legal issue, one is left in legal suspension. Positivists 
believe that in the absence of an epistemically sufficient approach to ascertaining 
God’s law on a particular issue, no person is in possession of a coherent epistemic 
status that enables them to make rules by relying on normative forces and 
associating them with divine will (Emon, 2005). Essentially, this position of strict 
scriptural positivism is cherished within Islamic traditions (ibid). Positivist jurists 
claim that in order to determine a divine law, scriptures have to be searched and 
an expression has to be identified that would directly or indirectly lead to the 
identification of God’s law on this matter (Brunner, 2011). 
 
Different theologies regarding the concept of God’s omnipotence have influenced 
the way in which classical jurists have understood the authority of reason. This 
variety in theological views led to the formation of the hard and soft models of 
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natural law theory (Maritain, 2001). Those theorists responsible for the hard natural 
law theory based their theological presumption on the idea that God only does 
good. This presumption was the start of what later evolved into the hard natural law 
theories, through which Sharia was given the ontological authority to reason by 
connecting God’s will with human rationale through nature (Bender and Klassen, 
2010). On the contrary, soft naturalists hailed from the position that something is 
good because of the divine desire for it to be so. They differentiated between 
goodness and Sharia norms and claimed that rationality could distinguish good 
from bad (Al Juwayni, 1981). However, that reasonable conclusion is unable to 
assume the authority of Sharia norms. Both of these categories will be discussed 
in the following sections. 
 
2.5.2. Hard Natural Law 
The hard natural law theory was founded by Al-Jassaṣ, Baṣran Mutazilites and a 
number of other classical theorists (Emon, 2011). This theory is constructed on the 
theological presumptions of the divine and the nature and it argues that God only 
does good and, as such, is unable to do any evil. As a result, hard naturalists 
believe that when the world was created, it was intended to benefit only human 
beings (Al Jassass, 2000). Further, they claim that God did not make such a great 
creation solely for his own benefit because he does not need it. He did not create it 
for the purpose of causing suffering and pain for others, in spite of their conduct, 
since such a thing is considered by these theorists to be unjust for those 
disadvantaged by it (Bearman, 2016). This hard naturalist belief is very problematic 
when we consider the fact that what is considered good or bad varies from one 
society to another. The same applies when considering the above belief that God 
is incapable of doing evil. Again, what is evil in this sense? If it refers to hardships 
such as poverty, wars and other injustices, then it may contradict the Muslim belief 
that this life is nothing but a test whereby people are tested with good and bad 
circumstances to examine how they will behave. This is evidenced in the following 
Quranic verse: “And We test you with evil and with good as trial; and to Us you will 
be returned” (chapter 21, verse 35).  Positivist Muslim theorists have also raised 
concerns about this belief and its theological implications. They claim that God’s 
omnipotence would be challenged by believing both that God is incapable of doing 
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evil and that he is bound to reward or penalise people due to their rational decisions 
(Mattison and Berkman, 2014).  
 
The hard natural law theorists argue that God is just and, as a result, his creation 
must be of benefit to others. In accordance with this presumption, they believe that 
people could discern such benefits by utilising their rationality to devise norms of 
conduct that are grounded on the normative authority of God’s will, which 
deliberately created such benefits (Hakim, 1953). This train of thought resulted in 
serious theological concerns since its implications adversely influenced God’s 
theological omnipotence (Emon, 2005). If God is omnipotent, how it is possible to 
bind him with human rationality for designing obligations and prohibitions when 
rewarding or penalising specific behaviours (Emon, 2005)?  The hard naturalists 
defended their point of view on the basis of the theology of a fair divine, and the 
nature in which his will and human rationality could be connected. Taking into 
account the fair God assumption outlined above, nature could be considered to be 
neutrally good for human beings (Izzatī, 2002). As a result, hard naturalists claim 
that good can be reasonably deduced from nature and that this finding can be 
transformed into a normative value within Sharia. They argue that this natural, 
empirical goodness reflects the divine will (Al Jassass, 2000). However, this 
argument has been opposed by positivists, who claim that if rationality is exclusively 
used to draw Islamic rulings, God could be bound by his human creations to enforce 
their own created rules, with zero reference to his will. As a result, God’s decisions 
would be based on the outcome of reasonable human study (Hourani, 1960). The 
theological standing point of the one and powerful God, who is subservient to no 
one, would potentially be challenged by this hard naturalist view (ibid). 
 
Furthermore, fusing fact and value is a key argument for theories such as the Al 
Jassas and Aljabbar natural law theories. These theorists believe that, subject to 
the absence of any opposing evidence, everything is good at a base level and is 
legally allowed (Al Jassass, 2000). They claim that good and bad can be 
rationalised by people through the study of nature, where their primary empirical 
evaluations would convert into normative evaluations. They argue that the 
normative content of the empirical assessments is grounded on fusing both facts 
and values, through which nature is used with a presumptive normativity that 
originates from God’s intended creation of nature for the benefit of people (ibid). 
They argue that, due to the fusion of both fact and value through the study of nature, 
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a reasonable ascertainment of good and evil is possible, which would then form the 
basis of Godly obligations (Jassass, 2000). Once it is reasonably determined that 
an act is good, it can be transformed into an obligation with consequences in the 
hereafter (ibid). Soft naturalists expressed their concerns about such a belief, 
claiming that nature alone cannot coherently and objectively determine the basis of 
the authority of rationality and, as such, there will be no fusion between facts and 
values (Al Qarafi, 2000). Their rejection of such fusion was grounded on the 
following Quranic verse: “We do not punish until We send a messenger” (Chapter 
17, verse 15). This Quranic text preserves the belief that God’s penalties need a 
clear expression of will and not a simple rational study of good and evil. If nature 
alone is considered the rational authority, it is too much of an assumption of God 
and the capacity of people to ascertain his will (Emon, 2005). Ibn Ḥazm, one of the 
11th-century jurists, argued that the hard natural law theorists’ attempts to fuse fact 
with values in nature was ‘plain pomposity’. He claims that humans, by nature, are 
open to different temptations such as drinking alcohol and adultery, which have 
been expressly forbidden by God. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the factors of 
nature can be transformed into moral norms and duties with the stamp of God (Ibn 
Hazm, 1984, p 54). Positivists also acknowledged that people are able to reach 
reasonable conclusions; however, such conclusions cannot be attributed to God’s 
rule of normative authority, which holds God bound to enforce rewards or 
punishments (Al-Ghazzali, 1894).  
 
2.5.3. Soft Natural Law  
In spite of positive theorists’ denial of the role of rationality in forming an obligation, 
some have nevertheless acknowledged the possibility of relying on the discretion 
of jurists to reach conclusions on some Islamic rules (Ahmed, 1971). The continuity 
presumption was not a method for asserting good duties in circumstances where 
there was no unequivocally expressed rule in the Quran or Sunnah, but was merely 
a non-liability rule (Al-Shirazi, 1908). The positivist theorists encountered an 
essential challenge concerning the justification of the use of juristic discretion for 
determining new Islamic rules (Montgomery, 1973). As a result, some assumed a 
softer form of natural law than the one adopted by hard natural law theory. Hard 
naturalists acknowledged the normativity of nature in a form which implies that God 
not only acts purposely, but also does only good. This implication was viewed by 
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positivists as an infringement of the principle of God’s omnipotence (Montgomery, 
1973). Consequently, in spite of the positivist’s reliance on the hard naturalists’ 
argument to validate their juristic discretion, they nevertheless constructed their 
theory in a form that meant God's omnipotence would be preserved (Emon, 2005). 
 
The positivists’ efforts resulted in the development of soft natural law. This theory 
uses the nature concept similar to that of hard naturalists, who view nature as 
created for the good of people and, as a result, fuse both facts and values. On the 
contrary, positivists, by relying on God’s grace and accepted authorities, justified 
the basis for their use of nature as a basis for making and updating laws (Al Razi, 
1997). By studying nature empirically, it seems this designed globe has different 
benefits for the existence of mankind. For soft naturalists, this evidence of benefit 
reveals that God designed the globe in order to support, keep and preserve human 
interests (Wacks, 2017). However, they believe that this is all done merely by God’s 
grace which, if he desires, he could easily change as he sees fit (ibid). The soft 
naturalists’ claim of grace enables them to fuse facts and values in nature and this 
authoritative nature rationale is consequently capable of maintaining a religious 
guarantee of God’s omnipotence (Emon, 2010). Soft natural theorists argue that 
God does not have to provide guidance by creating nature. However, he did so and 
allowed humans to use it all out of grace. They did not use it because of an 
assumption that God’s powers are limited. However, our ability to discern good and 
evil as grounds for new rules stems exclusively from God’s deliberate and gracious 
creation of this ability within us, which he could withdraw at any time, as he sees fit 
(Al-Ghazzali, 1894). Since both models of natural law merge fact and values in 
nature, proponents of soft natural law claimed that the constancy of such merging 
is limited by God’s will, which is subject to change at his discretion. Soft naturalists 
have further argued that nature, in its current form, is a source of goodness. 
However, it could be changed and its goodness is not undoubtable (Hourani, 1960). 
Such a belief is grounded in the theological possibility of the continuous goodness 
of nature and, as a result, it was called a soft theory (Hakim, 1950). Notwithstanding 
the nature contingency, God’s grace theory provides that, in the absence of an 
unequivocally clear ruling within scripture, natural theory jurists have merged both 
fact and value in nature for the purpose of rendering rationality an ontologically 
reliable source for Islamic law (Al Qarafi, 2000). 
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One of the leading founders of the soft natural law theory, Imam Al Ghazali, in his 
form of discretion, used intuition, God's grace theology, and texts to induce 
rationality, through which he fashioned the fundamental objectives of a legal 
framework (Al-Ghazzali, 1894). He claimed that the objectives of the legal 
framework were those that would be recognised by most legal frameworks. He 
further clarified that the existence of such objectives was founded on various 
sources of Islamic law. These objectives or Maqasids are discussed further below 
(ibid). 
 
To sum up, it is clear that both soft and hard natural law theories argue for the 
development of Islamic rulings by fusing both facts and values. Although they have 
different views on such fusion, they nevertheless agree that nature is created for 
the benefit of humans. Consequently, it should be referred to by mujtaihids to 
deduce new Islamic rulings. Thus, the practice of fusing facts and values is likely to 
develop Islamic law and its practice by Muslim states. In particular, the KSA could 
develop its legal system by encouraging its Islamic scholars to refer to nature in 
order to deduce new rulings on newly arising matters. This is to be done by utilising 
both Usul Alfigh and Foru’ Alfigh to study the sources of Islamic jurisprudence and 
nature before reaching conclusions on arising matters. In this regard and in the 
KSA, the Council of Senior Scholars are the body authorised to exercise such 
legislative powers (see Chapter Three). 
 
2.5.4. Natural Law and Arbitration 
Having discussed natural law theory and its models, it is now important to assess 
the implications of this theory on ICA. An arbitral legal order could be established if 
there was a willingness to recognise and apply the rationality of natural law theory 
(Gaillard, 2010). This natural law theory advocates that nature could reveal higher 
values that sometimes justify positive law solutions to consolidate them, and at 
other times encourage their development through questioning such solutions. This 
belief could be understood in a way that would justify establishing a legal order that 
has superiority over all legal frameworks, whose only advantage is the fact that they 
were introduced by sovereign nations (Emon, 2011).  
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This being said, it is nevertheless hard to analyse natural law theory’s various 
schools when it comes to international arbitration. This is mainly due to the 
confusion caused by the many trends that exist within the philosophical traditions 
of natural law (Gaillard, 2010). Certain trends are conservative, and others are more 
prepared to acknowledge that theory evolves as society changes. This theory is 
sometimes grounded on religious values and at other times on non-religious ones 
(ibid). In spite of these trends, the different directions in natural law theory share a 
common consensus on the existence of higher values that stem from nature, 
regardless of whether they have been transformed into a positive legal framework 
or not (Gurvitch, 1935).  
 
Moreover, referring a dispute to arbitration is viewed by 20th-century arbitration 
practitioners as a clear sign of the parties’ desire to adjudicate their dispute in a 
different manner to that of litigation (Gaillard, 2010). A similar viewpoint was 
expressed by Bruno Oppetit, who stated that international commercial law  
“for its part, clearly manifests a desire for unity, based on the 
common needs and interests of the international economic 
community. As such, it does not accord with a fragmentation of the 
international legal framework and encourages the use of unifying 
legal notions, such as Lex mercatoria, general principles of law, or 
truly international public policy (Oppetit, 1999, p.119).”  
Islamic natural law theories could also be of benefit to the development of Islamic 
arbitration practices, which are either fully or partially adopted by many Muslims 
states. In the absence of a clear ruling from either the Quran or Sunnah, Islamic 
jurists could fuse facts and values in nature for the purpose of filling this gap within 
Islamic law rulings.  These jurists’ empirical investigation of nature is likely to lead 
to a common consensus between them with respect to long-standing legal issues. 
For instance, the concept of public policy within Islamic law is yet to be properly 
defined for those from other religious backgrounds. This is mainly due to the variety 
of schools of thought, which lead to different views of what should constitute public 
policy. This researcher believes that Muslim state jurists should meet to deliberate 
the use of natural law theory as a potential tool for finding solutions to the 
vagueness inherent in their application of Islamic law. This would lead to more 
certainty in the legal framework and equip Muslim state jurists with the skills that 
will enable them to face upcoming legal issues within their jurisdictions. 
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2.6. Maqasid Al Sharia 
The term ‘Maqaisd’ refers to the rationale behind an Islamic law ruling. Such rulings 
include charity, which was mainly introduced in order to enhance social welfare, 
and fasting, with its underlying rationale of realising God’s grace (Chapra, Khan and 
Alshaikh, 2006). It also refers to the law’s allowance or prohibition of certain matters 
with the purpose of achieving a positive outcome. Therefore, Islamic law’s strict 
prohibition of alcohol and drugs is mainly the result of an attempt to preserve the 
souls and minds of individuals (Auda, 2008). El-Mesawi (2006) sees the word 
‘Maqasid’ as meaning the purposes, objectives, principles, intentions, goals and 
ends. It is also viewed by some Islamic legal theorists as a substitute expression 
for people’s interests. For instance, Al-Juwayni, one of the first jurists to contribute 
to the theory as it is known today, referred to both Maqasid and public interests 
(Masalih Al Mujtama’) interchangeably (Al-Juwayni, 1981). Also, Abu Hamid Al-
Ghazali expanded the Maqasid classification by placing it entirely under what he 
named unlimited interests (Al-Ghazzali, 1894). Public interest was defined by 
Najem Al-Deen Al-Tufi as something that achieves the legislator’s purpose (Lubis, 
1997). Al-Qarafi, on the other hand, linked Masalih (Good actions) and Maqasid 
through a key rule of Usul Al Fiqh that considers Maqasids to be invalid unless they 
either accomplish Masalih or avoiding Mafased (Bad actions) (Al Garafi, 1994).   
 
2.6.1. Maqasid Dimensions  
In Islamic law, Maqasids are classified in different ways in accordance with various 
dimensions. Such dimensions include the necessity level, which is the traditional 
classification, the ruling scope, the people scope and the universality’s purpose 
level (Al-Shatibi, 1997). Figure 1 describes how the traditional classification of the 
necessity level functions. For the sake of this thesis, only this dimension will be 















      
Figure 1: Levels of Necessity Chart. Adopted from Auda (2008) 
 
Maqasid are classified and divided into the above levels of necessities. The first 
level is further divided into the preservation of people’s faiths, souls, wealth, minds 
and offspring (Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007). Certain Usulis, such as Al-Ghazali, 
introduced the preservation of honour into the earlier five broadly known levels of 
necessities (ibid). This category of necessity was considered to be a significant 
factor in people’s lives. Additionally, the preservation of such necessities is 
generally thought to be the primary motivation behind any Islamic ruling (Al-Shatibi, 
1997). Furthermore, at the needs level, purposes are of lesser importance for 
people’s lives and luxuries, in the traditional expression, are considered to be for 
beautifying purposes (ibid). Figure 1 illustrates the levels within the hierarchy of 
necessity. These levels are interconnected in accordance with Al-Shatibi’s views. 
Each of these levels supports and preserves the level below it. For instance, the 
needs level preserves and protects the necessities level (ibid). This is the reason 
certain scholars prefer to perceive necessities in the form of overlapping circles 
instead of in a strictly hierarchical form (Attia, 2001). 
 
Auda (2008) believes that the levels of necessity are similar to Maslow’s 20th-
century hierarchy of human objectives, the ‘hierarchy of needs’ (Maslow, 1943). 
Maslow believes that human needs are various, representing essential 
physiological requirements and security, to emotional feelings and self-
actualisation. In 1943, Maslow proposed five levels of ‘needs’, revising this in 1970 
to include seven-levels (Maslow, Frager and Fadiman, 1970).   Al-Shatibi’s and 
Maslow’s theories are similar in respect to the importance placed on levels and with 
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regard to their goals. A further similarity between the Islamic goal theories and the 
Maslow’s  later theory is that they both focus on the capacity for development 
(Auda, 2008). 
 
2.6.2. Contemporary Perception of Maqasids 
Over time, the theory of the Islamic Maqasid evolved and its most important 
overhaul took place in the 20th century. Recent jurists of Islamic law have criticised 
the Maqasid’s traditional classification (mentioned above) for several key reasons. 
Firstly, the traditional Maqasid scope is entirely focused on Islamic law. 
Nevertheless, it failed to contain precise goals for either individual texts or 
collections therein, or of law that covers particular subjects or chapters of Fiqh. 
Also, the traditional Maqasid classifications are focused on individuals more than 
on groups such as families, communities or humanity at large. They also identified 
the above classification’s failure to incorporate justice and freedom and other 
values that are globally recognised as being fundamental rights. Finally, all of the 
above Maqasid were deduced from Islamic jurisprudence literature instead of from 
original sources and scripts (Al shaykh, 1957). 
 
In order to remedy the above deficiencies, contemporary scholars introduced 
modern notions and classified Maqasid in accordance with contemporary 
dimensions (Emara, 1981). Primarily, the earlier classifications place Maqasid into 
levels based on the scope of the rulings they cover. General Maqasid are witnessed 
in the entire Islamic law body, comprising of necessities, needs, justice and 
freedom. The second level is the specific Maqasid that are seen throughout Islamic 
law in the form of children’s welfare and family law matters, crime prevention for 
criminal law matters, and monopoly prevention in commercial law matters. Finally, 
there are partial Maqasid, which attempt to determine the wisdom underlying each 
Islamic script or ruling. For instance, discovering true intent by demanding a specific 
number of witnesses in specific judicial claims; alleviating the difficulty of intent by 
permitting a sick person to break his/her fast; and feeding poor intent by prohibiting 
the storage of meat throughout Islamic festival days (Jughaim, 2002). 
 
To remedy the shortcoming of individuality, a further expansion to this notion of 
Maqasid was made by contemporary scholars to cover a larger group of individuals, 
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societies and human beings in general. For instance, Ibn Ashur prioritised Maqasid 
that are related to the Ummah (nation) over those that are related to individual 
people (El-Mesawi, 2006). Another example is Rashid Rida, who incorporated a 
reform to include women’s rights in his Maqasid theory. Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, in his 
Maqasid theory,  incorporated human dignity and human rights. This growth in the 
scope of Maqasid’s permits them to address universal matters and develop 
alongside rulings underlying wisdom and practical proposals for reform and 
development (Kamali, 2008). 
 
It is important to note that contemporary Muslim scholars have recently initiated a 
global Maqasid, which is deduced from the Quran and Sunnah, rather than having 
to rely on Islamic jurisprudence literature which differs depending on jurist 
madhhab. This method has enabled Maqasid to overcome the Fiqh edicts’ 
historicity and better reflect the higher principles and values of the Quran and 
Sunnah (Auda, 2008). Comprehensive rulings subsequently result from such global 
values.  
 
Rashid Rida is one of the scholars who conducted a survey of surveyed the Quran 
in order to uncover its Maqasid. His theory of Maqasid included, “reform of the 
pillars of faith, and spreading awareness that Islam is the religion of pure natural 
disposition, reason, knowledge, wisdom, proof, freedom, independence, social, 
political, and economic reform, and women’s rights” (Rida, 1948, p. 100). In 
addition, Al-Tahir Ibn Ashur suggested that the global Islamic law of Maqasid exists 
to keep “orderliness, equality, freedom, facilitation, and pure natural disposition 
preservation” (Fitrah) (El-Mesawi, 2006, p. 236). The freedom purpose, suggested 
by various contemporary scholars including Ibn Ashur, has been identified as 
different from that of the concept of ‘freedom’ (Itq) as stated by jurists (Auda, 2008). 
Itq means ‘to be freed from slavery’, which contrasts with the standard notion of 
freedom as it is understood today. ‘Freedom’ (Hurriyah) is a newly introduced 
purpose in the Islamic law literature. Ibn Ashur has, excitingly, accredited his 
reliance on the term Hurriyah to the literature regarding the French revolution, which 
was translated into Arabic in the 19th century (El-Mesawi, 2001). 
 
Similarly, Mohammad Al-Ghazaly has argued that we should benefit from the earlier 
fourteen centuries of Islamic traditions. Consequently, he included both justice and 
freedom in the necessity level of Maqasid (Attia, 2001, p. 183). Moreover, following 
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his survey of the Quran, Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, a contemporary Islamic scholar, 
included the following global Maqasid: “true faith preservation, preserving human 
dignity and rights, inviting people to worship God, soul purification, reinstating moral 
values, strengthening families’ relations, fair treatment of women, strengthening the 
Islamic nation and seeking global cooperation” (Al-Qaradhawi, 1999, p 3). Al-
Qaradhawi illustrates that it is wise to suggest a theory in global Maqasid only after 
developing a good level of knowledge of the script’s details (ibid). Taha Al-Alwani 
also surveyed the Quran with the purpose of ascertaining its highest and most 
predominant Maqasid. He came up with the following Maqasid: the oneness of God, 
soul purification, and building civilisation on earth (Al-Alwani, 2001). 
 
2.7. Application of Islamic Theories 
Having discussed the significance of both the natural law theory and Maqasid Al 
Sharia theory in the development of Islamic law rules, it is now important to address 
the contentious issue of interest in light of these theories. The provision of interest 
has been the cornerstone upon which most international awards were rejected in 
the KSA. Therefore, it is important to define the scope of interest and whether or 
not it is similar to Riba. Riba is an Arabic word meaning increase or growth and is 
referred to in English as interest in spite of their differences (El-Gamal, 2011). The 
more accurate translation of Riba is Usury, which refers to an agreed increase in 
the repayment of debt imposed by the lender on the debtor for the sake of profit. It 
should be noted that interest encompasses different forms of compensations; for 
example, damages for any incurred loss or for the loss of profit (Noorzoy, 1982). 
This concept is discussed in more detail herein. 
 
2.7.1.  Riba 
Both the Quran and Sunnah Prohibit all forms of Riba due to the destructive impact 
it has on communities. This is evident from the following verses: “You who believe, 
do not consume usurious interest, doubled and redoubled. Be mindful of God so 
that you may prosper” (Chapter 3, verse 130). “Whatever you lend out in Usury to 
gain value through other people’s wealth will not increase in God’s eyes, but 
whatever you give in charity, in your desire for God’s approval, will earn multiple 
rewards” (Chapter 30, verse 39). “Allah destroys Usury and gives increase for 
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charities” (Chapter 2, verse 276). A number of other Quranic verses and Hadiths 
also warn believers to avoid Riba and instead encourages them to give charity, 
which reflects the converse influence of Riba and Charity on communities. While 
the former enables wealthy people to exploit the less fortunate, the latter 
encourages the wealthy to give to the poor for the purpose of increasing social 
justice within communities (Ali, 2016). This restriction on Islamic commerce 
prevents the wealthy from placing excessive burdens on vulnerable community 
members. Thus, restriction was viewed by Ali as “a logical outcome of the Qur’anic 
ethos of social justice” (Ibid, p 121). 
 
Although there is a complete Ijma between all scholars, and especially schools of 
jurisprudence, that Riba is forbidden, there is nevertheless a lack of consensus on 
what constitutes Riba (Noorzoy, 1982). In fact, the uncertainty in the scope of Riba 
was first uncovered in the early years that followed the passing of the prophet 
Mohammed PBUH. This was evidenced in Omar Bin Al Khattab’s statement that 
“The last verse to be revealed was on Riba and the Prophet, peace be upon him, 
passed away without explaining it to us; so give up not only Riba but Ribah [i.e. 
whatever is doubtful].” (Asad, 1980, p 622). This shows that there is a controversy 
over the definition of Riba rather than the legality of Riba, which has to be 
addressed. The ascertainment of what form Riba takes had the power to 
significantly develop the practice of Islamic finance in Muslim states and 
consequently their enforcement of foreign awards. 
 
The ascertainment of Riba could be reached by utilising the above theories of 
Islamic law. Natural law theory would help refer the concept of Riba to its original 
practice, enabling Islamic jurists to understand the rationale behind such prohibition 
and determine which of the modern practices fall under its scope. Prior to the 
establishment of Riba, pre-Islamic Arabs used to double the original sum of debt if 
a debtor failed to pay, doubling it again should they fail to pay the originally doubled 
sum. This practice was not accepted as a fair transaction by Islam, since Islam, 
while encouraging profiting from trade, discourages profiteering through it (Ali, 
2016). Therefore, it is important to contextualise the prohibition of Riba and 
distinguish it from legitimate trade profits. This is because “Not all interest is the 
prohibited Riba ...[and] Not all Riba is interest” (El-Gamal, 2001, p 3). 
Understanding such distinction and applying it to modern day commercial 
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transactions is likely to increase the effectiveness of Islamic finance as well as the 
amount of enforced awards in Muslim states. 
 
Muslim jurists should also rely on the theory of Maqasid Al Sharia in order to 
ascertain the scope of Riba. They should do this by considering the rationale behind 
the prohibition of Riba and subsequently applying it to modern financial practices in 
term of Masalih and Mafasid (Kahf, 2006). Riba was prohibited because it: 
“reinforces the tendency for wealth to accumulate in the hands of a 
few, and thereby diminishes man's concern for his fellow man. (B) 
Islam does not allow gain from financial activity unless the 
beneficiary is also subject to the risk of potential loss; the legal 
guarantee of at least nominal interest would be viewed as 
guaranteed gain. (C) Islam regards the accumulation of wealth 
through interest as selfish compared with accumulation through hard 
work and personal activity” (Gotanda, 1996, p 47).  
A reliance on such rationale would enable Islamic Jurists to clearly define the scope 
of Riba. It would also enable them to categorise the current practices of modern 
commerce into those that fall within such scope and those that do not. Thereby 
creating a more reliable and consistent framework of Islamic finance, which Muslim 
states would feel encouraged to adopt and enforce within their legal jurisdictions.  
 
2.7.1.1. Compensation for Lost of Future Profit 
One of the areas that differentiates between interest and Usury is the compensation 
for loss of profit that would have been attained had the parties fulfilled their 
contractual obligations. In this regard, there are two types of future profits: definite 
future profit and potential future profit. Definite future profit is what the innocent 
party has lost due to the other party’s breach of contract or other harmful actions 
(Zaraq and Elgari, 1991). Potential future profit, on the other hand, is mostly 
concerned with one party losing a real opportunity as a result of another’s actions, 
which would have resulted either in obtaining profit or avoiding losses (Awni, 2007).  
This dynamic can be illustrated thus: if someone’s actions resulted in a horse dying 
before it participated in a global competition in which the horse had a real 
opportunity of winning. In this case, the party would not be compensated for 
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whatever potential profit he would have had if the horse had participated because 
it is not a definite profit, but rather mere speculation as to the potential of profit, a 
circumstance that Islamic law does not allow compensation for. However, the 
horse’s owner would be compensated for the lost opportunity itself because the 
opportunity is definitive and, as such, it has to be compensated for (Alshagawi, 
2010).  
 
In this regard, in the KSA, Diwan Almazalim held in decision no: (893/S/6. 2008) 
that the Diwan takes into account only the claimant’s incurred loss and definitive 
future profit, but not the potential one. Therefore, any damages issued must be 
measured by the definitive reality and not by speculative scenarios that may or may 
not happen. The Diwan reached similar decisions in two other cases involving the 
closing of someone’s business and a wrongful imprisonment (Decision 
no:3747/2/G/2008, Decision no: 524/1/G/2006).  
 
The Egyptian court of appeal adopted a more flexible approach in decision no: 
4797/ 64/ G/ 2007, which states that the claimant is to be compensated for both the 
incurred damages and the loss of profit. It further defined the loss of profit as what 
the innocent party hoped to gain providing that such hope is based on reasonable 
grounds, since the lost profit is potential but the loss of opportunity is definitive.  
What is considered to be reasonable ground may differ between judges and this 
court’s decision may motivate other judges to accept potential profits providing that 
their decision is based on reasonable grounds. The flexibility in the Egyptian court 
of appeal’s view may be attributable to the judge’s referral to Egyptian civil law in 
his judgments, rather than the provisions of Islamic law. Although the Egyptian law 
relies on Sharia as its most supreme source, it also relies on other sources that 
may contradict with some Islamic law provisions. 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that the current interpretations of Islamic law 
provisions compensate for any definitive future loss, but will not compensate for 
any potential loss that avoids being in gharar. This area needs to be revisited by 
Islamic scholars so they may clearly define what encompasses definitive future 
loss. This could be done by considering the above Islamic theories and applying 
them to this subject matter. It could be argued that the presence of a strong 
possibility of the attainment of profit is enough to determine the concept of definitive 
loss over potential loss. Looking back at the earlier example of a horse missing an 
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opportunity to participate in a global competition, if this horse had been the 
champion of this competition for several years and in good health, the profits 
generated for the owner from this competition should be considered more than just 
potential. 
 
2.7.1.2. Compensation for the Time Value of Money 
The concept of inflation or the time value of money is a very sensitive topic to 
discuss. This is particularly true in the KSA because it shares similarities with Usury 
or Riba (Al-Zuhayli, 2008). It is, nevertheless, a clear example of the small lines that 
differentiate Usury from interest in as far as contracts of sale are concerned. This 
concept is problematic because it is calculated on the basis of the time value of 
money in a similar way to that of Usury (Khir and Fairooz, 2013). Therefore, there 
was a controversy of opinions as to the legitimacy of this concept in Islamic law. 
Some scholars argue that compensation for inflation is not legitimate in Islamic law 
due to it being recognised by conventional economies as a financial concept that is 
relied upon to justify Usury (Al-Mawdudi, 1958). Others have argued against this 
attitude, claiming that it is a recognised concept in Islamic law because of its 
significance in ensuring justice between contracting parties. In this regard, Mr Khan 
states:  
“Islam has nothing against having a positive time preference. 
However, it is more reasonable to think of the time preference as a 
function of time rather than treating it as fixed and independent of 
the time-frame under consideration. There is also nothing against 
realising time value of money as long as it is not claimed as a 
predetermined value” (Khan, 1991, p44). 
 
Therefore, it could be concluded that compensating for inflation in commercial 
contracts is legitimate as long as it does not involve a loan or a pre-agreed 
arrangement for such compensation.  This view is supported by Diwan Al mazalim 
in the KSA who stated:  
“due to a defendant's failure to allow the contractor to initiate the 
required work, the plaintiff would be compensated for the increase 
in the market value of materials due to inflation. The conduct of the 
defendant led to the extension of the contract to take into account 
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the rate of inflation. An increase in the market value of materials and 
wages would have been avoided if the defendant had performed the 
contractual obligation, as intended at the signing of the contract” (No. 
392/ 1979). 
The KSA position in this regard is clear when the case involves a breach of contract, 
but it is nevertheless unclear when it comes to loans. This is particularly evident in 
the KSA bank’s continuous charge of additional payments for loans, where such 
loans are disputed and enforced by the committee of banking disputes (See 
Chapter 3). The KSA’s lack of consistency in its view of the concept of the time 
value of money should be considered by its Council of Senior Scholars. This council 
could subsequently rely on the above theories to investigate the Sharia views in 
this regard and whether or not loans should be treated the same as those of 
contractual arrangements. 
 
2.7.1.3. Compensation Due to Procrastination 
Another important area that could be confused with Usury is the innocent party’s 
claim of being compensated for the other party’s procrastination in spite of being 
able to pay in due course. This act of procrastination is forbidden in Islam due to 
the harm it inflicts on other people’s properties, as well as any other injustices that 
it may cause (Ahmed, 2015). The Prophet PBUH stated that “Procrastination 
(delay) in repaying debts by a wealthy person is injustice” (Al-Bukhaari, 1994, No: 
2400). Since injustices are forbidden in Islam, there must be a way of compensating 
the innocent party for any incurred loss. In this regard, Shaikh Mustafa Alzarga 
suggested that “this compensation for procrastination is deserved as long as the 
debtor has no legitimate reason for withholding the repayment” (Alzarga, 1985, p 
95). He further described the procrastinator as an “oppressor” of someone else’s 
property and that expressed oppression is not acceptable in Islam (Ibid). Shaikh 
Abdullah Almanee’ has also acknowledged the legitimacy of compensating the 
innocent party for procrastination, providing that “the procrastination is proven in 
addition to proofing the procrastinator’s ability to repay” (Almanee’, 1996, p 401).  
  
In spite of the above-described acceptance of compensation for procrastination, the 
matter is still subject to conflicting opinions. Since some scholars believe that 
compensation should be limited to any cost incurred by the creditor in his pursuit of 
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obtaining his debts. This includes any travel costs, attorney fees or any similar fees 
that directly result from the procrastination (Al Amin, 1985, Shaa’ban, 1988). Other 
than this, the creditor should not be compensated any extra money because this 
would be some sort of Usury (ibid). In addition, a consensus was reached between 
contemporary scholars in the prohibition of predetermined agreements on the 
compensation for any future procrastination (Ghaith, 2010). This is because such 
agreements rely on the same foundations as Usury in terms of determining the 
percentage of compensation and the method of its calculation and this is prohibited 
in Islam (Ahmed, 2015). Therefore, it is unclear how the innocent party is to be 
compensated and on what basis such compensation should be calculated. This 
area needs to be revisited by Islamic scholars in order to clearly define the process 
of compensation for the innocent party for the procrastination of the debtor; the 
exact form the compensation would take also needs to be addressed. These 
scholars could rely on Magaisid Al sharia imperative stand towards the protection 
of people’s property as the basis for studying such subject matter. 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
It is obvious from the issues presented in this chapter that there are sufficient 
dynamism and autonomy within Sharia to introduce amendments and 
reconsiderations to Fiqh rules which will reflect better commercial transactions and 
cultural positions. In the event of legal principles and methodology being 
insufficient, the sanctity of contractual obligations, such as treaties within Sharia, 
make it more likely that amendments will be made to Islamic law (Kutty, 2006). This 
chapter highlighted the variety of interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence, as 
demonstrated by the various schools of thought, where these schools of thought 
are viewed by Muslim scholars to be a mercy from God "because these 
disagreements injected Islamic laws with the degree of flexibility necessary for a 
religion which proclaimed itself suitable for all times, all people and all societies” 
(Al-Hibri, 1979 p 1). It is unrealistic to assume that ICA rules will be entirely 
consistent with Sharia interpretations. However, when considering Sharia’s 
inherent flexibility, it is also impractical to assume that the rules and practices of 
ICA will still have legitimacy in Muslim states if the principles and methodologies of 
Sharia are completely disregarded (Kutty, 2006).   
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This chapter also considered natural law theory from an Islamic perspective. The 
different views of Islamic natural law theory and their resultant natural law models 
were extensively discussed. Therefore, in spite of Islamic jurists’ competing 
theological arguments for both models of Islamic natural law, they all uphold the 
natural law philosophy of merging facts and values in nature. In addition, although 
the jurists of natural law permit rational deliberations, they nevertheless restrict the 
scope of such deliberations by developing particular analytical methods such as the 
legal reasoning of Maqasid Al-Sharia. This has led to the discussion of the theory 
of Maqasid Al-Sharia and the views taken of it by different scholars. In addition, it 
shows the importance of Maqasid in determining Islamic rulings and in developing 
Islamic jurisprudence. Hence, there is considerable need for Islamic law to be 
reformed from within for the purpose of addressing contemporary norms, 
transactions, and institutions (El Fadl, 2014). There is, equally, a need to deal with 


























After assessing the main theories and sources of Sharia, it is now imperative to 
discuss its influence on the legal system of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), 
which relies on traditionalist Islamic views to form the basis of its legal system. 
Sources of Sharia are considered to be the most authoritative legal sources in the 
KSA and they represent its public policy. Furthermore, the KSA has experienced a 
number of changes since oil became a very important factor in the world’s economy. 
Such changes influenced its legal system leading to modifications in the legal 
structure of the KSA. It also led to the issuance of many regulations and laws, in 
addition to the creation of several new courts and committees to deal with matters 
arising from such changes (Alabdullah, 2016). This chapter begins by providing an 
overview of the KSA legal system and the structure of its courts. To this end, it will 
provide an overview of authorities who are competent to review arbitral disputes. 
These include the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes (CSBD), 
which hears claims involving banking disputes, as well as the Diwan Al mazalim, 
which hears commercial disputes and reviews foreign decisions. This chapter then 
considers the main sources of the KSA’s legal system and the extent of their 
application. Lastly, it will consider the influence of foreign legal systems on the 
development of KSA legal practice. 
 
3.2. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
The Arabian Peninsula, the original homeland of the Arabs and Islam, is largely 
occupied by the KSA, with a population of 31,015,999 (Central Department of 
Statistics, 2015). King Abdulaziz Al Saud united the KSA in 1932 and then declared 
himself its absolute monarch, ending a long series of clashes between different 
tribes and territories of the Arabian Peninsula (Faisal, 2002). He began the building 
process of the nation with the aim of meeting the needs and aspirations of the 
country’s citizens, who hoped for a more civilised and developed state. This 
significant initiative joined all of the KSA’s nationals under a single governing 
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system that helped to create a unified sovereign state (Faisal, 2002). Since then, 
the government of the KSA has gradually been transformed from a humble 
governing body to a number of developed institutions that helps the executive 
authority to manage the affairs of the country. He then began establishing an 
Islamic based governance structure in accordance with the principles of Sharia 
(ibid). The cultural identities of KSA nationals are mainly informed by those of Islam 
and Arab cultural norms, connecting them to millions of people outside the country’s 
borders (Al Farsi, 1986). The KSA culture is intensely influenced by the Islamic 
religion, society’s customs and traditions, and family and tribal orientations (ibid). 
These practices and customs go back thousands of years, and were inherited from 
earlier traditions of their ancestors (Tripp & North, 2003). Nevertheless, as it 
developed from an undeveloped society of nomads to become a rich oil-producing 
country (post-oil-boom in the 1970s) the KSA’s culture has been characterised by 
dramatic transformations, (Tripp & North, 2003). 
 
3.3. Constitutional Developments 
Five years before uniting the whole Kingdom, King Abdulaziz established Makkah’s 
Consultative Council in 1925 to formulate the basis of a constitution. It had 
extensive powers and was charged with managing most of the country’s 
institutional affairs (AI-Fahad, 2005). A year later, the King approved a 
comprehensive body of law for the Hejaz province called the Basic Directives. 
These directives were, at the time, consistent with the developed world’s 
constitutions and were considered as the foundation on which other directives could 
be developed (Ibid). Such directives were divided into nine parts and 79 provisions, 
which concerned major constitutional matters including the government system, 
administrative roles, the Kingdom of the Hejaz affairs, and the Department of 
Accounting (AI-Fahad, 2005). 
 
The Inspection and Reform Commission, which was in charge of constantly 
assessing the country’s governance structure, was formed in 1927 with the role of 
providing recommendations on a number of reforms for the administration. The 
Commission’s recommendations led to the creation of the Consultative Council 
Decree, which received approval in July of the same year (Al Kahtani, 2004). In 
response to the complications of that era, the recommendations of the Commission 
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for the Establishment of the Council of Directors were implemented at the beginning 
of 1932. The Council of Directors worked for more than two decades while limited 
to the Hejaz province, but this changed when the Council of Ministers was created 
in 1953 who possessed the power to cover all parts of the KSA (Ibid). 
 
In the 1930s, oil was discovered in the Kingdom, which resulted in growing 
complications in governmental matters and made the previous administration 
structure inadequate (Richard, 1984). Therefore, in order to guarantee the future 
efficiency of the administrative organisation, a number of ministries were 
established. These included, in 1930, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Finance 
Ministry in 1932, the Defence Ministry in 1944, and the Ministries of Internal Affairs 
and Communications in 1953. The KSA also successfully created diplomatic 
relations based on political representation by appointing ambassadors (Faisal, 
2002). 
 
In the 1980s, the Council of Ministers formulated the Kingdom’s policies on the 
economy, education, social welfare and a large number of other public issues. The 
Municipal Affairs Ministry was established in 1975, after which there was a 
declaration for the issuance of a specific law for such affairs that would lead to the 
creation of municipal councils and encourage decentralisation (Ansari, 2015). This 
shift towards decentralisation empowered local councils to regulate themselves 
while still being under the supervision of the government. The devolution of powers 
eased the burden on the government since most of its focus at the time was devoted 
towards developing the country’s regulations. Between 1975 and 1982 an expert, 
high-level Committee (including senior officials chaired by Prince Naief Bin 
Abdulaziz) drafted the KSA’s most important regulations (Faisal, 2010). At the 
beginning of March 1992, these drafts were approved by Royal Decree and 
published in the official Gazette (Royal Decrees No. A/90-92, UM Al-Qura Gazette, 
1992): 
 The Basic Law; 
 The Shura Law; 
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3.3.1. The Basic Law  
This regulation (the Basic Law), is considered to be the most significant 
constitutional legislation issued to date by the KSA. It declares the Quran and 
Sunnah to be the Constitution of the KSA (Article 1). Sharia is considered by Article 
7 to form the foundation of the KSA and, in the same article, the monarch’s power 
is considered to be derived from Sharia. This is because the monarch has been 
appointed through Bay’ah (pledge of allegiance) from the Bay’ah council members 
and subsequently from all the KSA citizens.  
 
The Bay’ah concept is derived from the Muslim practices in the eras that followed 
the death of prophet Mohammed, PBUH. The Basic Law also confirms the 
government’s functions and aims are to ensure that Sharia is fully protected and 
enforced (Article 23). The Basic Law is governed by Sharia when describing the 
identity, aim, and role of the government; the relationship between the monarch and 
the citizens is, similarly, founded on Shura (Consultation) (Al-Muhanna, 2009). This 
Shura is encouraged by the holy Quran, which states “consult them in the matter 
and when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah loves those who 
rely [upon Him]” (Chapter 3, verse 159). Furthermore, in another verse, it is stated: 
“And those who have responded to their lord and established prayer and whose 
affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves, and from what We have 
provided them, they spend” (Chapter 42, verse 38). However, these verses show 
that the outcome of the Shura’s is not meant to be compulsory but rather advisory 
since the Prophet was asked to consult and then make the decision in his own (Ali, 
2016). However, this might represent a special case, since the Prophet is unlike 
any other person and his ability to ascertain what is right no longer exists.  
 
It is, nevertheless, worrying that there is no evidence on how Shura is to be applied 
in Islamic constitutionalism (ibid). Therefore, it has been suggested that Shura 
should be exercised by the whole public, rather than by selected scholars and 
should, therefore, also form the basis of institutionalising the constitutional 
principles of Islamic law (Hosen, 2007).  
 
The significance of the Basic Law enactment lies in its similarity to other state 
constitutions in terms of content. It has nine chapters: governance law, general 
principle, national social values, principles of economy, privileges and 
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responsibilities, authorities of the state, financial matters, and institutional audit. The 
Basic Law stresses the monarchical system of the state (Articles 5 and 13) and 
emphasises several principles of governance (Articles 8 and 9). It defines each 
branch of the state comprehensively, and interactions between the judiciary, 
executive and legislature are also defined in Article 44. The Basic Law, in the same 
way as all other laws in this field, has failed to clearly separate these various 
powers, particularly with respect to executive and legislative powers (Gregory, 
1994). The monarch, the Ministers’ Council, Ministries, and other independent and 
partly independent public departments are all part of the executive, while the 
legislative power is exercised by the monarch, the Ministers’ Council and the Shura 
Council (Articles 44, 67, 70). Institutions of the judiciary can be divided into three 
branches: Sharia courts, Diwan Al mazalim, and other judicial Committees. The role 
and hierarchy of these institutions will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
The enactment of the Basic Law theoretically enlarged the scope of democratic 
participation in decision-making and checks and balances in the affairs of the state. 
For instance, people are now able to participate in the management of the Municipal 
Council (MC) by selecting half its members in elections held every four years (Saudi 
National Portal, 2016). The introduction of The Basic Law, alongside other 
constitutional documents, was followed by a number of Royal orders which modified 
them.  Those major reforms and subsequent amendments increased citizens’ 
participation in the conduct of public affairs and established civil and political rights 
in governance (Ansary, 2015). The Basic Law is the largest constitutional reform 
since the establishment of the KSA. It provides a codified document that governs 
both citizens and monarch, as well as constitutional protection for the people’s basic 
rights of education, housing, and safety. Although The Basic Law is silent on some 
rights, this does not nullify all of the merits the introduction of such enactments 
produces. While the above represented a significant step towards the codification 
of the KSA’s constitution, it is still not close to the globally practised standards of 
civil and political rights and was also long overdue. Ever since King Abdulaziz united 
the country in the 1930s, a promise had been made for the promulgation of laws 
that would enable citizens’ participation in government and allow public evaluation 
and criticism of state decisions. The final product is disappointing and falls well 
short of expectations (AI-Fahad, 2005). 
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It is reasonable to have high expectations regarding a law, the adoption of which 
was awaited for six decades and remained for half of that period in the drafting 
stage. However, these expectations were not satisfied as the act failed to represent 
any significant sign of ushering in a new age of constitutionalism, nor did it present 
any considerable amendments or modernisations in the structures and practices of 
the state (AI-Fahad, 2005). Apart from it eventually being issued, it is argued that 
there is little significance in this document at all (AI-Fahad, 2005). If anything, it is 
a prism through which the deterioration of Saudi governance can be observed over 
the same period (ibid). Early state practices permitted a certain level of participation 
in political, transparency and accountability affairs. On the contrary, this law 
regulates exclusion from political participation. This lack of participation in the 
country’s politics on the part of citizens, while unfortunate in a number of regards 
is, however, comprehensible because the oil boom permitted the state a level of 
independence from citizens that was unimaginable several decades ago (AI-Fahad, 
2005). 
 
The law was written in secret and the names of Drafting Committee members were 
only publicly known after its enactment (Aba Namy, 1993). Both public debate and 
the normal processes of consultation through state agencies was absent (AI-Fahad, 
2005). The procedure that was followed in the creation of the document seemed to 
reflect the will of the King, which was unsurprising since the constitutional 
Committee members were not chosen following any law or standard, but rather 
appointed by the King himself. This constitutional document was created without 
any allowance made for the basis of its authority in popular sovereignty. This meant 
that no popular ratification was required, whether in the form of constituency’s 
representatives or wide referendum. Therefore, it is often argued that the 
constitution appeared only to reflect the wishes of the Royal family (ibid). 
 
With regard to the modern notion of rights, the new law reflects various standing 
points; for example, it defends private and economic rights, but is seen as contrary 
to public rights. This is apparently in the law which provides for the improvement of 
standards of living for citizens through the creation of employment opportunities, 
the promotion of science, the accessibility of free health and educational services 
and the encouragement of environmental protection (Articles 27 to 32). However, it 
does not offer much protection in the public sphere, since it fails to include certain 
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rights that are incorporated into most states constitutions (AI-Fahad, 2005). 
Although human rights protections were recognised by this law, it is exclusive to 
those living within Sharia principles (Article 26). Certain rights are entirely absent, 
such as the right to religious freedom, while others are tightly restricted, such as 
freedom of expression (Article 39). The right of association is unsurprisingly absent, 
since the KSA forbids political movements and groups, which are looked upon only 
with suspicion (Tarazi, 1993). 
 
Finally, this constitutional document failed to create any substantive amendments 
to the law of succession in the KSA. The 1992 Act, for the first time, codifies that 
succession is limited to male descendants of King Abdulaziz and maintains that the 
KSA ruler retains the power to select or dismiss his successor (Article 5). Although 
this power is theoretically efficient and clear, it is problematic from a practical 
perspective because there is no historical precedent for any Saudi King removing 
his successor up until 2015. A successor has always been appointed as soon as a 
new King has been put in place and this appointed successor has always become 
the monarch of the KSA on either the previous King’s death or his serious illness, 
as was the case with King Saud (AI-Fahad, 2005). However, in 2015 and 2017, 
King Salman Bin Abdulaziz exercised his constitutional powers and changed two of 
his crown princes in an attempt to allow a younger generation of the ruling family to 
have their say in the country’s governance (Royal order No: A 255, 2017). This was 
additionally supplemented by a number of internal changes that empowered the 
younger generation of Royals to manage a number of the KSA’s provinces.  
 
3.3.2. The Shura Council 
The Shura Council undertakes a consultative role in the legislative process of KSA 
issued regulations alongside the King and the Council of Ministers (Article 67, the 
Basic Law of 1992). This council has 150 members, appointed by the King for a 
term of four years. Most of the councils’ members have their term extended for a 
further four years.  Until 2013, it only consisted of male Saudi nationals and women 
had no representation in this public forum. However, the situation changed in 2013 
when King Abdullah appointed, for the first time, 30 female Shura members (The 




The Shura Council holds regular monthly meetings and, for meetings to proceed, 
two-thirds of its members in addition to the speaker, or his deputy, are required to 
be in attendance, as per article 16 of the Shura Council law. This council has limited 
powers for expressing opinions on sensitive government affairs such as budget 
management and commercial relations with foreign states, with most of its 
deliberations relating to limited aspects of the state’s economic, legal and public 
welfare (Article 15, Shura Council law).  The Shura Council may also issue 
resolutions and submit them to the King who decides which of these resolutions 
gets transferred to the cabinet for deliberation and approval. Resolutions will only 
have legal effect after receiving the King’s approval, as per article 17 of the Shura 
Council law.  One of the most relevant and important regulations in relation to the 
scope of this research are the detailed deliberations in the Shura Council of the 
2012 SAR. During these deliberations, members of the Shura requested expert 
opinions on the subject; the minister of justice also attended one of these 
discussions and answered questions and concerns raised by Shura members 
(Alalshaikh, 2017).  
 
Although this council is thought to be similar to parliaments in the developed world, 
it is, in fact, a body chosen by the executive authority and its resolutions are also 
approved by such authority. Therefore, it could be argued that the Shura Council is 
not actually a public forum, but one of the consultative departments of the executive 
authority. This fact is evidenced in its name i.e., “Shura” which means consultation. 
The author believes that, whilst the Shura Council consists of well qualified Saudi 
nationals, their limited decision-making powers both undermines them and limits 
their effectiveness. 
 
3.3.3. The Court System 
The 1975 judicial system of the KSA included a Supreme Council, courts of first 
instance and appeal courts. It also had a number of administrative committees that 
decided on a variety of commercial, civil and administrative cases. The Royal 
Decree under which each committee was established determined its judicial 
jurisdiction (Ansary, 2015). In October 2007, Royal Decrees were issued approving 
 67 
amendments to that system. This resulted in the creation of the High Court, which 
is empowered by the Supreme Council’s role as the KSA’s highest court.  
 
Another important amendment was the creation of courts of appeal in all Saudi 
provinces. The Decree additionally introduced specialist courts for hearing criminal, 
commercial, or labour disputes across different regions and judicial centres (Royal 
Decree No M/78, 2007). A number of these courts are currently considering 
disputes that were previously considered by special administrative committees 
(Ansary, 2015). The 2007 amendments have largely altered the KSA’s judicial 
structure, due to the historical introduction of specialised courts in the judicial 
system of the KSA. Before the 2007 law, judges decided criminal matters and, for 
a short while after, heard claims for inheritance disputes. This old practice is 
indicative of a legal system that is unreliable with respect to settling large, 
complicated commercial disputes due, in part, to a lack of specialisation (Al-Jarbou, 




Figure 2: Structure of the Saudi judicial system. Adopted from Ansary (2015) 
 
To maintain an efficient judicial system in the KSA, and overcome the barriers that 
judges and litigants were facing, the Judiciary law of 1975 was annulled in 2007 by 
Royal Decree and initiatives were taken for the creation of a reliable judicial system 
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equivalent to the that of other developed nations. The Decree changed certain 
statutes that were applicable for more than three decades in general courts and 
more than two decades in the case of Diwan Al mazalim (Royal Decree No M/78, 
2007). A budget of seven billion Saudi riyals6 was allocated to restructuring the 
judicial system in order to develop and upgrade the judiciary as a whole. This 
budget was utilised for the building and renovating of courts facilities and for the 
training of judges. The KSA’s judicial system is currently working through a period 
of transition, during which the 2007 judicial amendments will be implemented 
(Implementation Mechanism Decree, 2007). 
 
3.3.4. Enforcement Courts 
Following the discussion of the impact of the Judiciary law of 2007 on the ordering 
and hierarchy of courts, it is now important to consider the establishment of 
enforcement courts. Article 19 of the judiciary law stipulates that the general courts 
must have specialised circuits of enforcement consisting of one- or three-judges’ 
boards, to be decided by the Supreme Judicial Council. This 2007 Regulation 
replaced the 1982 system of enforcement before Diwan Al mazalim and delegated 
enforcement power to enforcement judges (Royal Decree No M/78, 2007). Under 
article 19 of the 2007 Judiciary law, more than 160 enforcement circuits have been 
set up to provide effect to court rulings and accelerate their enforcement (Al-Rashid 
2014).  
 
The Supreme Council is empowered by the judiciary law to create specialised 
courts for approval by the King (Article 9). The same judiciary law states that the 
Supreme Judicial Council can, when needed, create specialised enforcement 
courts (Article 8(3)). In response to the substantial caseload, a Royal Decree for 
the creation of these courts was issued. Following this Royal order, a resolution 
was adopted on August 27, 2014 by the Supreme Judicial Council to create 
specialised enforcement courts as the first phase of enforcement (Resolution No. 
530 - 4 – 34). These courts execute, in a speedy manner, judgments delivered by 
other courts, thus assisting in safeguarding people's interests and avoiding delays 
(Arab News, 2014).  
 
                                                 
6 US$ 1.8 billion. 
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The 2007 Law identifies enforcement judges as “The chief justices and judges of 
enforcement circuits, enforcement court judges, or judges of single-judge courts 
(Article 3).” Their role is the enforcement or supervision of all judgments and awards 
enforcement within the KSA, excluding rulings and decisions coming from 
administrative or criminal disputes (Al-Jarbou, 2007). The judge is obliged to 
conform with provisions of procedural law of the Sharia courts, except where the 
2013 SER instructs otherwise (Article 3). The enforcement judge may seek help 
from the Internal Ministry for the purpose of imposing or lifting travel bans, or 
ordering detention and release. His decisions are final, except those on issues and 
proceedings of insolvency, in which case his decision could be appealed and the 
appeal decision will be final (Article 6). The finding is suspended pending the 
outcome of the appeal (Article 10).  
 
Enforcement courts have jurisdiction to enforce all decisions seeking enforcement 
in the KSA including those of foreign awards and judgments. Prior to the 2014 
resolution, the enforcement of foreign decisions rested within the jurisdiction of 
Diwan Al mazalim (Jones and Day, 2013). This process, when it was assigned to 
the Diwan, was long and exhausting (Al-Amr and Al-Ayoni 2013). Issuance of the 
2013 SER, alongside the establishment of the enforcement courts, has made a 
remarkably positive impact on the laws of the KSA, upgrading them to a higher 
standard. They have also facilitated flexibility in arbitral awards enforcement 
through establishing explicit jurisdiction and procedures for dealing with such 
enforcement (Jones and Day, 2013). This 2013 SER and the 2014 resolution 
appear to have repaired the lack of confidence in those commercial dealings 
requiring prompt dispute resolution through orders of enforcement. In 2015, the 
KSA enforcement courts settled almost 7,946 disputes and allowed for the recovery 
of more than ten billion Saudi riyals from sellers and other concerned parties (The 
Ministry of Justice, 2016).  
 
3.3.5. The Board of Grievances System (Diwan Al mazalim) 
A Royal Decree was issued in 2007 to approve amendments to the Diwan Al 
mazalim system in the KSA (Royal Decree No M/78, 2007). The new structure of 
Diwan’s administrative courts remain similar to those of the Sharia courts. The 2007 
law stipulates that such Diwan is to be situated in Riyadh and considered as an 
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independent entity accountable directly to the King (ibid). The 2013 Diwan Al 
mazalim procedural law provides in Article 1 that: “[t]he Board of Grievances courts 
shall, in the cases filed therewith, apply the rules of the Islamic Sharia in accordance 
with the Quran, the Sunnah and laws not conflicting with the present law, and their 
proceedings shall comply with the provisions thereof.” 
 
 
Figure 3: Structure of the Diwan Al mazalim. Adopted from Ansary (2015) 
 
Diwan Al mazalim includes a ministry-ranked President, with one or more Vice 
Presidents and their assistants in addition to other judges (law of Procedure 2013, 
Article 2). An Administrative Judicial Council was also created by the 2007 law to 
include the President of the Diwan and High Administrative Court Chief Justice in 
addition to the Diwan’s Senior Vice-President, and four judges, all assigned by the 
monarch (Article 4). This Administrative Judicial Council has a number of 
administrative jobs which are undertaken in their twice-monthly meetings. These 
meetings are valid only if a minimum of five members are present and decisions 
are taken by majority vote (Article 6). The council has created a number of 
committees such as the Jurisdictional Dispute Committee (Article 15); the 
Committee for Judicial Discipline; and the Judicial Inspection Department (Articles 
16-24). 
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3.3.5.1. High Administrative Court (HAC) 
The 2007 law created the HAC, which includes the ministerial rank Chief Justice 
selected by the monarch and an adequate number of judges of certain rank that 
are also chosen by the monarch as recommended by the Administrative Judicial 
Council (Article 10). The HAC performs its functions via specialised circuits 
consisting of three-judge panels. It is empowered by the 2007 law to review rulings 
made by the Administrative Appeal Court when the appeal is based on certain 
grounds, such as the court’s incompetence and Sharia provision violation. 
 
3.3.5.2. Administrative Courts of Appeal 
The 2007 law contains provisions for a minimum of one Administrative Court of 
Appeal working through special circuits and comprising of a three-judge panel. This 
court hears appealable judgments from the lower administrative courts (Articles 8 
and 12). Diwan Al mazalim has established four such courts in Riyadh, Aseer, the 
Eastern Province, and Makkah, all of which are empowered to hear appeals from 
all of the KSA provinces (Ansary 2015). 
 
3.3.5.3. Administrative Courts 
The 2007 law provides for the creation of one or more administrative courts. These 
courts operate via special circuits including a panel of one- or three judges (Article 
8). These courts are empowered to hear claims such as tort cases against decisions 
or actions made by administrative authorities, cases linked to contracts to which the 
other party is an administrative authority, a competent authority filing disciplinary 
claims, other administrative cases, and the enforcement of foreign judgments and 
arbitral award requests (Article 13). 
 
Consequently, it is clear that under the 2007 law, Diwan Al mazalim continues to 
consider administrative disputes that involve a government agency. The old law of 
Diwan Al mazalim, was approved in 1982 and provided the Diwan with the 
jurisdiction to consider crimes related to forgery, bribery, misuse of official effects, 
misuse of power in criminal proceedings, or human rights violations (Diwan Al 
mazalim law, 1982). The 2007 law removed their authority over criminal offences, 
which was given by the 1982 law to the present Ordinary Court System. 
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Additionally, Diwan Al mazalim has no jurisdiction to consider claims related to 
sovereign acts, objections against rulings made by normal courts in their designed 
jurisdictions, judgments made by either the Administrative Judicial Council or the 
Supreme Judicial Council (Article 14). Diwan Al mazalim is still regarded as having 
jurisdiction over supervising award proceedings within the KSA. Prior to the 2013 
SER that established the enforcement court in Saudi Arabia, the Diwan had the 
jurisdiction to enforce both national and international arbitral awards (See Riyadh 
Convention next chapter). However, this is no longer the case since the 
enforcement courts are now the competent authority to enforce all awards, in 
accordance with the 2013 SER (Almuhaidb, 2013). 
 
3.3.6. Quasi-Judicial Bodies 
Alongside the Sharia courts and Diwan Al mazalim, several quasi-judicial 
committees exist with limited powers. These committees are bound by judicial 
procedures similar to those followed by other judicial authorities in the Kingdom and 
produce binding decisions (Al-Samaan, 2000). The establishment of these 
committees was needed in order to ease the courts’ burden and, more importantly, 
to refer these disputes to specialists who are competent to hear disputes of such a 
nature (Al-Samaan, 2000). These include the following: 
 
3.3.6.1. The Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes (CSCD) 
The CSCD deals with the settlement of disputes related to the business conduct of 
banks in relation to their customers and other banks, which is competent to hear 
such claims in the KSA (Shoult, 2006). These committees comprise three members 
who consider matters submitted to them by relying on contractual agreements 
made by the disputing parties, other applicable Saudi laws and recognised 
international banking practices. While deliberating, the committee may seek 
consultation from any expert it deems appropriate for the settlement of the disputed 
matter (ibid). Furthermore, the CSCD role is in acting as a mediator between the 
parties to the dispute. In other terms, following the hearing stage, both parties are 
invited by the committee to reach a final settlement of the dispute in light of the 
committee’s guidance (Rolf, 1995). The committee will make a decision containing 
the settlement of the dispute if the parties accept the committee’s invitation and, 
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therein, such a decision will be final and binding on both parties. The committee will 
decide the disputed matter and render a decision if the parties reject the 
committee’s invitation (Rolf, 1995). 
 
Moreover, it is notable that para 3 of CSCD’s Internal Rules and Procedures 
stresses that, when the CSCD’s decision for settling the dispute fails to satisfy both 
parties, the dispute will have to be litigated before a competent court (CSCD,1987). 
This might be construed to mean that the committee is supposed to act as mediator 
between the parties and not make binding decisions on the disputed matter. 
Consequently, such interpretation of the above provision is considered to be a 
shortcoming, since it undermines the committee’s effectiveness as a competent 
authority for settling disputes between banks and their clients (Al-Saman, 2000). 
The matter is exacerbated by the fact that, apart from the CSCD, the Kingdom has 
no judicial body with competence to hear banking disputes. Although Sharia courts 
have general jurisdiction, they refrain from hearing disputes of this nature (ibid). As 
a result, it is advised that, unless disputing parties reach an amicable settlement, 
once invited to do so by the committee, they should refer to arbitration under the 
2012 SAR and inform the committee of their decision. This is because the parties 
are permitted to resort to arbitration by virtue of article 10 of the CSCD’s Internal 
Rules and Procedures (CSCD, 1987). 
 
3.3.6.2. The Commercial Papers Committees (CPC) 
This Committee was established in 1963 for the purpose of providing an efficient 
forum to hear disputes involving debts evidenced by commercial papers such as 
promissory notes and cheques (The CPC 1963). This committee has branches in 
Riyadh, Dammam and Jeddah, and each committee has a chairman, as well as two 
legal counsels from the Ministry of Commerce. This committee’s decision can be 
appealed within 30 days from the parties’ notification of the decision. The procedure 
and time limit of the appeal are identical to those of the CSCD, because the same 
rules of procedure are applied by both committees (Shoult, 2006). 
 
However, theoretically, a creditor with a dispute over a claim evidenced by a 
commercial paper is better off pursuing his/her claim before the CPC rather than 
pursuing it before the CSCD on the basis of the underlying transaction (Boshoff, 
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1985). Claims brought before the CPC only take around 12 months from inception 
to final decision, as opposed to claims brought before the CSCD, which can take 
up to three years, without reaching a final judgment (ibid). Theory and practice are 
not always in line since, in strict law, the CPC is only required to provide its ruling 
by relying on the commercial paper upon which claims are made. However, it has 
been suggested that the CPC is able to review the underlying transaction if 
requested by the defendant to do so (Baamir, 2010). If such requests were to 
become common, the commercial paper’s attractiveness as security for payments 
would diminish because it relies on a quick solution being available before the CPC 
(Baamir, 2010). 
 
3.3.6.3. The Committees for the Settlement of Labour Disputes (CSLD) 
The CSLD is empowered by the Labour and Workmen Regulations of 1987 to hear 
disputes involving labour in addition to providing how such committees should 
function. The CSLD is composed of primary committees and higher committees. 
The primary committees have branches in every city with a labour office and 
operate under the supervision of the Ministry of Labour (Almuhaidb, 2013). 
According to Article 173 of the regulation, the committees have an exclusive 
jurisdiction over labour disputes involving claims that are less than SR3000, 
requests for the enforcement of a ruling for the termination of a labour contract, and 
an employer’s imposition of fines upon his/her employees under Article 125 (Labour 
Regulation of 1987). An appeal could be made with respect to any decision resulting 
from the above claims to the higher committees, provided the appeal is made within 
30 days of receiving the notification (ibid). 
 
On the other hand, the higher committees’ decisions are final and binding over all 
disputes referred to them. Both the higher and primary committees’ rulings are 
based on the majority votes of their members; in addition, dissenting members are 
obliged to justify their dissention (Article 187). Although these quasi-judicial 
committees are doing a good job within their assigned jurisdiction, the Saudi 
government ended such committees and recently established the Labour and 
Commercial Courts with jurisdiction to hear all labour and commercial disputes 
within the domain of their speciality (Saudi Gazette, 2018). 
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3.3.6.4. Judicial Precedents 
Having considered the different judicial and quasi-judicial bodies hierarchy, it is now 
important to consider the effect of the KSA’s judges’ decisions and the doctrine of 
judicial precedence. The law of judicial precedent is a method of compelling judges 
to stand by already decided matters as long as they share similar facts so as to 
increase the consistency of court decisions (Garner and others, 2016). Different 
legal jurisdictions have different ways of looking at judicial precedents. Some 
jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom, binds future judges by the judicial precedent 
system unless the judge could distinguish the case at hand from the decided one, 
or overrule or reverse the previous decision (Duxbury, 2008). The techniques for 
avoiding previous decisions are limited to those decided by a court of the same 
level as the one deciding the new case. However, if an upper court set the 
precedent, the lower court’s judges must follow the upper court’s decisions. And 
the upper court judges are not bound to judicial precedents set by a lower court 
and, instead, its only obligation is courts of a similar or higher level (Cross and 
Harris, 1991). For example, the English County Court judges’ decisions will not bind 
the High Court judges and the High Court judges’ decisions will not bind the 
Supreme Court judges. 
 
On the other hand, some countries, like the KSA, have chosen to only give judicial 
decisions an advisory role that a future judge could rely on or consider, but do not 
have to follow (Shoult, 2006). The KSA’s view is based on giving judges 
discretionary powers to cope with the continuously changing legal issues and legal 
rules that may have been omitted, or not available to, the previous judge. This is 
particularly important when realising that KSA judges rely on Sharia sources as well 
as domestic regulations to reach a particular ruling (Alabdli, 2007). This 
interpretation of Sharia texts could differ from one era to another. Binding judges 
by previous decisions that were decided within a completely different timeframe 
may not serve justice. However, such a lack of precedent in the KSA has resulted 
in entirely inconsistent decisions regarding similar cases occurring within similar 
contexts and timeframes (see Chapter Five). It also enabled the judges of lower 
courts to deduce the Islamic ruling based on their personal preference, even if there 
are contrary views on the matter.  The knowledge these lower courts judges have 
of Sharia rules is not as deep as it should be to allow them to review scholarly views 
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on a particular ruling and chose the one that is most applicable (Diwan Al mazalim, 
2019). 
 
Therefore, it might be appropriate for a country like the KSA to consider the option 
of establishing a judicial precedent system, whereby a higher court judge’s 
decisions binds those of lower courts. This would increase the consistency of 
judicial decisions and increase their reliability because higher courts judges are 
generally more experienced and have a deeper knowledge of Sharia rules than 
lower court judges. Enabling such a judicial precedent system would also have a 
positive impact on the enforcement of foreign awards in the KSA, since it would be 
easier to predict the KSA’s view on a particular case by reviewing past precedents. 
The impact of such a dynamic would bring the KSA closer toward achieving its goal 
of creating an attractive legal system for foreign commerce.  
 
3.4. Sources of the Legal System 
Since the KSA is based on Sharia principles, most of its regulations are derived 
from the teaching of Islam. Even those originating from other sources must not 
clash with the principles of Sharia. These sources fall into four categories: Islamic 
law, state regulations, international treaties, customs and practices. 
 
3.4.1. Islamic Law 
Islamic law is the supreme source of law in the KSA and, therefore, all other sources 
must avoid clashing with its principles and rulings or they will be considered void. 
The Islamic law governs a great proportion of legal areas such as property rights, 
criminal behaviour, family and all other areas of law that are not specifically 
governed by regulations (Vogel, 2000). This law is derived from the primary sources 
of Islamic jurisprudence the Quran and Sunnah, and from secondary sources such 
as Ijma, Qiyas and Ijtihad (Ansary, 2015).  The Hanbali school of thought is the 
official Madhhab in the KSA for applying Islamic law principles (Saudi Basic Law, 
1992). Judges in the KSA also refer to other Sunni schools of thought when making 
judgments, especially if the Hanbali view on the matter is not clear or the judge 
believes another school’s ruling is more appropriate. 
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Islamic jurisprudence in the KSA has developed through the issuance of Fatwas 
(rulings) on new arising matters of Islamic law and Sharia in general. The power to 
issue Fatwas is exclusively in the hands of the Council of Senior Scholars (Royal 
Order No. B/13876, 2010). This council was last formed in 2008 by King Abdullah 
Bin Abdulaziz where, for the first time, the council consisted of twenty-one scholars, 
included scholars from other Sunni schools of thoughts (Scholarly Research and 
Fatwa Portal, 2018). Prior to this time, only the Hanbali view was reflected only in 
officially agreed Fatawa (plural of fatwa) in the KSA. This change indicates a better 
appreciation of the importance of being open to other Sunni schools of thoughts in 
providing more effective Fatwas. The Council of Senior Scholars undertakes a 
number of tasks such as issuing Fatwas based on the views of various Sunni 
schools and conducting research on Islamic law to help meet the developing needs 
of Sharia (Scholarly Research and Fatwa Portal, 2018). 
 
It will be interesting to see such councils expand to include scholars from all 
branches of Islam as well as scholars in fields other than Sharia. This is likely to 
make such Fatawa a more unifying act and universally accepted by all Muslims. It 
will also help combine the expertise of Sharia scholars and others from different 
fields such as law, economy and finance, which will produce Fatawa that are easily 
applicable to disputes of both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The proposed 
inclusivity in the council could be more effective in dealing with transcendent issues 
of interest, as well as public policy under Islamic law in general. This is particularly 
important when realising that the KSA’s public policy is based on Sharia as per 
article 11 (3) of the 2013 SER. All of these sources and their hierarchy were 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
3.4.2. State Regulations and Resolutions 
The second category consists of state regulations and Resolutions adopted to deal 
with contemporary legal issues arising from developments in different fields. These 
resolutions have to be in line with the principles of Sharia, and so Sharia will 
override any regulations if it conflicts with it. The goal of such regulations is not to 
amend Sharia, but to supplement it (Michiel, 2010). In fact, the words legislation 
and regulations differ only in terminology and have no practical significance in the 
KSA. This is because the KSA’s regulations enjoy all the characteristics of 
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legislation, and also enjoy the same force, jurisdiction, significance, and sanction 
as any legislation in any other developed state (Amin, 1985). 
 
The procedure for making such regulations can be summarised as follows. A 
Committee consisting of legal advisors in the relevant ministry formulates an 
appropriate text for the draft regulation. The draft is then sent to the Council of 
Ministers’ division of experts to be reviewed and revised. The division then sends 
the draft to the council for consideration, and once the council approves the draft, 
it is submitted to the Consultative Council for review (Article 67, Basic Law of 1992). 
Following this review, the draft is returned, with notes and suggestions, to the 
Council of Ministers who study the notes and submit the final draft regulation to the 
King, who approves it and issues a Royal Decree that is published in the official 
Gazette, Um al- Kura (Council of Minister law 1993). In addition to the official 
procedure of making regulations, all ministers and several heads of public agencies 
have the power to issue administrative resolutions and laws through ministerial 
circulars. Such circulars are not published in the official Gazette since they carry 
less weight than Royal Decrees. Consequently, Royal Decrees will be applied over 
these circulars in the event of any conflict between them (Council of Minister law, 
1993). 
 
3.4.3. International Treaties 
The third category is international treaties, which form an essential source of the 
legal system of the KSA. The controversy existing between theories of monism and 
dualism is reflected in trying to define the relationship between international and 
national law. The monists agree that international law in the form of treaties and 
conventions is part of the national law without legislation, as long as it was 
concluded according to the constitution and has already come into force (Aust, 
2000). On the contrary, the dualists believe, “that international law is separate from 
municipal law and that a treaty has no special status in domestic law unless specific 
legislation is in force to give effect to such treaty” (Aust, 2000, p 143). The difference 
between these theories has attracted much controversy among international 
lawyers over the past years, which is crucial when it comes to considering whether 
a rule of international law should be applied by domestic courts (Rothwell and 
others, 2010). This is very problematic since it is important to know if international 
 79 
and domestic laws represent two distinct legal orders, operating individually from 
each other, and if that is the case, then it is essential to determine the grounds upon 
which one legal order should be considered superior to the other (Haris, 1998). 
According to the monist view, they are to be considered part of the same legal order 
(ibid). 
 
The KSA’s Basic Law recognises international law by stating that “laws, 
international treaties and agreements, and concessions shall be issued and 
amended by Royal Decrees” (Article 70). The same law, in its general provisions, 
also states that “The enforcement of this law shall not prejudice whatever treaties 
and agreements with states and international organisations and agencies to which 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is committed” (Chapter 9, article 81). Therefore, the 
KSA adopted the dualist view regarding the recognition and application of 
international law, which corresponds with international law’s general rules that all 
parties of treaties in force are bound by them and must perform them in good faith 
(Alkahtani, 2010). Such treaties hold the same weight as regulations, since they 
are ratified by the King and a special Decree is issued for them (Jeanne, 1982). 
The process of incorporating such treaties within the KSA, whether bilateral or 
multilateral treaties, is the same as that for regulations issued within the KSA. The 
process usually starts with the concerned ministry and goes to both the Shura 
Council and the Ministers Council; the monarch then receives it for approval. If the 
King approves the treaty then it is published in the official gazette as a Royal Decree 
(Council of Minister law, 1993). Therefore, the importance of international treaties 
in the KSA legal system stems from the fact that they are incorporated into the 
KSA’s legal system by Royal Decree. Without the Royal Decree, such treaties 
would have no implication on the KSA’s legal system. 
 
3.4.4. Customs and Practices 
Customs and practices are considered to be very important sources in the KSA’s 
legal framework, particularly those modern practices of international commerce and 
trade, which have contributed significantly to the development of the KSA’s 
contemporary legal system (Amin, 1985). Following the discovery of oil in 1938, the 
Saudi businessmen entered into new kinds of contracts with both the government 
and foreign international companies. These contracts involve importation, 
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exportation and investment contracts. Hence, a considerable portion of Western 
legal views derived from such contracts has increasingly influenced Islamic 
traditions in the KSA (Maren, 1987). These relationships between domestic and 
international entities resulted in the issuance of several regulations dealing with 
modern commercial and financial needs such as commercial agencies, companies, 
papers, banking transactions and maritime aspects (Amin, 1985). 
 
In addition to the above international customs and practices, it is of great 
importance to discuss the significant influence of the national culture of the KSA on 
the development of its own legal system. The KSA’s national culture is entirely 
based on Sharia and Arab traditions, since they determine every aspect of both 
people and government behaviours (Moran et al., 2014). Sharia governs all legal, 
political, economic, family and societal affairs in the KSA. At the political level, it 
regulates the relationship between the ruler and the citizen on the basis of 
allegiance, loyalty, consultation or Shura as referred to in the KSA (At-Twaijri, Al-
Muhaiza, 1996). On a legal level, it forms the basis of the Kingdom’s constitution 
and no regulation can be issued if it does not comply with Sharia principles (Saudi 
Basic Law, 1992). On a societal level, Sharia advocates all noble deeds such as 
generosity, hospitality, truthfulness, debt repayment and the keeping of promises 
(At-Twaijri, Al-Muhaiza, 1996). In addition to Sharia’s influence on the KSA’s 
national culture, indigenous Arab traditions continue to play an important role in 
how people behave and how the state perceives and applies Sharia. For example, 
there is no Islamic ruling that prohibits women from driving in all Islamic schools 
and branches, but women still only drove for the first time in the KSA in 2018 (The 
Guardian, 2018). This shows that legislators in the KSA also take into account 
cultural traditions when issuing regulations. Since society’s traditions change with 
time, regulations also develop to correspond with such changes. This may result in 
the legislators amending some of the current unclear legal issues of public policy 
and women’s representation in courts and arbitral tribunals. 
 
3.4.5. The KSA’s Law and Foreign Jurisdictions 
At the time of its establishment, the KSA’s limited experience led to a reliance by 
the government on the Ottoman Codes that existed at the time in order to form the 
basis for the KSA’s legal system alongside Sharia principles (AI-Fahad, 2005). The 
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KSA then strived to create a robust legislative body using existing bodies of law and 
the practices of other developed states. This view is represented in the King’s 
command for the Hejaz attorney general to follow the Ottoman Codes until told 
otherwise (Royal Decree, 1927). The Ottoman Code of 1885 clearly influenced the 
KSA’s Commercial Courts Regulation of 1931. This 1931 Regulation existed with 
few changes until 2012, when it was replaced by the 2012 Arbitration Regulation. 
The 1931 code had a large amount of Turkish legal terms, which indicates that they 
were literally translated from the Turkish Code (Article 290, The Ottoman 
Commercial Code, 1885). 
 
The Kingdom’s journey to developing its own legal system was also indirectly 
influenced by the French civil system. France’s considerable influence on the KSA’s 
legal system was largely driven by a reliance on foreign experts by the KSA 
government when developing its regulations, where most were from Arab states 
(Holden and Johns, 1981). The majority of these experts were from Egypt, which 
was occupied by France between the 18th and 19th centuries. Furthermore, most 
of the King’s legal advisors at the time were from either Egypt or Syria, because of 
birth or origin, and had a legal background enormously influenced by French law 
(Maren, 1987). This resulted in the King’s order for the Egyptian laws, which were 
actually translated from French laws, to have full adoption and application in the 
KSA’s jurisdictions. 
 
Nevertheless, before the adoption of these laws in the KSA, they had to comply 
with the principles of Sharia. The 1966 enactment of the Regulation Governing Bids 
for Government Procurement,7 is one of the imported regulations of the time. This 
regulation was literally copied from the Egyptian Regulation of 1957, which was 
itself copied and translated from the French Regulation of 1953 (Maren, 1987). 
Enactment of the Saudi Companies Law in 1965 is another example of the influence 
of French law,8 since it was also literally adopted from the law of Egypt, which in 
turn was inspired by the company law of France (ibid). The list of these imported 
laws is long and they governed many aspects of the KSA’s law; however, these 
regulations had to be compliant with Sharia or at least not clash with its principles 
(Thabet, 2000). The KSA’s Labour Law of 1969 provides an example of the state’s 
                                                 
7 Royal Decree No. (M/6) dated 24/02/1386 H 
8 Royal Decree No. (M/6) dated 22/03/1385 H. (1965) 
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efforts to ensure that western-style regulations are in line with Sharia (Labour and 
Workers Regulation of 1969). In spite of the law being based on the Egyptian 
Labour Law, it nevertheless contained some articles banning males’ and females’ 
presence in the same workplace, and allowing special vacations for pilgrimages 
that did not exist in its Egyptian counterpart (Thabet, 2000). 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the discussion within this chapter indicates that the change and 
development processes in the legal system of the KSA has had a social and political 
impact on the country. Despite the ongoing attempts toward creating a proper 
constitution for the KSA, the 1992 Royal Decree created a similar document 
referred to as the KSA’s Basic Law. It reflects a humble and long-awaited action in 
acknowledging the state’s structural need for development in order to 
institutionalise the government’s management of its increasingly complicated 
community. After the Basic Law, several Royal orders were issued regulating 
certain areas of the Kingdom’s institutions. One of the most important Decrees was 
the 2007 Royal Decree from King Abdullah, which revamped the Kingdom’s legal 
structure. This judiciary law made a number of structural changes to the judicial 
system of the country leading to the establishment of several specialised courts. In 
addition, this chapter considered the quasi-judicial committees and their role in 
developing legal practice within the KSA. Such committees eased the courts’ 
burden and, more importantly, referred disputes involving banking transactions, 
promissory notes and labour to specialists who were competent to hear disputes of 
this nature (Al-Samaan, 2000). 
 
Furthermore, this chapter discussed the Kingdom’s main sources of law and the 
extent of their influence and application within the KSA’s legal jurisdiction. It also 
highlighted the influence of foreign countries on the development of the Kingdom’s 
legal practices, such as French law, which formed the basis of most Saudi 
commercial laws between the 1940s and 1970s. To conclude, the above discussion 
indicates that the Kingdom’s legal system has developed significantly since its 
establishment and that the recent development initiative has created a more reliable 
legal system in the country. In addition, the variety of court specialisations offered 
a better chance for claims brought within the Kingdom’s jurisdiction to be 
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considered by the right experts. This shows a clear departure from the KSA’s early 
habits of referring all claims, regardless of their nature, to Sharia courts, which 
































Chapter Four: Arbitration Theory and Practice 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The most well-known mechanism of alternative dispute resolution is international 
commercial arbitration (ICA). Several aspects of arbitration have been differentially 
interpreted by national courts, mainly because that they do not all perceive ICA and 
its theories uniformly. This has resulted in conflicting perceptions of the state’s roles 
and those of the parties involved, giving rise to some completely contrasting 
theories that attempt to explain the nature of arbitration (Paulsson, 2011). These 
theories have been summarised by scholars into the following distinct categories: 
jurisdictional, contractual, hybrid or mixed, and autonomous (Hong-lin Yu, 2008), 
which highlight the scope and limit of both state sovereignty and party autonomy. 
In addition to the various theories that impact how ICA is perceived and applied in 
various jurisdictions, the doctrines of party autonomy and state sovereignty too, as 
distinct concepts, influence perceptions and approaches to ICA. Therefore, this 
chapter analyses these theories, the doctrine of party autonomy and state 
sovereignty, and their influence on how ICA is perceived. 
 
4.2. Party Autonomy and State Sovereignty 
Before discussing the main theories on ICA, it is important to discuss the doctrines 
of party autonomy and state sovereignty in order to examine how to reconcile the 
interests of states to have their sovereignty protected, and arbitration parties to 
have their autonomy respected. The discussion of these doctrines will, in turn, lead 
to an examination of the ICA theories, which are very informative in understanding 







4.2.1. Party Autonomy 
Arbitration is one of the most widely used mechanisms for settling ICA disputes. Its 
increasing popularity is mostly due to the doctrine of party autonomy. This doctrine 
empowers parties by giving them the freedom to enter into contracts and formulate 
the substance of international commercial agreements (Redfern and Hunter, 2015). 
This substance includes the contractual terms, the parties’ rights and obligations. It 
is also important to the process of arbitration itself, since it enables parties to enter 
into arbitration agreements that empower an arbitral tribunal with the competence 
to settle a dispute while relinquishing the courts’ ability to do so (Mills, 2018). In 
addition, it limits the court’s ability to interfere with an arbitral process, making it 
possible for different legal practices to be shaped within the autonomy of the arbitral 
procedure (ibid). Therefore, the choice of substantive law in arbitration can lead to 
the application of various laws and remedies arrived at in commercial disputes 
compared to those found in similar proceedings in national courts, making 
arbitration a significant factor in the development of lex mercatoria (Moss, 2015).  
 
On the contrary, the procedural law of arbitration is more concerned with regulating 
the internal matters of the arbitration procedure and the relationship between the 
arbitration and the courts (Henderson, 2014). Most domestic laws have within their 
lex arbitri a default set of procedures to regulate the arbitration process in their 
territory. Such procedures are available to help the case’s orderly development, 
where there are no other arrangements made by the parties, through adopting 
standard or alternative arbitral rules (ibid). Dicey and Morris (2000) defined this as 
the directory role of the lex arbitri but it could also be viewed as facilitative or as a 
safety net, which provides a basic procedural framework and minimum necessary 
guarantees of due process that are applicable as far as the parties have made no 
alternative provision (Dicey and Morris, 2000). Nevertheless, in practice, parties do 
regularly include other provisions for matters of procedure, yet they may not 
conceptualise this as a conscious decision for opting out of the law of the seat. They 
make such provisions through specifying the rules of arbitration to govern their 
dispute, which results in the displacement of the default provisions in the governing 
law, as far as the law and rules are inconsistent and to the extent that the law is not 
of mandatory application (ibid). 
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This doctrine of party autonomy was developed initially by academics but was later 
applied by domestic courts since it attracted wide acceptance in national systems 
of law. In this regard, Redfern and Hunter (2015) stated that all countries, despite 
their political systems, have been affected by the trend to allow parties to determine 
which law presides over their contracts. They further argued that there has been no 
concerted effort by nations to bring about this development, rather it has occurred 
independently in every nation; “it is the result of separate, contemporaneous and 
pragmatic evolution within the various national systems of conflict of laws” (ibid, p 
187). 
 
4.2.2. Rationale for Party Autonomy 
The rationale behind the principle of party autonomy is that an arbitration 
agreement is initially a contractual agreement between parties to adjudicate their 
dispute by means of ICA (Seyda Dursun, 2012). The arbitration agreement is 
fundamental to the arbitration proceedings for several reasons. Primarily, it shows 
the parties' exercise their freedom to solve their disputes via arbitration rather than 
litigation (ibid). An arbitration agreement was described by Odoe as an obligatory 
promise formed by parties to solve any current and upcoming disagreements via 
ICA, rather than settling them in the courts of law (Odoe, 2014). Accordingly, parties 
have considerable autonomy when drafting their arbitration agreement to choose a 
dispute resolution system that they see fit. Consequently, the power of an 
arbitration agreement originates from party autonomy (Seyda Dursun, 2012). 
Secondly, parties have autonomy to construct the terms of their agreement and to 
design it in accordance with their needs – this is an essential principle of ICA 
(Boralessa, 2004). Finally, arbitration agreements exclude judges from settling 
disputes submitted to arbitration. If a party to the agreement tries to settle the 
dispute through the courts, then the other party can challenge the court’s 
jurisdiction, arguing that the court’s jurisdiction was waived (Odoe, 2014). Hence, 
the courts have no jurisdiction to resolve a conflict related to the matters involved 
in an arbitration agreement, unless both parties expressly or tacitly waive the 
arbitration agreement (Fagbemi, 2015). 
Furthermore, a fundamental requirement for the formation of arbitration agreements 
is the attainment of consent from the parties. The parties’ desire to settle their 
disagreements through ICA should be plainly stated in the agreement freely entered 
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into by them (Chatterjee, 2003). However, the agreement to arbitrate will be invalid 
for lack of consent if either party was subject to fraud, coercion or undue influence 
(Fagbemi, 2015). Therefore, the New York Convention NYC requires all of its 
members to acknowledge a written agreement undertaking to settle their disputes 
via arbitration (Article 2 (1)). This provision implies that the agreement must include 
a mandatory (not permissive) undertaking for resorting to arbitration in their 
disputes, rather than all other mechanisms of dispute resolution (Fagbemi, 2015). 
 
4.2.2.1. Recognition for Party Autonomy 
Both international conventions and the UNCITRAL Model law have recognised the 
doctrine of party autonomy, which focuses on the disputed parties’ ability to choose 
the applicable law in respect to their contract (Redfern and Hunter, 2015). For 
instance, the Rome I Regulation, which applies to the EU’s contractual obligations, 
recognises such doctrine and allows the parties to determine the governing law of 
their contractual relationship (Article 3).9 In addition, the UNICTRAL10 Model Law 
compels arbitrators to issue their award by relying on the parties to choose the law 
that is applicable to the substance of their dispute (Article 28). Furthermore, the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ICSID provides similar 
provisions, requiring arbitrators to reach a decision on the dispute by relying on the 
parties’ chosen laws and the rules of arbitral institutions (Article 42). Moreover, the 
International Chamber of Commerce ICC Rules enable the parties of arbitration 
agreements to have the freedom to choose the governing law of the substance of 
their dispute (Article 21 (1)). A leading commentator on this field asserted that there 
are some principles which have wider global recognition in private international law 
than those acknowledged by the contract’s applicable law terms. As a result, the 
contract’s applicable law is the one selected by its parties, either expressly, or tacitly 
(Lew, 1978, p. 87). 
 
4.2.2.2. Limitations to Party Autonomy  
Parties to arbitration agreements theoretically possess significant autonomy to 
decide how to settle their disputes. For example, the parties’ agreement may 
                                                 
9 Rome 1 is European parliament and council Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations 
10 The United Nations Commission on International Trade and Law. 
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exclude the court’s jurisdiction and allow them to perform the arbitral proceedings 
in the way they see fit (Fagbemi, 2015). Nevertheless, whether or not the parties’ 
autonomy is absolute or limited is questionable, since without doubt the parties to 
arbitration have certain degrees of autonomy, provided that their arbitration 
agreement has been consented to by all parties, either expressly or tacitly 
(Boralessa, 2004). However, this freedom is subject to a number of limitations; for 
example, certain fundamental principles exist that arbitration parties are unable to 
violate or ignore under any circumstance. Such limiting principles have been 
codified into the different provisions of the Model Law (Moss, 2015). 
 
In the resolution of international trade disputes, the principle of party autonomy, 
from a practical perspective, demonstrates that the creation of the transnational rule 
of law supporting such a doctrine is “almost too good to be true” (Redfern and 
Hunter, 2015, p 189). This is because, most of the time, there are limitations such 
as guarantees that the parties’ choice of applicable law does conform to the state’s 
public policy (Moss, 2015). This is evidenced in the Rome I Regulation which 
prohibits parties from selecting a different rule to supersede the state’s mandatory 
rule of law, such as choosing foreign law to avoid taxes or competition regulations 
(Rome Regulation, 2008). This has been clearly demonstrated in the case of Eco 
Swiss China Ltd v Benetton International NV (1999) ECR I-3055, where a decision 
was reached by the European Court of Justice stating that breaching the EU 
competition law was considered to be a violation of public order. Additionally, in 
Soleimany v Soliemany (1999) QB 785 the Court of Appeal (CA) in England 
rejected the enforcement of an award on the basis that the transaction was 
permissible in the governing law; however, it was prohibited in English law. The CA 
rejected the enforcement of the contract on public policy grounds. 
 
4.2.3. State Sovereignty 
The concept of sovereignty is disputed in both law and politics. It was initially 
described as the supreme power equivalent. Nevertheless, in practice, it usually 
deviates from its traditional definition (Giuditta, 2013). The principle of state 
sovereignty can be demonstrated in a number of ways and measured by the use of 
different indices, such as competence, independence and the legal equality of 
states (Murat, 2008). Normally, such principles are inclusive of all matters under 
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which states are allowed by international law to make decisions and act 
independently, away from foreign sovereign countries or intervention or exclusion 
by entities (Daniel, 2001).    
 
There are different theoretical views on state sovereignty and its influence on ICA. 
The first view considers ICA to be completely governed by a single legal order of 
the arbitration seat. Such a view is founded on the principle of state positivism which 
considers the party autonomy within ICA to derive its validity from a state law 
(Poudret and Besson, 2007). Francis Mann affirmed this view by stating: 
“No one has ever or anywhere been able to point to any provision or 
legal principle which would permit individuals to act outside the 
confines of a system of municipal law; even the idea of the autonomy 
of the parties exist only by virtue of a given system of municipal law 
and in different systems may have different characteristics and 
effects” (Mann, 1967, p157).  
In the same way, all arbitrations are subject to the laws of a particular state. All 
private individuals must act at the level of municipal law, as all of the rights and 
powers that they enjoy are derived from or conferred by municipal law (Mann, 
1967). Accordingly, arbitration cannot exist in a legal vacuum (Hinsley, 1986). As a 
result of geographical jurisprudence and the state sovereignty principle, arbitration 
that takes place in a country should be governed by its municipal law (Poudret and 
Besson, 2007). The arbitration’s legality and influence stem from the lex loci arbitri 
11.12. In fact, the practice of arbitration clearly demonstrates that few countries are 
willing to abandon control over arbitration conducted within their territories 
(Reisman, 2014). 
 
On the contrary, Gaillard believes that, in spite of the positivist view’s wide 
acceptance:  
“State positivism cannot in itself justify the view that anchors 
international arbitration solely in the legal order of the seat. This 
conception in reality stems from the combination of state positivism 
and the desire to unilaterally ensure an improbable international 
                                                 
11 The law of the forum place or court where the arbitration had taken place 
12 Law of the seat. 
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harmony of solutions regarding the fate of arbitral awards” (Gaillard, 
2010, p 22).  
He further questioned the right of a single state to make its domestic law, alone, the 
governing law of the ICA process, simply because it happened to be within its 
territory (Gaillard, 2010). In this regard, an alternative view of ICA was developed 
that considers it to originate from more than a single legal order. It argues that ICA 
originates from every legal order that commits itself to recognising the effectiveness 
of arbitral awards, provided certain conditions are met (Gaillard, 2010). This view 
considers the seat to be one of the legal orders rather than the only legal order for 
arbitration. In addition, all such orders will have an equal say over arbitration, which 
will lead to the removal of the arbitration’s nationality. This removal will decentralise 
arbitration and internationalise it, as opposed to the earlier positivist view that 
preferenced centralising arbitration in the seat law (ibid). Both views have different 
standpoints since the first focuses on the starting point of arbitration while the other 
focuses on the outcome.  
 
A different view of ICA argues that arbitration is a completely autonomous legal 
order. It acknowledges that the origin of arbitration stems from an independent 
transnational legal order, which could be referred to as the legal order of arbitration 
rather than the national laws of either the state of the seat or the enforcing state 
(Gaillard, 2010). This is in line with the arbitrator’s role of administering justice on 
behalf of the international community, rather than a particular state. This view of 
detaching arbitration into a transnational legal order would have a different impact 
on the states’ sovereignty over ICA. If such a view is accepted, the effectiveness of 
the award will be entirely governed by the party’s contractual terms and the 
requirements of the enforcing state (Paulsson, 1981). The seat, in this case, will 
have only marginal significance on the ICA award’s effectiveness as opposed to its 
position if the detachment process is rejected since the rejection of such a 
transnational approach will provide the state where the award was rendered with 
significant powers over the validity of ICA awards (Paulsson, 1981). Therefore, it is 
important for the disputing parties to choose the arbitration seat carefully in order 
to avoid any unpleasant decisions. 
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4.2.3.1. Limitations on State Sovereignty 
State sovereignty is historically infringed by those in charge of political authority. 
Due to a number of factors involving cultural, environmental and economic 
influences, there has been a major drive towards globalisation in recent decades 
(Al-Adba, 2014). Accordingly, the common perception regarding the amount of 
influence exercised by state sovereignty has been reconsidered. Furthermore, in 
international law, both the principles of state sovereignty and of jurisdiction have a 
number of significant and commonly acknowledged restrictions (Christopher, 
1997). It seems to be the case in contemporary times that most actions for 
restricting the sovereignty of the state frequently result in unimportant and 
conditional measures. For instance, any restriction enforced on the sovereignty of 
a nation-state provided within the interstate associations framework is normally 
considered to be voluntary (Vladimir, 2005). 
 
4.2.3.2. State Sovereignty Versus the New York Convention (NYC) 
Within the current ICA framework, states are bodies in possession of significant 
powers to determine the development of the practice of arbitration (Hong-lin Yu, 
1998). This is due to their suitable and beneficial role in supervising arbitration 
proceedings and awards. Nevertheless, the courts’ influence is ascertained by two 
important factors: jurisdiction and the award presented to them that is pursuing 
enforcement (Reisman, 2014). The controlling power of governments is visible at 
all stages of the arbitration process. The competent authority is enabled by Article 
V of the NYC to reject the enforcement of awards where the party against whom 
the award is invoked provides this authority 13 with evidence that compels refusal. 
This proof could be that the award is not yet obligatory on the parties, or was 
refused or suspended by the competent court of the state under which that order 
was made (The New York Convention, 1958). This understanding of the article was 
questioned, since it was considered to be directly contradictory with the 
Convention’s spirit and intention, being created for the purpose of supporting a 
system that enables member states to recognise and enforce arbitral awards (Wolff, 
1991). This being said, it is important to note that states have chosen to enter into 
such conventions willingly and with the knowledge that their sovereignty is 
                                                 
13 In the state where recognition and enforcement is sought 
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preserved. Therefore, states should abide by the Convention and apply its 
reservation narrowly in order to benefit from its development within the arbitration 
framework. Otherwise, the broad application of this Convention’s reservation will 
deprive the member state from actually relying on the ratification of this Convention 
to develop the reliability and attractiveness of its legal framework. 
 
Moreover, it is particularly important to take into account the different arguments 
made in relation to the issue of party autonomy and territoriality. It should be noted 
that territorialists cited the NYC to support the role of lex loci arbitri position (Article 
II (1) and (3) of the New York Convention). Instead, party autonomy and the 
delocalisation of award advocates rely on Article VII to argue that the courts of 
enforcement in the enforcing country are able to apply other state’s arbitral awards 
following local orders, notwithstanding their annulment by the state-of-origin courts. 
This is especially the case where the annulment was based on reasons associated 
with domestic laws and not on the basis of a domestic court’s refusal to recognise 
such awards (Carmen, 2014). This was apparent from Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc 
v, The Arab Republic of Egypt (1996) 939 F. Supp. 907, where the Columbian 
district court agreed to enforce an award made in Egypt even though it was annulled 
by the Egyptian CA on misapplication grounds in relation to the Egyptian 
substantive law by the arbitration tribunal.  
 
However, the US court of appeal revoked the Chromalloy’s Columbian district 
decision in the case of Baker Marine (Nig.) Limited v. Chevron (Nig) 191 F.3d 194 
(2d Cir. 1999), where it refused the enforcement of two annulled Nigerian awards. 
The court of appeal stated that: “It would not be proper to enforce a foreign arbitral 
award under the New York Convention when such an award has been set aside by 
the Nigerian courts”. Another US court followed the ruling in Baker when it rejected 
the enforcement of an annulled Italian award in the case of Spier v. Calzaturificio 
Tecnica, SpA, 71 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  Both of the above cases have 
impliedly rejected the Chromalloy case’s interpretation of article VII of the New York 
Convention. This rejection was later affirmed by another judicial decision in 
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P V Electrificadora Del Atlántico 87 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007), 
where a Colombian award was annulled by the highest administrative court in 
Columbia on the basis that the arbitration clause on the parties’ agreement violated 
Colombian law. The parties sought enforcement in the US and the enforcement 
request was rejected by the US district court of Columbia. This rejection was in line 
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with the earlier trend to depart from the rationale of the Chromalloy case and 
interpretation of the New York Convention. 
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the prospect of a stateless award is uncertain if Article 
VII provides for exceptions to the lex loci arbitri application in the way and extent to 
which it is permitted by the state where the award is sought to be recognised or 
enforced in law or treaties. Van den Berg, an expert in this Convention provision, 
stated:  
“It is not only the legislative history of the Convention which seems 
to be contrary to the Convention applicability to the ‘a-national’ 
award. The system and text of the Convention to appear to be 
against such interpretation. The Convention applies to the 
enforcement of an award made in another state. Those who 
advocate the concept of the ‘a-national’ award, on the other hand, 
deny that such award is made in a particular country (‘sentence 
flottante’. ‘sentence apatride’). How could such award then fit into 
the Convention scope?” (Van den Berg, 1998. p 145) 
 
4.2.4. Territoriality and Party Autonomy 
The traditional territoriality principle is grounded in the international general 
principles of law whereby a country is supreme inside its territory and its courts 
enjoy absolute power to ascertain the legal consequences of actions conducted 
within that territory, including any arbitral awards subsequently made (Goode, 
2014). By contrast, in arbitration, the party autonomy principle confirms that the 
arbitration tribunal and its award authority comes exclusively from the agreement 
of the parties, rather than from national laws (Mills, 2018). Neither territoriality nor 
party autonomy are a codification of one homogenous principle. The principle of 
territoriality deals with circumstances where a court must determine the effect of 
competent decisions from jurisdiction courts in foreign a territory, for example, 
whether to approve them or not (Chang, 2009).  
 
The enforcing state law will, under normal circumstances, ask its court to reject the 
recognition or enforcement of arbitral decisions that were set aside by the 
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competent jurisdiction court (ibid). This is apparent in both Italian and Netherlands’ 
laws where the first provides that: 
“The court of appeal should refuse the recognition and enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards, and if the opposing proceedings between 
the other party or adopted arbitral award prove to be one of the 
following condition: (5) the arbitral award has not yet been bound by 
the party, or been set aside or suspended by the competent 
authorities of the state either under, or in which the law was being 
made” (Article 840 (5) of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure). 
The second, the Netherlands law, states something similar, but differently 
expressed: 
“if there are no provisions relevant to recognition and enforcement 
that can be applied, or applicable provisions are permitted by 
provisions for the parties to depend on seeking the recognition and 
enforcing of the law of the states, the arbitral awards made in foreign 
states can be recognised and enforced in Netherlands….unless: (e) 
The arbitral award has been set aside by a competent authority of a 
state that made the award” ( Article 1076 (1) (A) (E) of the 
Netherlands private International Law Act). 
Therefore, the Italian model provides that arbitral awards are unenforceable if the 
seat of arbitration set them aside and both laws demonstrate clear examples of 
territoriality. 
 
Moreover, the law of the seat enables the courts of the land to declare whether or 
not the arbitral awards made within that territory are legal or not (Goode, 2014). 
However, this is only related to domestic laws and domestic court decisions, 
provided that they are within the territory of the state and where there are no precise 
jurisdictions governing recognition and enforcement. Therefore, it could be argued 
that under the doctrine of state sovereignty, which is provided for in national and 
international laws alike, the enforceability of arbitration awards is governed by the 
enforcing states’ laws (Robert, 2007). This is mainly due to the judicial system’s 
deep involvement in the arbitration processes, in many occasions it is not possible 
to reach an appropriate balance between a national court’s supervisory powers and 
party autonomy (Reisman, 2014). 
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4.3. Nature of International Commercial Arbitration 
Having discussed the doctrines of party autonomy and state sovereignty, it is now 
crucial to address the key theories identifying the nature of ICA. Identifying the legal 
nature of arbitration is considered by Julian Lew to be the key to identifying both 
legal and non-legal standards open to arbitrators in ICA. Therefore, each theory of 
ICA impacts on the legal status of international arbitrators and the practise of their 
autonomy within any domestic legal framework under which they operate (Onyema, 
2010). The above-named theories of ICA will be discussed in the following section. 
 
4.3.1. Jurisdictional Theory 
The jurisdiction theory emphasises the importance of a states’ powers of 
supervision, particularly in relation to the arbitration place. This theory recognises 
the notion that the origin of arbitration stems from the disputing parties’ agreement. 
Nevertheless, it argues that the parties’ agreements and the arbitration procedure’s 
validity must be regulated by a states’ laws. Hence, an award’s validity depends on 
the laws of the seat where recognising or enforcing the award is sought (Hong-lin 
Yu, 2008). The seat law normally applies to the proceedings of arbitration, but it 
has been argued that its application should be extended to cover the arbitration 
agreement’s substantive validity, provided that such an agreement relates more to 
the law than to the parties’ substantive rights and obligations (Bernardini, 1998). 
 
The views outlined by this theory are evident in different jurisdictions’ judicial 
decisions, which reflect the effectiveness of this theory in practice. For example, 
the UK, following its enactment of the 1996 Arbitration Act, has given more weight 
to the application of the seat law (Nazzini, 2016). This was evidenced in the case 
of XL Insurance v Owen Corning (2001) 1 All E.R. (Comm) 530 where the parties 
held an insurance policy that included a clause for arbitration providing that "[a]ny 
dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the] Policy or the breach, 
termination or invalidity thereof shall be finally and fully determined in London, 
England under the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996” (XL Insurance v Owen 
Corning (2001) 1 All E.R. (Comm) 530). The applicable law provided that the 
insurance document is to be interpreted following the State of New York domestic 
laws, except where there is a clash with any provision within the Policy. 
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An action was taken in the United States by Owens against XL Insurance. The latter 
applied for a restraining order from the English court against Owens to stop him 
making a claim in a place other than through arbitration in the UK in accordance 
with parties’ agreement. The validity and enforceability of the arbitration clause was 
questioned (XL Insurance v Owen Corning (2001) 1 All E.R. (Comm) 530). The 
parties’ likely intentions were directly considered by Toulson J, who viewed the 
arbitration clause’s reference to the 1996 Arbitration Act as an indication of the 
parties’ intended reliance on the seat law as the applicable law to the parties’ 
dispute. Therefore, it was held that the seat law was the governing law with respect 
to the parties’ agreement (ibid). 
 
A similar decision reflecting the jurisdictional views application was reached by the 
English courts in C v D (No2) [2007] APP.L.R. 12/05). This case concerned a 
dispute over a Bermudan insurance contract form. Longmore LJ questioned 
whether, in the absence of an express law governing the parties’ dispute, the one 
with the closest and most tangible link to the agreement is the underlying contract’s 
law or the seat law. After studying the relevant cases in this regard, he answered 
that the seat law be applied (ibid). Also, in Habas Sinai Ve v VSC Steel Company 
Ltd (2013) EWHC 4071, Hamblen J held that, where there is no clear indication of 
the governing law to the parties’ contract, choosing the seat law is overwhelmingly 
important, since such law will normally be the nearest and the most connected law 
to the parties’ agreement. Accordingly, the law governing the arbitration agreement 
was considered to be the English law in spite of the Turkish law application to the 
original contract (Habas Sinai Ve v VSC Steel Company Ltd (2013) EWHC 4071). 
 
Moreover, in FirstLink Investments Corp Ltd v GT Payment Pte Ltd [2014] SGHCR 
12, the Singaporean High Court decided that, where there is no clear provision 
determining the law governing the original contract and there is a choice of the 
arbitration seat, the law of the seat is likely to govern the arbitration clause, even if 
this does not govern the original contract. A three-stage inquiry was followed by the 
judge exactly as did the CA in Sulamerica. He reached the conclusion that choosing 
the seat reflected an implied selection of the applicable law to the parties’ arbitration 
clause. The following factors informed this conclusion; it cannot be inferred that the 
parties want their arbitration clause to apply the exact law as the one governing 
their dispute’s substance because the two could be different. Also, the logical 
deduction when such association breaks down would be the parties’ wish for 
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neutrality would be appreciated and, as such, the selected procedural law would 
apply rather than the substantive one. Finally, the arbitration seat is considered to 
be one of the most important factors influencing arbitration agreements and 
ensuring their effectiveness and validity (FirstLink Investments Corp Ltd v GT 
Payment Pte Ltd [2014] SGHCR 12).  
 
Having considered the practical applications of these views on jurisdictional theory, 
it is important to note that the proponents of jurisdictional theory recognise that all 
procedures of arbitration must be governed by the parties’ selected law and the rule 
of law in the place of arbitration (Belohlavek, 2011). These proponents believe that 
arbitrators are similar to national court judges in terms of their powers, which 
originate from national states through the rule of law processes. In the same way 
as judges, arbitrators have to rely on a state’s national law in order to settle the 
disputes before them (Hong-lin Yu, 2008). Additionally, awards reached by 
arbitration tribunals are as effective as the judgements a judge reaches in national 
courts. Consequently, they believe that, similar to the judgements of courts, arbitral 
awards are enforceable by courts in states where the enforcing party seeks 
recognition and enforcement (Onyema, 2010).  
 
Advocates of this theory additionally emphasise the importance of the seat to 
arbitration. For example, Mann stressed how important a state’s law is to arbitration, 
particularly in relation to the law of the seat. Mann believes that every sovereign 
country has the right to accept or reject any legal actions conducted within its 
territorial limits (Mann, 1983). Furthermore, arbitrators are obliged to conduct the 
arbitration proceedings according to the parties’ choice in as far as the seat law 
allows (Mann, 1983). However, if their acts clash with the relevant territory’s public 
policy or mandatory laws, then these acts will be considered judicially unjustified 
(Mann, 1967). 
 
Jurisdictional theory empowers national courts with a strong basis for exercising 
supervision over disputes taking place within the state, by relying on the seat law 
of the state where enforcement is sought (Onyema, 2010). These powers of 
supervising disputes are also in the NYC 1958, which provides that when one party 
of the dispute breaches one of the grounds mentioned in Article V of the 
Convention, the competent authority may reject the award’s enforcement at the 
request of the party against whom such an award is invoked (Article V).  Their 
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refusal could be based on several grounds involving the parties’ agreement validity, 
arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator's power, and the arbitral awards’ submission 
and enforceability scope. This is to be carried out following the request of the party 
against whom it is invoked (Hong-lin Yu, 2008). 
 
The state court’s supervisory powers over arbitration, based on the application of 
the seat law, is based on the following arguments. Firstly, the state’s delegation of 
its exclusive powers forms the basis of the arbitrator's power to create enforceable 
settlements. Secondly, all acts are bound by the state law where they took place. 
Finally, applying the seat law and relying on its courts tends to be the most effective 
way of resolving disputes (Samuel, 1989). However, practically speaking, the law 
could confer these powers of supervising disputes. The Scottish law, for example, 
provides the Scottish court with exclusive jurisdiction in all disputes seeking 
arbitration in Scotland, except those related to consumers. The Scottish law further 
provides that someone could be sued "In proceedings concerning an arbitration 
which is conducted in Scotland or in which the procedure is governed by Scots law 
(Rule 2(13) in Schedule 8 of the 1982 Act)." 
 
The jurisdiction issue over arbitral proceedings and awards is well illustrated in the 
concept of arbitrability. Supervisory powers over arbitral proceedings compel 
arbitrators to consider a dispute in as far as the parties’ chosen law permits; 
nevertheless, this chosen law cannot override the seat’s mandatory rules (Hong-lin 
Yu, 2008). Moreover, where a choice of law is expressed, the seat’s law where the 
arbitration takes place will govern the arbitrability issue. This means that national 
courts would hear challenge requests for any issued award if a dispute exceeding 
the scope of arbitrability under the governing law is considered by an arbitrator. 
(Hong-lin Yu, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, the jurisdictional theorists believe that, in the state where recognising 
or enforcing awards is sought, courts have powers to supervise the arbitrability 
issue when it reaches the enforcement stage. Hence, courts are empowered by 
Article V (2) of the NYC with the option of rejecting an arbitral award recognition or 
enforcement where "The subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country" or where "recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country (New 
York Convention, 1958)."  A similar approach is also enforced by the law of the seat 
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courts, which are additionally empowered with supervisory power over the issue of 
arbitrability. This was demonstrated by the US Supreme Court’s approval of the 
federal rule that favours arbitration in Mitsubishi Motors. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). This case deals with a dispute involving anti-trust that 
was previously forbidden from being solved through arbitration in domestic cases. 
The parties' arbitration agreement, including the anti-trust dispute, was enforced by 
the Supreme Court, with an assumption that in the domestic context a contrary 
decision would be expected. In this regard, Justice Blackmun stated that, at the 
stage of enforcing awards, local courts in the US are willing to “ensure that the 
legitimate interest in the enforcement of the anti-trust laws has been addressed” 
(Motors. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), p 629, 638). This is 
because the New York Convention gives each ratifying country the right not to 
enforce an award if doing so would be against that country’s public policy (Samuel, 
1989, p. 55). Relying on this point of view, it might be argued that, from the 
perspective of jurisdictional theory, there is a supervisory nature in the relationship 
between courts and arbitral tribunals. 
 
While the above seat tests may be informative for the factors provided in FirstLink 
Investments Corp Ltd v GT Payment Pte Ltd [2014] SGHCR 12, there are still a 
number of situations where it would be inappropriate to apply the seat law (Nazzini, 
2016). Significantly, the arbitration agreement’s validity may need to be considered 
by the courts when the seat has not yet been chosen, or where the seat may be 
altered in the process of arbitration proceedings even after the decision is rendered 
on the arbitration agreement’s validity with respect to the tribunal. Moreover, views 
in favour of considering the seat choice as the arbitration agreement’s implied 
choice of law is not convincing enough, especially if such selection is made by an 
arbitral tribunal or institute (ibid). It is argued that the institute or tribunal selection 
is not entirely detached from the parties’ will since the delegation of the choice was 
intended and made by the parties (Bernardini, 1998). Nonetheless, from a 
constructive point of view, it is harder to claim in the absence of an expressed 
choice that the parties intended the seat law to apply to their dispute, either due to 
the seat already having been agreed or because they failed to reach an agreement 
on it (Gaillard and Savage, 1999). Such a view does suggest that the parties have 
reached an agreement to arbitrate without basing it on the applicable laws and, 
therefore, they are unable to decide on whether their agreement is valid. Such an 
argument is illogical since it posits that the parties consciously chose to have their 
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model of dispute resolution remain uncertain (Nazzini, 2016). Consequently, where 
there is a clear statement of the parties’ chosen law, it is going to be hard or maybe 
impossible to assume the location of the seat because the arbitrators may select 
any jurisdiction to be it. This means that the arbitration agreement’s applicable law 
cannot be ascertained by the seat when the seat choice is delegated (ibid). In these 
circumstances, the contract’s underlying law may be applicable, due to it being the 
parties’ embedded intention or due to it being the closest to the arbitration 
agreement (International Tank and Pipe SAK v Kuwait Aviation Fuelling Co KSC, 
(1975). 
 
4.3.2. Contractual Theory 
Unlike jurisdictional theory, proponents of contractual theory reject the significance 
of the law of the seat, claiming that arbitration is based on the parties’ agreement 
alone (Stone, 1966). They do not see that any considerable connection exists 
between the law of the seat and the arbitral proceedings since they argue that the 
parties have the power to make decisions about issues relevant to their arbitration 
procedures and that such power should not be limited by the state’s power (Domke, 
1965). 
 
In contrast to jurisdictional theory, this theory considers the nature of arbitration 
from a contractual point of view. While contractual theory acknowledges that 
national laws could influence arbitration proceedings and agreements, they yet 
contend that arbitration is of contractual identity and stems from the agreement of 
the parties (Hong-lin Yu, 2008). Consequently, the parties’ arbitration agreement is 
a contract that clearly stipulates the will of the parties to resolve their dispute 
through ICA.  Parties enter into such contracts voluntarily, since it empowers them 
to decide both arbitration timing and location, to appoint arbitrators to consider their 
dispute and, in addition, to select the laws to be applied on both procedural and 
substantive issues (Onyema, 2010). 
 
Supporters of contractual theory argue that dispute resolution via arbitral 
proceedings is better kept separate to state power, and the pacta sunt servanda 14 
concept should remain obligatory upon the parties to conduct their agreed 
                                                 
14 Means that agreements should be observed. 
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arbitration proceedings away from the pressure of the state. This concept was 
demonstrated by Kellor when he emphasised the voluntary nature of arbitration. 
There are no laws forcing parties to enter into arbitration, nor can one party force 
another to engage in arbitration. When the agreement to resort to arbitration is 
completed, the parties forgo any other rights that they may have, as they consider 
that arbitration will be of greater benefit to them (Kellor, 1941, p. 182). Therefore, 
the law of the seat does not hold influence over the outcomes or procedures of 
arbitration, apart from in regards to arbitrability and public policy. Klein goes on to 
conclude that "national arbitration laws only exist to supplement and fill lacunae in 
the parties' agreement as to the arbitration proceedings and to provide a code 
capable of regulating the conduct of an arbitration” (Klein, 1955, p 182). 
 
The mechanism of ICA, in most jurisdictions, is designed following the contractual 
theory viewpoint. Since they recognise the desire of commercial interests for 
flexibility and informality in settling their disputes, courts in those jurisdictions 
consider the parties’ and the arbitrators’ relationship to be a contract (Hong-lin Yu, 
2008). Taking the party and arbitrator relationship as an example, most jurisdictions 
follow views advanced by contractual theory.  For example, in “Cie Europeene de 
Cereals SA v. Tradax Export SA, [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 301” the English court held 
that parties and arbitrators share a contractual relationship. Subsequently, it was 
decided that in accepting their appointment as arbitrators, they had become parties 
to the arbitration agreement and, as such, they should be bound by the arbitration 
contract’s terms from a contractual point of view. Although the English courts did 
adopt a contractual point of view in this regard, English law is mostly influenced by 
the jurisdictional view rather than any other. This was demonstrated in Lord Mustill's 
statement in the case of Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty 
ConstructionLtd (1993) Adj.L.R 01/21, where he emphasised the inherent powers 
of the court to stay proceedings, despite the existence of an arbitration clause.  
 
Furthermore, International commercial contracts normally include a provision 
stipulating for the law to be applied to the substance of the dispute. Thus, the issue 
lies in whether the selection of the main contract’s applicable law remains pertinent 
to the arbitration agreement (Nazzini, 2016). The UK’s relevant authorities, after the 
Arbitration Act 1996 came into force, stressed the significance of the seat. In 
Sulamerica CIA Nacional de Seguros SA and others v Enesa Engenharia SA and 
others [2013] 1 WLR 102, the Court of Appeal had to make a decision on the 
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applicable law to the contractual clause requiring an arbitration based on the ARIAS 
Rules in the UK. This requirement was integrated into an insurance policy governed 
by the law of Brazil. Therefore, determining the validity of the arbitration clause was 
an important matter to consider when deciding whether to uphold or discharge an 
anti-suit injunction. The party with insurance argued that the arbitration clause 
under Brazilian law is enforceable exclusively upon their approval. The parties’ 
agreement had no clear selection of the arbitration agreement’s applicable law, so 
the judge had to consider whether a selection of governing law was impliedly made 
by the parties through choosing the law of Brazil as the original contract’s governing 
law, or whether the English law was applicable to the arbitration agreement as the 
law of the seat of the arbitration, either through the implied choice of the parties or 
because the law is the nearest link to the arbitral process providing that an implied 
selection cannot be determined (Sulamerica and others v Enesa and others [2013] 
1 WLR 102). 
Moore-Bick LJ, with whom Hallett LJ agreed, said: 
“In the absence of any indication to the contrary, an express choice 
of law governing the substantive contract is a strong indication of the 
parties' intention in relation to the agreement to arbitrate. A search 
for an implied choice of proper law to govern the arbitration 
agreement is therefore likely (as the dicta in the earlier cases 
indicate) to lead to the conclusion that the parties intended the 
arbitration agreement to be governed by the same system of law as 
the substantive contract, unless there are other factors present 
which point to a different conclusion. These may include the terms 
of the arbitration agreement itself or the consequences for its 
effectiveness of choosing the proper law of the substantive contract 
....”( Sulamerica and others v Enesa and others [2013] 1 WLR 102, 
para 26). 
Nevertheless, this was merely a presumption that could be rebutted by the following 
factors: (1) choosing England as the law of the seat; (2) the outcome that would 
take place if the applicable law to the arbitration clause was the Brazilian law (ibid, 
paras 29-31). The latter factor was especially influential in this case since the 
arbitration clause was obviously made in order to oblige all parties, while the 
Brazilian law would result in the clause binding just the insured party. Therefore, 
the assumption that the original contract’s applicable law also applies to the 
arbitration clause was refuted. He considered that the parties’ implied selection of 
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the governing law cannot be determined and consequently, the nearest link test 
was applied and established that the arbitration agreement’s closest link fell within 
the law of the seat (London) (bid, para 32).  
 
4.3.3. Hybrid Theory 
Both contractual and jurisdictional theories have great backing at opposite ends of 
the arbitration spectrum. Still, a number of jurists believe that neither theory gives 
a logically acceptable elucidation of the ICA’s current structure. On this basis, Lew 
stated that there is no shock in the development of a mixed theory with a hybrid 
character (Lew and Julian, 1978). The hybrid theory was developed by a group of 
theorists who were convinced that the best operation of ICA uses both jurisdictional 
and contractual theoretical elements. Therefore, this theory was developed as a 
compromise theory, as a mix of both contractual and jurisdictional theory (Hong-lin 
Yu, 2008). 
 
Surville (1925) created this theory, which was further developed by Sauser-Hall, to 
include the mixed character method of ICA. He argued that arbitration has a 
contractual element that stems from private contracts, where parties are 
empowered to select the arbitration tribunal and the governing laws to both 
procedural and substantive elements of arbitration (Sauser-Hall, 1952). He also 
agreed that arbitration has to be performed under a state’s domestic laws in order 
to decide the parties’ powers, the validity of arbitration agreements and the 
enforceability of awards (Sauser-Hall, 1952). Consequently, he defined arbitration 
as "a mixed juridical institution, sui generis, which has its origin in the [parties'] 
agreement and draws its jurisdictional effects from civil law (Ibid, p 398-399)." In 
other words, arbitration is of a jurisdictional nature when it comes to the procedural 
rule application, while the parties’ arbitration agreement gives it effectiveness and 
existence (ibid). Sauser-Hall's argument has been accepted by certain practising 
scholars, such as Redfern and Hunter, who argue that ICA is of hybrid nature since 
it starts with mutual agreement by the arbitration parties. This agreement, following 
the arbitration procedure, should lead to a legally binding award that most states 
will recognise and enforce upon meeting certain conditions (Redfern et al., 1991). 
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Accordingly, the hybrid theory advocates for parties’ right to freely enter into an 
agreement to arbitrate, appoint the arbitration tribunal and select applicable laws 
and stems from contractual arbitration origins (Redfern et al., 1991). However, the 
issues surrounding the validity of arbitration proceedings and arbitration 
agreements are subject to the enforcing state’s mandatory laws and public policy, 
which reflects the jurisdictional element of arbitration agreements (Onyema, 2010). 
In addition, the validity of arbitral awards and their recognition or enforcement are 
to be considered in light of the enforcing state’s mandatory rules and public policy 
(ibid). It is incorrect, according to Hunter, to reject the duality in the character of 
arbitration, given that arbitrators use an ‘award’ or ‘arbitral Decree’ to decide on the 
matter presented before them and, when doing so, must not contravene any laws. 
Thus the power that the arbitrator has over those submitting their case is based on 
a contract; however, arbitration is still partly judicial in nature (Hunter, 1987). 
 
This duality in the character of arbitration has also been emphasised by Ancel, who 
argues that it is a concept that demonstrates the contractual basis of arbitration is 
since it originates from the parties’ agreement. It is also jurisdictional since it is 
expressed in a way that involves a states’ jurisdictions, especially at the stage of 
recognising or enforcing awards (Ancel, 1993, p 121). 
 
The hybrid theory was also considered by Sander (1975) to be far more 
comprehensive than the first two in addressing arbitration-related issues. He 
argued that stressing only the contractual or jurisdictional view of arbitration is 
inadequate. Arbitration has to be based on consensus between all parties 
concerned in having agreed to arbitration since, without this agreement, arbitration 
cannot take place. If this concept is focused upon and then extended to cover the 
procedure and award of arbitration, it leads to the nature of arbitration being 
contractual. Alternatively, the quasi-judicial nature of arbitration can be focused 
upon, as arbitration is a form of judicial process – the role of arbitrators is similar to 
that of judges. They submit a decision on the differences that are brought before 
them, and these decisions act in the same way as the judgements of courts. “The 
dualistic character of arbitration has led to the intermediary view taken by those 
who adhere to what may be called the mixed arbitration theory” (Sanders, 1975, p 
233-234). This is due to the character of arbitration, which is affected by its origins 
being both contractual and involved in judicial processing.  
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Jean Robert, in support of the dual character of arbitration, draws attention to the 
close proximity between arbitration procedures and forums. Robert states that the 
arbitration structure and the powers of the arbitration tribunal arise from the 
agreement of the parties. Whereas the agreement’s validity and the award’s 
enforcement are dealt with in accordance with the relevant state’s public policy and 
mandatory laws (Robert as discussed in Sanders, 1975). 
 
4.3.4. Autonomous Theory 
Rather than defining arbitration within the available range between the above 
theories, Rubellin-Devichi focused on the practical aspects of arbitration and, 
accordingly, the autonomous theory was developed. Since she believes that the 
ICA’s merits are the speed and flexible nature of the proceedings, she maintained 
a suitable theory by considering arbitration’s use and purpose (Rubellin, 1965). 
Having the aim of creating an arbitration welcoming environment in the international 
commercial community, she contended that the autonomous nature of ICA’s has to 
be acknowledged. She argued against the first two theories on the basis that they 
do not reflect the practice, while at the same time being contradictory of each other. 
She also rejected the third theory due to its undefined scope of application, citing 
that it is difficult to know exactly when arbitrators should follow the parties’ 
contractual agreement and when they should follow state regulation (ibid). 
 
Rather than participating in customary discussions over arbitration’s jurisdictional 
or contractual nature, the true nature of arbitration was seen by Rubellin-Devichi as 
its use and purpose; thus, placing it on a supranational level while acknowledging 
its autonomous character. Following her study of ICA’s societal and economic 
needs, she recommends that "in order to allow arbitration to enjoy the expansion it 
deserves, while all along keeping it within its appropriate limits, one must accept, I 
believe, that its nature is neither contractual, nor jurisdictional, nor hybrid, but 
autonomous” (ibid, p 365). 
 
Furthermore, the dual nature of arbitration was not disputed by Rubellin; however, 
she rejected the arguments made in attempting to distinguish between the 
arbitration’s contractual and jurisdictional elements. This is because of the difficulty 
in drawing a line between the elements. She argues that such an attempt to 
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segregate them will lead to a distortion in the development of ICA. She did not try 
to classify arbitration under either theory, since she believes that both elements 
have been "so inextricably intertwined that they have become impossible to 
separate” (ibid, p 363). In this regard, she argues that it is inappropriate for the law 
of contract to be applied to arbitration agreements, and those related to judgements 
to arbitral awards. This is because arbitral awards do not resemble court decisions 
while, at the same time, private contracts are not similar to arbitration agreements.  
 
The autonomous theory was formed on the basis that ICA’s existence and ongoing 
development corresponds with the demands of the international trade community 
(Rubellin, 1965). International commercial actors have recognised that ICA 
corresponds with their demands for a controllable and flexible method for their 
dispute settlements. For the purposes of satisfying the arbitration industry’s 
development and expansion, the autonomous theory provides that parties to the 
arbitration agreement should have complete party autonomy (Hong-lin Yu, 2008). 
Accordingly, certain amendments should be introduced in national laws and 
institutional rules to meet the international commercial community’s needs. This 
reflects the genuine importance of the principle of party autonomy in ICA, which 
accordingly suggests that the users of such mechanism should be empowered to 
drive its development and not sovereign states (Onyema, 2010). This will, therefore, 
lead to the redundancy of the seat law in practice, since an independent non-
national regime’s procedural rules could be chosen by the parties to govern their 
dispute. An example is the use of arbitration institute rules to govern the parties’ 
substantive dispute. Such arbitration rules have no connection with any domestic 
laws and no states law has influence on them, even the state where such an 
institution is physically situated (ibid). 
 
The need for such theory is explained by the parties’ desire to have their dispute 
settled by arbitral tribunal with no court intervention. This choice of the parties is not 
plausible since courts sometimes involve themselves in the parties’ dispute 
settlement process, particularly when it comes to the enforcement of awards.  This 
is evident in COMMISA v Pamex (2013) Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 22. This case is 
related to an award that was rendered in Mexico and then enforced under the 
Panama Convention 1975, notwithstanding the seat setting it aside. The courts in 
Mexico applied a legislation that was not yet enforceable at the time of the formation 
of the parties’ contracts and, consequently, the award was set aside based on 
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Mexican law that considered Pemex, an oil company, as an organ of the state due 
to its being owned by Mexico (ibid). In approving the award and refusing the ruling 
of the Mexican court, the district court in the US was cautious to elucidate that it did 
not decide nor review the law of Mexico. Instead, the decision was based on the 
Mexican decision’s infringement of the fundamental notions of justice.  This was 
because the applied law was not enforceable when the parties’ agreement was 
reached and, as a result, it left COMMISA unable to litigate its claims (ibid).  The 
US court of appeal issued its final say on this decision in 2016 when it confirmed 
the district court’s decision to enforce the award in spite of its being set aside by 
the court of the seat on the basis that it is infringing to the fundamental notions of 
decency and justice. Despite this ruling, enforcing awards that have been set aside 
by the seat courts is still contentious.  A nulled award is very unlikely to be enforced 
by most courts around the globe in spite of a few remarkable exceptions (Redfern 
and Hunter, 2015). 
 
The French court’s view of enforcing such set aside awards is one of the most 
remarkable exceptions. The French courts totally disregard the seat court’s views 
on the award on domestic law grounds. This was apparent in the case of Société 
Hilmarton v. Société O.T.V (1994) Rev. Arb. 327, where the French court had to 
consider the enforcement of a Swiss award that was set aside by the Swiss courts. 
It was held by the Cour de cassation that “the award in question was an international 
award which was not integrated into the Swiss legal order, such that its existence 
continued in spite of its being set aside”. This decision was justified in the case of 
Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia c/ SA Rena Holdings (1994) Rev. Arb. 327, to be 
based on the notion that  the seat’s court decision to set aside an award should be 
limited to that court’s jurisdiction and, as such, it should not affect the enforcing 
court’s view of the award. Commenting on the French court’s approach, Gaillard 
agreed with the approach on the basis that ICA is of transnational character and, 
as such, each enforcement court should form its own view of the award’s validity 
(Gaillard, 2012). Thus, it is clear from the above case that court disputes could 
affect the parties’ ICA outcome and, as such, autonomous theory advocates the 
removal of such court intervention in favour of a more delocalised platform of ICA.  
 
The arguments for the delocalisation of the arbitration seat in order to apply 
universal principles of public policy to international arbitration has been influenced 
by autonomous theory (Onyama, 2010). The delocalisation advocates base their 
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theory on the principle of party autonomy, since it is their agreement for arbitration 
that initiates the proceedings, and it relies on the following important arguments. 
Firstly, there is an assumption of sufficient rules in international arbitration to 
regulate itself and such rules are adopted by the parties or made by arbitrators. The 
second argument provides for the enforcing state’s exclusive supervision of the 
arbitration (Redfern and Hunter, 2015). Accordingly, it is obvious that autonomous 
theory delocalisation is one of its main ingredients. In spite of the similarities 
between autonomous and delocalisation theories, they still exhibit major differences 
when it comes to court intervention. The autonomous theory completely disregards 
a courts’ role, which will result in real issues relating to the national court’s extensive 
and important role in how arbitration is conducted. However, the delocalisation 
theory advocates for the complete detachment from the supervision of the seat and 
the enforcing state court’s dual system. Instead, they are in favour of having only 
the enforcement state as a single point of control (Redfern and Hunter, 2015). 
 
Furthermore, it is now broadly accepted in the context of arbitration for parties to 
select international rules for the governance of their disputes’ substance. Guidance 
in that regard, within the context of England and Wales, was provided by Sir John 
Donaldson in Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft v Ras al Khaimal 
National Oil Co, (1987) 3 WLR 1023 where he stated: 
“By choosing to arbitrate under the rules of the ICC and, in particular, 
article 13.3, the parties have left proper law to be decided by the 
arbitrators and have not in terms confined the choice to national 
systems of law. I can see no basis for concluding that the arbitrators' 
choice of proper law - a common denominator of principles 
underlying the laws of the various nations governing contractual 
relations - is out with the scope of the choice, which the parties left 
to the arbitrators” (ibid, 1035). 
Accordingly, if the parties are able to select the international principles governing 
their substantive contract, they may also be able to select such principles to govern 
their arbitration agreement, which is also certainly a contract. However, such a 
contract has as its subject matter the dispute resolution choice and regulation 
method instead of substantive rights and obligations (Nazzini, 2016). Certainly, the 
common law does not distinguish, in principle, between the conflict of laws rule that 
governs substantive contracts and those governing arbitration agreements 
(Sulamerica v Enesa Engenharia, (2013).  However, what is vague is whether the 
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parties’ failure to include a choice, either expressly or impliedly, will enable courts 
to rely on international principles for the ascertainment of the arbitration 
agreement’s validity (Nazzini, 2016).  
 
Where the parties’ choice cannot be identified either expressly or impliedly, the 
courts of England and Wales still resist the potential application of non-state rules 
to arbitration agreements. This view was illustrated in Halpern v Halpern (2007) 
EWCA Civ 291, in which case the court had to ascertain whether to apply the 
Jewish, English or Swiss law to the arbitration agreement.  The parties’ implied 
intention indicated the application of the Jewish law, since it was the parties’ 
selection of the applicable law to their compromise. It was concluded by English 
courts that the principles of common law demand the choice of a state legal system 
as the agreement’s proper law, therefore, the applicability of the Jewish law was 
denied (ibid). This conclusion was rebutted by the English court of appeal which 
provides that arbitration tribunal could refer to non-state rules or parties’ 
considerations, if this reflect’s the parties’ choice and, consequently, an award 
based on such rules or consideration will be enforceable by English courts (Halpern 
v Halpern (2007) EWCA Civ 291).   This enforceability of the parties’ choice is 
preconditioned by the existence of an arbitration clause expressing the parties’ 
intentions. However, in this case, the court of appeal decided that English conflict 
of laws principles are applicable and the Jewish law is to be considered one of the 
applicable laws and it was a matter of which law applies to which part of the contract 
(ibid). 
 
There is currently no transnational approach that is entirely independent of any 
state’s law and this is demonstrated in the French law practice, which is presumably 
seen as the most internationalist approach in ICA. Since its judiciary views the 
regles materielles to be governing the validity of arbitration agreement independent 
from any states laws, even where the parties fail to either expressly or impliedly 
make a choice in this respect. In the Dalico case (1994) Rev arb 116, 117, the Cour 
de Cassation ruled: 
“... according to a substantive rule of international arbitration law, the 
arbitration clause is legally independent from the main contract in 
which it is included or which refers to it and, provided that no 
mandatory provision of French law or international public policy is 
affected, its existence and its validity depends only on the common 
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intention of the parties, without it being necessary to make reference 
to a national law” (Nazzini, 2016, p 8). 
This view was consistently adopted in successive French cases and was not 
influenced by the late adjustments to the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
 
Some commentators criticise this approach, believing it to be contentious since, in 
their view, the outcomes are random and arbitrary (Blessing, 1997). Others, 
possibly more accurately, indicate that law’s transnational principles are 
represented by their recognition of domestic law or public international law, as 
opposed to the autonomous and detached legal systems (Wortmann, 1998). 
Although, French regles materielles might be viewed as transnational due to it being 
applied by French law only to international arbitration and not to local ones because 
the international business community practice is thought to have formed the origins 
of such rules. However, this does not make them applicable across national legal 
systems without the full adoption by each member state within its own legal rules 
(Nazzini, 2016). 
 
4.4. The KSA Arbitration Framework. 
Having discussed the above theories and their influence on how ICA is perceived 
by national states, it is now pertinent to ascertain which of the above theories reflect 
the KSA’s current arbitration practice. For the purpose of this thesis, the author 
adopts the jurisdictional theory for the theoretical analysis of the KSA arbitration 
regulations. This decision was made on the basis that jurisdictional theory, unlike 
the other theories, to a large extent reflect the views of the legislators in the KSA. 
As will be addressed in the following chapters, the KSA legislative bodies have 
always taken into account the state sovereignty doctrine before issuing any 
legislation. This is particularly important in the context of ICA after the Aramco case 
decision which is discussed in detail in the following chapter. Therefore, the KSA’s 
development of its arbitration regulation has always been within the scope of the 
jurisdictional theory views, since it attempts to provides disputing parties with 
certain autonomy over their dispute resolution while, at the same time, maintaining 
direct supervision of the whole arbitration process. Although such supervision was 
lessened in the 2012 SAR, as opposed to its predecessor, the KSA retains some 
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supervision over ICA taking place in its territory or seeking enforcement before its 
courts. 
 
Despite the KSA’s attempt to develop its regulation to attract foreign commerce, its 
most important doctrine of state sovereignty remains unchanged. Therefore, the 
contractual theory, in spite of its attractiveness to international commerce, is not 
adopted in this thesis due to its attempt to limit state sovereignty over ICA in favour 
of the disputing parties’ unlimited autonomy. The application of such theory will 
significantly undermine developments introduced by the 2012 SAR in trying to ease 
the state’s supervision over ICA and increase parties’ autonomy over their dispute.  
At the same time, the hybrid theory is not applied in this thesis because it is too 
good to be practical. This theory tries to satisfy the needs of both of the above 
theories of ICA, while at the time failing to specify how an arbitrator could clearly 
ascertain which of the above views is applicable to each stage of the parties’ 
arbitration.  Last but not least, the autonomous theory is not adopted in this theses 
analysis of the 2012 SAR due to its total rejection of the state’s role in the process 
of ICA. This theory views arbitration as totally autonomous from any states 
regulation and such rejection is not particularly practical because most states would 
have an important role to play either due to the state being the seat of the dispute 
or the enforcing state. Therefore, unless there is an international court which could 
hear appeals of disputes’ arbitrability and issue binding enforcement decisions on 
sovereign states, the application of this theoretical view will be of little significance 
in the context of the KSA, taking into account its administrative and legislative 
structures (see Chapter 3). 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter discussed two significant doctrines to the application and 
development of ICA, party autonomy and state sovereignty. While both have a 
significant role in the practice of arbitration, there are still arguments favouring the 
application of one over the other. Law of the seat and state sovereignty advocates 
argues that ICA is based on relevant laws.  Therefore, domestic courts have a 
sovereign position over the entire arbitral process. The recent growing global 
recognition of the commercial significance of arbitration has led to the 
modernisation of a number of domestic laws that apply to the process of ICA in 
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various parts of the globe. Such a liberal approach has managed to minimise court 
intervention. Nevertheless, such interference is not necessarily disruptive of the 
arbitration process, since it may be equally supportive (Sumer, 2008). Domestic 
laws have contributed significantly to the development of ICA practice, through 
legislating regulations to govern the application of ICA and facilitate the 
enforcement of its awards within a state’s jurisdictions.  
 
Party autonomy supporters argue that party autonomy is the essence of arbitration 
and that arbitration came into existence through parties’ will. Therefore, parties 
have the freedom to select the method by which their arbitration is held. It is, then, 
the job of the courts to enforce the outcome of that arbitration process without 
considering the merits of the dispute. Although this seems theoretically plausible, 
there are certain considerations for the court to undertake, such as ensuring that 
the arbitral award is not inconsistent with the enforcing state’s mandatory rules and 
public policy.   
 
These opposing views of how arbitration should be conceived have led to the 
establishment of the four theories of ICA namely: contractual, jurisdictional, hybrid 
and autonomous. Understanding these theories is important since it enables a 
better understanding of how a particular state views ICA and practices it 
accordingly. Although the jurisdictional and contractual theories reflect opposite 
standpoints on the subject, a more acceptable theory was considered to be the 
hybrid theory, which adopted a middle-ground between the two earlier theories. The 
autonomous theory attempts to provide the foundation of a complete arbitration 
body. Contrary to the other three theories, this theory moved away from the reality 
of modem ICA.  Since, the current framework of arbitration and the criteria 
ascertaining whether an award could be enforceable are managed and applied by 
the states’ rules, accordingly, it is necessary to comprehend the various 
jurisdictions and the adoption of various theoretical views (Hong-lin Yu, 2008). In 
addition to the importance of arbitration theories in determining a state’s arbitration 
practices, the state’s culture and religion are equally important factors. Since this 
thesis focuses on Saudi arbitration law, the next chapter discusses the legislative 




































Chapter Five: The Development of Arbitration Law in 
Saudi Arabia: A Historical Overview 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Arbitration was practised well before litigation and before the establishment of 
formal legal frameworks and systems. Although, at certain times in the past, an 
absence of judicial institutions and the presence of state power meant that the use 
of force was the main method for settling disputes (Ragib, 1993). Esteemed people 
nevertheless managed to intervene and reach solutions. Such dispute resolution 
practices developed over time to create a body of customs and traditions in 
accordance with which parties began referring their conflicts to others.  
 
Ancient Arab traditions consisted of a set of general criteria for selecting arbitrators, 
such as choosing those reputed for their impartiality, fairness, wisdom or social 
power. Religious leaders were appointed for their religious influence, which was 
advantageous when enforcing a judgment, while the head of tribe was appointed 
for his social power, which was needed in the enforcement of decisions after they 
were reached (Albejad, 1999). Consequently, arbitration developed as a method 
for reaching a fair and final settlement of a dispute as delivered by an independent 
body. Nowadays, following the creation and development of judicial bodies, 
arbitration has become a supplementary dispute-resolution method, functioning 
under the supervision of judicial bodies (El-Ahdab, 2011). 
 
The Code of Commercial Courts 1931 constituted the first step taken in the KSA 
towards codifying Sharia arbitration rules. It failed, however, to provide a set of 
comprehensive arbitration law provisions, resulting in the Sharia courts’ refusal to 
acknowledge arbitration clauses. Even if recognised, the arbitral award’s 
enforcement was not compulsory, but voluntarily, and this voluntary enforcement 
led to arbitration law existing only in theory in the KSA, without any practical impact. 
 
In 1983 the Kingdom made another step towards establishing a robust arbitration 
framework by enacting the Arbitration Regulation of 1983. This regulation 
addressed many of the deficiencies inherited from the 1931 code but fell short of 
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producing a comprehensive set of articles governing all problems embedded in 
KSA arbitration practice.  
 
The previous chapter considered the main legal theories governing the practice of 
ICA and the extent of their impact on the doctrines of state sovereignty and party 
autonomy. It also considered the applicability of these theories to the perspectives 
on ICA which were prevalent in the KSA. This chapter provides a historical overview 
regarding the chronological development of the KSA arbitration regulation up until 
the enactment of the 2012 SAR. It also provides a critical evaluation of the 1983 
Regulation and its main deficiencies which led to the enactment of the 2012 SAR.  
 
5.2. The Commercial Court Regulation 1931 
The 1931 Code of Commercial Courts was the first set of rules governing 
commercial arbitration proceedings in the KSA. This code contained 633 articles, 
out of which nine short articles regulated arbitration proceedings in the KSA 
(Decree No.32 dated 15/01/1350 H). These nine articles provided limited rules 
governing commercial arbitration proceedings between private entities. For 
instance, disputants were enabled to refer to arbitration in a written, certified deed 
(Article 493). Such parties had the autonomy to select the arbitration tribunal, the 
timeframe, and procedures for the issuance of arbitral awards. The same code also 
forbade parties from revoking appointments of arbitrators after being approved by 
the court, but they were allowed to appeal the award before the judiciary (Article 
496). Article 493 of this code provided for institutional arbitration, and for 
proceedings to be conducted under the supervision of the commercial courts. The 
procedural law of arbitration was provided in Article 494, whereby arbitrators were 
required to take into account Sharia procedural rules and the parties’ arbitration 
agreement. 
 
These provisions of the code were not implemented in practice for a number of 
reasons, including the courts’ repeated failure to approve arbitration agreements 
and, even where agreements were approved, providing only voluntary grounds for 
the enforcement of awards (Albejad, 1999). Consequently, relying on arbitration 
was not a popular choice for parties with disputes to be settled. Conflict between 
the commercial and Sharia courts was another reason for its ineffectiveness (ibid). 
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The 1931 Regulation empowered the commercial courts to supervise the 
enforcement of arbitration awards. However, the commercial court’s power was 
suppressed by the state as per the advice of its Islamic scholars who wanted to 
unite the legal system under the framework of the Sharia courts (Mohammed, 
1987). This position, however, did not lead to the invalidation of the 1931 code and 
it continued to theoretically exist until the 1983 Regulation was enacted.  
 
5.3. The Convention of the Arab League of Nations on the 
Enforcement of Judgments of 1952.  
The Convention of the Arab League of Nations on the Enforcement of Judgments 
was ratified by the KSA on July 18, 1954, in the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 
50, dated June 1960. This Convention was replaced by the Riyadh Convention for 
Judicial Cooperation of 1983. Both conventions were ratified by Arab member 
states in order to enhance the enforcement of both judicial and arbitration decisions 
rendered in fellow member states. Both conventions confirm the enforceability of 
arbitral awards rendered in any member states without regard to the party in whose 
favour the award was issued. This was a distinctly positive step towards facilitating 
the enforcement of foreign awards in the Kingdom, taking into account the fact that 
the KSA was not a member of the NYC at the time (El-Ahdab, 2011).  
 
5.4. Saudi Arabia v Aramco 1954, 27 I.L.R.117. 
When discussing the development of the KSA arbitration regulation, it is important 
to discuss the Aramco case and its influence on the KSA legal system. This case 
concerned a contract concluded between the KSA government and the Standard 
Oil Company of California (SOCC); its name being subsequently changed to the 
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). In 1954, the government of KSA made 
an agreement with Saudi Arabian Maritime Tankers Ltd (SATCO) that gave SATCO 
priority for the transportation of KSA oil for a period of three decades. The KSA 
government ordered Aramco to comply with the Royal Decree approving its 
agreement with SATCO (Royal Decree No. 5737, 1954).  This order was refused 
by Aramco on the grounds that there was a clash between the SATCO provisions 
and the agreement with Aramco, which provided Aramco with the exclusive power 
of transporting oil from its contracted zone in the KSA. Although the government 
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made an effort to settle the dispute internally, this was unsuccessful and the issue 
was then referred to an arbitration panel in Switzerland. Having highlighted the root 
of the parties’ dispute, it is now pertinent to address the parties’ chosen applicable 
law in this case in order to understand the KSA’s attitude following the Aramco case 
decision. 
 
5.4.1.1. Applicable Law 
Article 4 of the arbitration agreement contained the following provision in regard to 
the law applicable in cases of the parties’ dispute: 
An arbitration tribunal decision in case of the parties’ dispute shall be: 
1) In conformity with the KSA law as long as matters are within the KSA 
jurisdiction. 
2) In conformity with arbitration tribunal applicable law, as long as matters 
exceed the KSA’s jurisdiction. The Saudi applicable law was Islamic law: 
 a) following the Hanbali school; and 
 b) in accordance with its application in the KSA. (Saudi Arabia v Aramco, 
1954, 27 I.L.R.117).  
 
5.4.1.2. Parties’ Positions 
The method for distinguishing matters that fell under KSA jurisdiction was 
problematic. Aramco argued that the general principles of law, as acknowledged by 
the majority of states, should be applied to the matter because their 1933 
agreement with the KSA was an international one. It also claimed that, in light of 
the international nature of the concession agreement, KSA law was exclusively 
applicable to domestic matters (Saudi Arabia v Aramco, 1954, 27 I.L.R.117). The 
KSA government responded that the SATCO agreement conformed with provisions 
of the concession agreement provided to Aramco, Sharia, the general principles of 
law as acknowledged by what were then known as ‘civilised states’, and 
international law (Saudi Arabia v Aramco, 1954, 27 I.L.R.117). Although both 
parties agreed to the applicable law terms stated in their agreement, they disagreed 
on how these terms should be interpreted and applied. 
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5.4.1.3. Panel Decision 
In spite of the parties’ agreement to arbitration outside the KSA, neither the KSA 
law nor the seat law was applied to this dispute. The arbitration tribunal provided 
that: 
“Considering the jurisdictional immunity of foreign states, recognised 
by international law in a spirit of respect for the essential dignity of 
sovereign power, the tribunal is unable to hold that arbitral 
proceedings to which a sovereign state is a party could be subject 
to the law of another state” (Saudi Arabia v Aramco, 1954, 27 
I.L.R.117.  p. 154). 
Moreover, although the parties mutually agreed to be governed by the principles of 
Sharia in accordance with the interpretation of the Hanbali school, the panel upheld 
Aramco’s position by deciding not to apply the KSA law. The panel held that: 
“The regime of mining concessions, and, consequently, also of oil 
concessions, has remained embryonic in Moslem law and is not the 
same in the different schools. The principles of one school cannot 
be introduced into another, unless this is done by the act of authority. 
Hanbali law contains no precise rule about mining concessions and 
a fortiori about oil concessions” (Saudi Arabia v Aramco, 27 
I.L.R.117.  1954, pp. 162–163).  
This decision shows a clear lack of knowledge of Sharia principles, which contain 
rules governing all types of agreements. Even if the Hanbali school did not have a 
rule on concession agreements, Islamic law is bigger than the interpretation offered 
by one school of thought and has the method of Qiyas that allows for resorting to 
other Islamic schools in order to solve a specific matter (see Chapter Two where 
Qiyas and other sources of Sharia were considered in further detail).  
 
The law applicable to this case could only be the Saudi law. However, the panel 
still refused to apply it to this dispute on the basis that there are no legal regulations 
governing oil concessions in the KSA. This concession agreement was between a 
state and a private company, and therefore could not be heard under the rules of 
public international law since this applies exclusively to disputes between states 
(Saudi Arabia v Aramco, 1954, 27 I.L.R.117). The panel stated that “Any contract 
which is not a contract between states in their capacity as subjects of international 
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law is based on the municipal law of some country” (Saudi Arabia v Aramco, 1954, 
27 I.L.R.117.  p. 202).  
 
Because of the nature of the dispute, international law was not applicable, while 
municipal laws were not applicable because of the principle of state sovereignty, 
which makes it unreasonable for a state to be subject to another state’s jurisdiction. 
So, the fact that the tribunal refused to apply KSA law and, instead, the UK and 
Swiss recognised practices were applied, may have impliedly considered the KSA 
as an uncivilised state (Al Saman, 2000). This might be considered discrimination 
against the KSA, as well as a misjudgement of Islamic law principles. The tribunal’s 
refusal to apply KSA law appears unfair because no law other than Saudi law can 
be seen to have any connection with the parties to the agreement. The concession 
agreement was made in the KSA, the contract was to be performed within the KSA’s 
jurisdiction and was given the force of law following its ratification and publication 
in the Saudi official gazette (Saudi Arabia v Aramco, 1954, 27 I.L.R.117.).15  
 
5.4.1.4. Comments  
The KSA’s relationship with Aramco was founded on each parties’ consideration of 
the other parties’ requirements. The US’s oil needs were realised by the KSA and, 
therefore, Aramco was enabled to operate in the KSA; Aramco understood the 
KSA’s need for money and organised loans and construction, as well as the training 
and employment of Saudi citizens (Baamir, 2010). If Aramco had agreed that 
SATCO should be given preferential treatment, this would have reduced the 
number of loans which it (Aramco) provided to the KSA, taking into account the 
substantial financial pressure that the KSA was under during that period (Holden, 
1981). Nevertheless, Aramco refused the agreement for preferential treatment for 
SATCO. 
 
Aramco and the KSA chose one arbitrator each and the Swiss national Georges 
Sauser-Hall was chosen by the arbitrators as the head of the arbitration tribunal. Mr 
Sauser was a well-known expert in international law and was also a member of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. In spite of his reputation, his appointment raised 
some questions regarding his knowledge of Sharia and the official language of the 
                                                 
15 No. 5737 of 09/04/1954. 
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concession agreement (Arabic) (Saudi Arabia v Aramco, 1954, 27 I.L.R.117). 
These concerns were not insignificant when taking into account one of the key 
points within the dispute, which was the interpretation of the parties’ agreement. 
The issue was whether the Arabic word ‘motlag’, in Article one of the agreement, is 
the same as the English word ‘exclusive’, and whether ‘moa’malat’ is the same as 
‘treatments’(ibid). In order for a fair decision to be reached regarding the correct 
interpretation of these words, an excellent knowledge of both languages was 
necessary, which was something the panel failed to provide (Baamir, 2010).  
 
The panel relied on the decision in Petroleum Development Ltd. v Sheikh of Abu 
Dhabi (1951) in order to not to apply a restrictive interpretation principle on the 
contractual commitment that a government owes to a private individual. However, 
this case cannot be relied on, since the nature of the dispute, in this case, was 
different from that of Aramco v Saudi Arabia. Unlike the KSA, Abu Dhabi was under 
UK control at the time and was thus not a sovereign state. This was evidenced by 
the fact that the UK government acted on its behalf in the Buraimi dispute with the 
KSA (Bin-Abood, 1992). Moreover, in Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh of Abu 
Dhabi, the arbitration tribunal, consisting of a sole arbitrator, stated that because 
Abu Dhabi was the place where the agreement was concluded and the place where 
it is to be exercised, the dispute should be governed by Abu Dhabi law. However, 
the Abu Dhabi law that was based on Sharia rule was then undermined when the 
sole arbitrator stated that: 
“It would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive region there 
is any settled body of legal principles applicable to the construction 
of modern commercial instruments” (Ruler of Abu Dhabi v Saudi 
Arabia, 1956, pp. 251–252).  
He applied English legal principles, claiming that they represented the common 
practices of civilised nations. Abu Dhabi law was rejected due to the claim that 
Islamic law had no general contract law (Kutty, 2006). That the Abu Dhabi case 
was cited by the Aramco tribunal shows the judge’s lacked understanding of Islamic 
legal principles and their application in agreements where Islamic law is applicable. 
 
The KSA’s lack of experience, from the case submission, to arbitration outside the 
KSA, to compliance with the award, played a considerable role in its losing the case. 
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The dispute included a sovereign country and a private commercial party and, if it 
was to be heard today, it would be subject to ICSID arbitration rules and the KSA 
might well secure a better outcome (see Section Six below). SATCO should not 
have been brought in the matter by the KSA since it was a Saudi company and a 
private entity created in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, complete protection should 
have been granted to SATCO, as a Saudi company. As the KSA was in a period of 
establishing and updating its legal framework, errors such as this were common 
(Baamir, 2010). 
 
Although the award found against the KSA, it delivered benefit in the sense of 
providing a useful lesson to it in respect to the structuring of its legal system (Al 
Saman, 2000). The KSA was encouraged by the award to be more cautious when 
concluding contracts with foreign entities, particularly when oil production was 
involved, and to avoid putting its national sovereignty at stake. The KSA indeed 
showed more caution when putting forward some reservations on its accession to 
the ICSID Convention (discussed below).  
 
5.5. Resolution No. 58 of 1963  
The Aramco award had a significant influence on KSA law and legal practice, 
especially aspects relating to ICA and commercial contracts. Following the Aramco 
case, a resolution was issued by the Council of Ministers in 1963 banning the 
government or its agencies from resorting to arbitration (Council of Ministers 
Resolution No. 58 of 1963). Prior to its issuance, the government had often used 
ICA to settle its disputes with private parties, both international and domestic (Al 
Saman, 2000). A Ministry of Commerce circular was issued in 1979 to supplement 
the 1963 resolution, imposing limitations on the recognition of arbitration 
agreements and clauses. The 1979 circular stated that any national company’s 
inclusion of a clause in its article of association providing for arbitration outside the 
KSA shall be unequivocally void.  It went further to reject any approval or 
registration of a company article of association if it includes such a clause (Ministry 
of Commerce, 1979). 
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5.6. Establishment of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), 1960 
Following a number of awards concerning oil related disputes, oil producing nations 
desperately needed to protect their natural resources from foreign control taking 
the form of unjust concession agreements (Skeet, 1991). For instance, until the 
middle of the 1950s, the amount of money paid as petroleum tax to the USA was 
much higher than the KSA’s percentage of its produced petroleum (Holdon and 
John, 1981). A ground-breaking idea was suggested by Perez Alfonso (the 
Venezuelan oil minister at the time) and Frank Hendryx (who was employed by the 
Kingdom’s oil ministry since he had prior experience working with Aramco). Alfonso 
suggested the establishment of OPEC in order to protect national sovereignty over 
national oil fields and to regulate the sharing of profits with foreign concessionaires 
(Brower and Sharpe, 2003). Hendryx suggested that all oil agreements should be 
renegotiated from time to time when either one of the parties is no longer happy 
with it, or when the agreement becomes outdated due to a substantial change of 
conditions (Brower and Sharpe, 2003).  
 
In 1960, OPEC was formed as a mechanism for collective self-protection and 
bargaining (Maugeri, 2006). This organisation empowered the process of 
bargaining for oil producers within the consumer-dominated market of the time 
(Griffin and Teece, 2016). Today, OPEC’s power in controlling prices has 
diminished somewhat as a result of uncertainty and political instability, in addition 
to the large volume of oil that is produced by non-OPEC states. Nevertheless, the 
psychological effect of the organisation’s statements is considered one of the 
biggest factors influencing the market (Griffin and Teece, 2016).  
 
Some Arab states, such as Libya and Algeria, chose to engage in incremental 
participation when taking control over foreign company owned concessions in 
respect to their states’ national resources, an approach which was thought to be 
both more technically beneficial and more politically safe (Alnasrawi, 1991). The 
KSA, by contrast, acquired full ownership of Aramco in 1980 as a result of their 
buying all of its assets from its US owners (Aramco, 2016). After the Aramco award, 
the KSA was encouraged to replace Western entities’ control over its domestic oil, 
for a domestic concessionaire fully owned and controlled by the government. This 
was accompanied by the prohibition, on public policy grounds, of any international 
 123 
investment in its oil industry (Brower and Sharpe, 2003). This might change in the 
near future if the KSA’s implements its recent statements where it suggested 
opening the door to foreign investors so they may buy shares of ARAMCO, which 
is the world largest petroleum company (Guardian, 2017). 
 
5.7. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Convention (ICSID). 
Saudi Arabia began transforming its economy in the 1970s, from relying completely 
on oil, to a more industrial and diversified economy, while also aiming to establish 
a petrochemical industry based on hydrocarbon (El Sheikh, 1984). Projects aimed 
at increasing foreign investment in the KSA would be unsuccessful if the economy’s 
needs for flexibility with respect to regulations and adequate protection for these 
investments are not met (Nader, 1987). For instance, foreign investments require a 
just and neutral dispute-resolution mechanism where both parties are seen as 
equal before the law. To this end, a change began when, in 1975, the KSA agreed 
to resolve a number of disputes related to Private Investment guaranteed 
agreements, in addition to contracts and commercial transactions made by the KSA 
government in the US (Ocran, 1988). The KSA joined the ICSID Convention in 1979 
and subsequently instigated a number of national amendments to its arbitration 
system in order to attract international commerce. 
 
ICSID is an independent global entity closely connected with the World Bank. 
Member States of this Convention are also members of the World Bank. ICSID 
came into force in 1966, providing its members with recourse to conciliation or 
arbitration when a member state is engaged in investment disputes with a private 
commercial person, providing that such persons hold the nationality of another 
member state (ICSID, Chapter 2, Article 25). Reliance on ICSID facilities is 
voluntary, but a disputing party will not be able to unilaterally withdraw its 
acceptance, therefore all ICSID arbitration decisions must be enforced by all 
ratifying states (ICSID, Chapter 1 (3)). The recognition of ICSID jurisdiction was 
considered a significant tool for providing investors with the confidence they needed 
to continue with ongoing investments and as an instrument for attracting additional 
investment (Lew and Mistelis, 2003). The KSA ratified the ICSID in 1979; in the 
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following year, this Convention was incorporated into the law of the KSA by 
Resolution No 372. 
 
According to Article 25(4) of the Convention, member states were allowed to inform 
ICSID of the type or types of claims that they might or might not submit for arbitration 
(ICSID, 1966). When the KSA ratified the Convention, it made reservations 
whereby all matters related to the KSA’s sovereignty and public policy were 
excluded from being submitted to conciliation or arbitration at ICSID (Delaume, 
1983). ICSID rules govern investment arbitration in the KSA, whereas the 1983 
arbitration rule governed all commercial arbitration up until 2012, when the 2012 
SAR came into existence.  
 
The first investment arbitration dispute to take place after the KSA joined ICSID 
was Ed. Züblin AG v Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2003. The dispute was in relation 
to the construction of university facilities. At the beginning of 2003, a request was 
made by the Secretary General for the convening of an arbitral tribunal, but the 
parties settled the dispute before the arbitration panel was set up and the claimant 
requested the proceedings to be stopped, relying on Article 44 of the Arbitration 
Rules (case number ARB/03/1). 
 
5.8. The Arbitration Regulation 198316 
The Arbitration Regulation 1983 was given effect by Royal Decree, through which 
the relevant articles of the earlier Code of 1931 were repealed (Royal Decree No. 
M/46 1983). Two years later a Royal Decree was issued providing the 1985 
implementation rules for the Act. The 1983 SAR achieved two significant goals for 
the KSA government. Firstly, it contained general arbitration rules that were 
accessible to both foreign investors and their legal counsels. The 1983 Royal 
Decree was designed to remove concerns over the earlier absence of judicial and 
legislative encouragement for commercial arbitration (Allam, 1985). Secondly, the 
regulation created the state’s control of the actual arbitration proceedings by 
requiring government agencies, courts, or quasi-judicial committees to supervise 
such proceedings (Allam, 1985).  
                                                 
16 These regulation articles are available on: The Arab Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3 (May, 1986), pp. 346-349. 




The 1983 SAR provided a proper body of law that aimed to facilitate an effective 
and flexible method of resolution for international commercial disputes 
(Abdulrahman and Bantekas, 2009). For several reasons, there was no practical 
arbitration in the KSA prior to the issuance of the 1983 SAR and it only existed as 
a theoretical option. Neither arbitration clause nor agreements were recognised by 
the KSA courts at the time if the party had contractually agreed to arbitrate their 
dispute. In addition, if the court approved the agreements and clause, the 
enforcement of these arbitral awards was completely voluntary (Albejad, 1999). 
Accordingly, recourse to ICA in Saudi Arabia at the time was very rare. Second, the 
dispute between commercial and Sharia courts in regards to their jurisdiction over 
arbitration disputes resulted in the ineffectiveness and lengthiness of the arbitration 
process (Abdulrahman and Bantekas, 2009).  
 
Three features of the arbitration procedure were particularly worrying and caused 
considerable concern among foreign observers (Allam, 1985). Primarily, despite 
the acknowledgement of contractual arbitration clauses in the 1983 SAR, its 
enforceability remained ambiguous if one party did not cooperate when disputes 
arose (Sayen, 1997). Neither was it certain the extent to which the KSA’s law could 
apply to the substance of the dispute. The 1983 SAR also failed to stipulate the 
grounds upon which relevant authorities in the KSA could set aside an arbitral 
award (Sayen, 2003). 
 
5.8.1. Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses 
Two kinds of agreements were recognized by the 1983 SAR: (i) the arbitration of a 
current dispute in accordance with the parties’ choice or (ii) an advance agreement 
for referring any future disputes to arbitration (Article 1). The 1985 Implementation 
Rule recognised, in article six, the validity of arbitration clauses, but the mandatory 
force of such clauses was questioned because the disputing parties were required 
to submit their arbitration documents to the relevant judicial authorities in order that 
they be validated (Article 5). Such documents had to include the names of the 
arbitrators, their consent to arbitrate in the dispute arising, the details of the dispute, 
and the signatures of both parties. 
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However, it was still unclear what would happen if one party, having given advance 
consent for the arbitration of disputes arising from a particular agreement, failed to 
cooperate with the other party in creating an arbitration instrument once the dispute 
occurred. It could be deduced from the provision of the 1983 SAR and the relevant 
timeframes and events, that the creation of an arbitration instrument is binding on 
both parties (Sayen, 2003). The 1985 Rule stressed the obligatory nature of an 
arbitration instrument, by making a distinction between an arbitration clause for 
future disputes and the selection of arbitrators, which is to be determined in an 
arbitration instrument by the disputing parties (Article 6). Different conclusions have 
been reached by commentators in regard to the legal effect of an arbitration clause 
(Saleh, 1984). 
 
The 1985 Rule created confusion when empowering arbitrators to render a default 
ruling if either party failed to attend the initial hearing, “as long as the respective 
parties have filed their statements of claim, defences and documentation” (Article 
18). If either party failed to cooperate in any phase of the proceedings, it was 
uncertain whether arbitrators would still be able to issue a default ruling. This lack 
of certainty in the drafting of the rule had to be seriously considered by foreign 
commercial entities, taking into account the earlier Saudi refusal to enforce 
arbitration clauses and the compelling questions regarding the validity of such 
clauses under Islamic law (Sayen, 2003). Under Islamic law, the legality of 
arbitration clauses could be challenged on a number of grounds. The agreement 
for future arbitration with no existing dispute might be interpreted as gharar 
(uncertainty), which is forbidden under Sharia contract law. In addition, the deferral 
of arbitration clause enforcement until the existence of the dispute between the 
contracting parties violates the doctrine that, according to the four Islamic schools, 
the arbitration clause’s contractual obligations are among the obligations that 
cannot be conditional (Al-Samaan, 2000). Nevertheless, the KSA’s official school 
of jurisprudence acknowledges the validity of contractual clauses provided they 
correspond with the purpose of the contract (Baamir, 2010). Principles of Sharia 
and its views on arbitration are discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 
 
It quickly became apparent that the 1983 Regulation and the 1985 Implementation 
Rule both contained sufficient uncertainty to enable any of the parties to delay 
proceedings. Article 7 of the 1985 Rule provided that “the authority shall issue a 
decision for approval of the arbitration instrument within fifteen days.” However, the 
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rules did not outline the course of action where authorities exceeded the assigned 
timing, which appears to be illogical and perhaps inapplicable if the instrument 
submitted had some required information missing. Also, if the authority was 
assumed to have the power to appoint arbitrators in such a case, both hearing and 
notice must be given when they are appointed (Article 10). The party seeking to 
avoid arbitration would then be given an opportunity to put forward their arguments 
concerning the validity of the arbitration clause and its applicability to the dispute 
and they could subsequently bargain over the various parts of the arbitration 
instrument (Sayen, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, uncertainty was seen when considering the authority’s potential 
intervention after the beginning of arbitration proceedings. This might happen in 
circumstances where one wished to replace arbitrators, or to hear challenges 
against them (Articles 10 and 12 of the 1983 Regulation). Article 37 stated that 
preliminary disputes concerning issues beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitration 
panel, such as criminal acts, would lead to the suspension of the arbitration 
proceedings until final judgment on the issue was heard from ‘the concerned 
authority’. The possibility of the authority intervening in the arbitration proceedings 
after it had begun undermined the parties’ autonomy, which is considered one of 
the core merits of arbitration. This led to a negative perception in the minds of 
foreign commerce actors who were discouraged from resolving their disputes under 
the KSA’s legal framework. 
 
5.8.2. Arbitrable Disputes 
Generally, the arbitrability doctrine concerns whether the applied law of a particular 
jurisdiction allows arbitrators to solve the matter in dispute. Every jurisdiction bans 
certain disputes from being resolved through arbitration, resulting in these being 
litigated regardless of the existence of an arbitration agreement (Paul, 2003).  In 
the KSA, relying on arbitration to solve a dispute is not limited to a specific kind of 
dispute. The 1983 Regulation covered a very wide range of civil disputes, making 
it a very comprehensive regulation (Article 1). However, Alassaf and Zeller (2010) 
argued that the claim that a single regulation was capable of, and appropriate for, 
regulating and resolving all internal, international, civil and commercial disputes is 
logically unreasonable. Therefore, arbitral disputes under the KSA’s legal system 
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should be clearly drafted in order to enhance certainty within the KSA’s legal 
framework.  
 
This perspective was evidenced in Article 2 of the 1983 Regulation which prohibited 
certain disputes from being resolved under arbitration where conciliation was not 
permitted. Also, Article 1 confirmed the exclusion of matters from arbitration when 
conciliation was not allowed, but the legislator of the KSA’s 1983 SAR failed to 
clearly identify the matters that could not be conciliated. Article 1 referred to limited 
subjects where conciliation was not permitted, such as Sharia limits and oaths after 
accusations of adultery. It also stressed that no dispute concerning public order 
should be accepted. Additionally, government agencies were prohibited from 
arbitrating their disputes before obtaining the Council of Ministers’ prior approval 
(Article 14). Such a ban on government agencies entering into arbitration was 
issued by the council of ministers in response to the Aramco’s award (Council of 
Ministers Resolution No. 58, 1963). 
 
5.8.3. The Capacity to Enter into an Arbitration Agreement  
The 1983 Regulation provided that the validity of arbitration agreements is limited 
by the legal capacity of the parties creating it (Article 2). The competent court 
provided authorisation to the natural guardian of minors, testamentary guardians, 
trustees and endowment administrators to rely on arbitration and, without such 
authorisation, they could not act. In contrast to other states, the KSA failed to clearly 
determine the legal age to act or enter into an agreement. Both Provision 2 of the 
1983 SAR and the 1985 Rule stated that all arbitration members must be qualified 
and capable to be party to an arbitration agreement. However, it was still unclear 
what qualifications or capabilities those members needed to have, since both 
enactments failed to specify them. The Hanbali school of juristic thought, which is 
adopted by the KSA, has outlined the specific qualifications a party must have in 
order to enter into a valid arbitration agreement. These qualifications are (Samir, 
2006): 
 Reaching the age of puberty; 
 No mental illness; and 
 Never experienced bankruptcy. 
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The age of puberty in the KSA is not determined by a fixed age but, instead, the 
KSA follows the Sharia view which takes every case on its own merits. Therefore, 
the age of puberty varies from one person to another, depending on each 
individual’s physical and mental maturity (Lerrick and Mian, 1987). There is also a 
difference in the age of puberty between males and females and, in some cases, it 
could be reached at a very young age in which the person would be incapable of 
rationally entering into commercial transactions (Çakmak, 2017). Therefore, the 
Hanafi school has fixed the age of puberty at eighteen years for males and 
seventeen years for females (Haddad and Stowasser, 2004). This being said, it is 
noticeable that the KSA requires all its nationals to obtain an independent 
identification card at the age of fifteen (The Agency of Civil Affairs, 2019) while, at 
the same time, preventing any KSA national from being employed in a public job 
until they reach the age of eighteen. Thus, it could be assumed that the age of 
puberty in the KSA is between fifteen and eighteen, depending on each person’s 
physical and mental capacities. This area needs to be clarified by KSA legislators 
in order to create more certainty in the definition of when a person is legally capable 
of being party to an agreement. This would assist the KSA’s judges in overcoming 
the issue of assessing the signs of puberty, which may differ from one person to 
another (Samir, 2006). Additionally, even if judges were able to decide on the ‘age 
of puberty’ (which might be quite young) the enforcement of this party’s agreement 
in another country might give rise to public policy or contractual issues in that 
particular state (ibid). Consequently, in order for the KSA to have an internationally 
respected legal framework, these ambiguities needed to be clarified. Since a large 
number of contractual agreements contain international substance, parties to those 
agreements need an international set of rules to ensure that their rights are well 
protected. 
 
5.8.4. Appointing Arbitrators 
Both the 1983 SAR and the 1985 Rule listed a set of requirements that a person 
must comply with before being eligible to act as a member of an arbitration panel. 
The arbitrator must have experience in the matter in dispute and have a history of 
good conduct and reputation. Where there was more than a single arbitrator, the 
panel must be odd in number (Article 4 of the 1983 Regulation). Additionally, the 
arbitrator must be self-employed with Saudi nationality or at least a Muslim from 
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outside the KSA (Article 3 of the 1985 Rule). This article additionally stated that the 
arbitrator, or the chairman where there was an arbitration tribunal panel, had to be 
aware of the principles of Sharia and the laws and rules of the KSA, as well as any 
related customs or traditions. Several commentators believe that the Kingdom’s 
1983 Regulations suggested that the arbitrator had to be a Muslim man from the 
KSA or a foreign Muslim man (Abdulrahman and Bantekas, 2009). Such 
requirement had lessened the attractiveness of the KSA arbitration regulation and 
made foreign, non-Muslim parties wary of engaging in commerce with the KSA or 
any of its nationals.  
 
The problem, nowadays, is that arbitrations are complex from both a technical and 
legal point of view. Consequently, excluding other nations’ experts is a considerable 
drawback which made arbitrations in the KSA less attractive. The fact that an 
arbitrator must be a Muslim also had to be reconsidered, taking into account the 
principles of Sharia and its sources, since foreign decisions reached by non-Muslim 
arbitrators might not be enforceable in the KSA (El-Ahdab, 1999). This is because 
Diwan Al mazalim, the competent authority responsible for reviewing foreign 
awards at the time, generally viewed foreign awards rendered by foreign arbitrators 
with suspicion. This was evidenced in Case no: No. 101/1424 in 2003 involving a 
dispute between Saudi and French commercial parties, heard by an arbitration 
tribunal in Switzerland, where Swiss law was the applicable law as per the parties’ 
choice. Diwan Al mazalim decided that such an award is null and void for violating 
the Islamic principles that prohibit Muslims from solving their disputes via non-
Muslims parties (See Chapter Six). 
 
Case No. 159/1416 in 1996 demonstrates a similar outcome. It involved a Saudi 
medical company and a Korean supply company who chose ICC rules as the 
applicable law of their arbitration clause and the UK as the seat of the dispute. 
Diwan Al mazalim, in its nullification of the subsequent award, stated that:  
“Although the text of the arbitration clause is in the parties’ contract; 
however, the basic rule in Islamic Law denies that the litigants can 
resort to the court or tribunal of non-Muslims, because resorting to 
non-Islamic Laws is considered non-belief, therefore, the arbitration 
agreement is considered to be nullified” (No. 159/1416, p 16).  
Case no: No. 142/1409 in 1988 resulted in another, similar outcome. In this case, 
Diwan Al mazalim stated that: 
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“the parties have the right to refer their dispute to litigation even if 
they have a valid arbitration clause, since litigation is the primary 
method for settling disputes and arbitration is an exception, which 
itself has no bearing on public policy” (Baamir and Bantekas, 2009).  
The suspicion of foreign awards indicated here was surely not related to ensuring 
Sharia was complied with but, instead, reflected a continuing hostility dating back 
to the Aramco award. Such awards, rendered by foreign or non-Muslim arbitrators 
and involving a Saudi party, are now enforceable under the 2013 Saudi 
Enforcement Regulation SER and the 2012 Saudi Arbitration Regulation SAR. 
These will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
 
There was also an issue concerning whether women could act as arbitrators. 
Neither the 1983 SAR nor the 1985 rule included any provision or guidance on the 
matter; however, there has never been a female judge or arbitrator in the KSA (Al-
Fadhel, 2009). Although the 1983 Regulation did not expressly prohibit women from 
acting as arbitrators, the cultural practices of the KSA cannot be ignored, since they 
play a major role in defining people’s behaviour. Neither the regulation nor the rule 
prohibited women from relying on arbitration or acting as arbitrators and women are 
entitled to have full recourse to arbitration because they have a full legal right to 
perform and manage their own businesses (Al Jarba, 2001). Notwithstanding 
women’s legal status and the 1983 SAR’s silence on this matter, it was unclear 
whether courts would accept women as arbitrators in domestic disputes. In spite of 
the ambiguity of judicial practice towards women, it is notable that women’s status 
in the KSA has changed over recent years. One of the main reasons for prohibiting 
women from acting as arbitrators was their lack of qualification; however, this is no 
longer the case (Alassaf and Zeller, 2010). Saudi women have managed, in recent 
years, to acquire significant representation in the Consultancy Council and have 
won a number of seats in municipality elections after being allowed to stand under 
the Law of Municipal Councils, 2014. The fact that the 1983 law did not recognise 
their right to be arbitrators made it globally less attractive and, from a western point 
of view, backward.  
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5.8.5. Hearing Procedure 
Article 5 of the 1983 Regulation stated that the competent authority must receive a 
submission of the arbitration agreement prior to the hearing. Once the arbitration 
agreement was accepted, the clerk of the competent authority would need to 
arrange a notification of the hearings (Article 8 of the 1983 Regulation and Article 9 
of the 1985 Rule). He would inform the arbitrators and disputing parties of the 
decision and notify them of the hearings’ time and location. Although it is in the 
process of being significantly developed, the postal system in the Kingdom remains 
inefficient, making delivery of court orders or notifications sent by post unreliable. 
The most efficient way of communicating notices in the KSA seems to be through 
telecommunications. Despite the efficiency of telecommunications, it was uncertain 
whether KSA judges would accept such methods. The method of communication 
used at the time was to inform the clerk of the competent authority who was 
empowered to seek the help of the police and mayors within their prescribed 
jurisdiction (Articles 11 and 19 of the 1985 Rule). This process of communication 
shows the extent of the courts’ intervention in the arbitration agreement because 
the method through which notifications and other conditions were performed was 
identical to those used in litigation (Alassaf and Zeller, 2010). This may have 
resulted in depriving arbitration of its main qualities of being quick, confidential, and 
mostly relying on the parties’ agreement. 
 
Another significant issue in relation to the 1983 Regulation was the language of the 
hearing. In contrast to the Model Law, where parties are able to choose the 
notifications and language of the hearings, the 1983 Regulation stated that Arabic 
must be used (Article 12 of the 1985 Rule). Articles concerning the notification of 
parties in 1983 SAR demonstrated that most of these were introduced for domestic 
matters. For instance, a notification and hearings had to be in Arabic and any party 
to the dispute or arbitrator unable to communicate in Arabic had to be accompanied 
by a competent interpreter (Article 12 and 25 of the 1985 Rule). This then raised 
the question of whether these arbitration regulations had been introduced only to 
solve domestic disputes. Article 1 of the Arbitration Regulation 1983 unequivocally 
states that it was created to settle any dispute and it should, therefore, be applicable 
to all disputes, not just local ones. Article 15(c) of the 1985 rules declared that 
international corporations with branches in the KSA should be notified by way of 
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notice being delivered to its branch or agent. This indicates that the KSA regulations 
were introduced to solve national and international disputes alike. Yet, limiting the 
arbitration process to the Arabic language resulted in fewer agreements selecting 
the KSA as a lex arbitri (Alassaf and Zeller, 2010). This issue has been encountered 
by other countries in the region too. In 1999, Turkey eased language restrictions for 
foreign investors, in particular, for solving disputes resulting from concessions for 
public services and, as a result, the level of international capital investment in the 
country has since tripled (Brower and Sharp, 2003). 
 
It is significant to consider the requirement that the arbitration tribunal should hear 
the dispute openly unless the panel or parties ask for it to be conducted in private 
(Article 20 of the 1985 Rule). This requirement for public hearings contradicted 
established arbitration principles. The main goal of having closed hearings is to 
ensure confidentiality for the parties, which is one of the main motives behind 
resorting to arbitration (Born and Born, 2012). The KSA’s requirement for public 
hearings is to ensure that justice is served (Albejad, 1999). Such a requirement has 
its roots in, and has developed from, the KSA’s judicial system and the Sharia 
courts law of procedure (Article 16). Although, in practice, the KSA’s courts prohibits 
any person unrelated to the dispute from entering the court during hearings. This, 
again, shows a lack of certainty in the KSA’s legal system, which was another 
reason for the lack of trust from international commerce in this system. 
 
5.8.6. Issuing Awards 
Once the dispute was ready to be settled, the tribunal would close the hearing for 
scrutiny and deliberations. The process of deliberation had to take place secretly 
and only the arbitration panel who attended the hearings had the right to attend 
(Article 38 of the 1985 Rule). During this process, the panel could hear no further 
clarifications from any of the parties unless they were both present. Additionally, no 
party was able to present documents to the tribunal unless the other party had been 
offered the chance to see it. If the documents were important, then the tribunal had 
the right to extend the award-issuing date and reopen the hearing (Article 40 of the 
1985 Rule). If an extension was granted, the parties had to be notified regarding 
the date of further deliberation (Article 40 of the 1985 Rule). If no date was fixed, 
the award had to be declared in a period of ninety days from the date of the 
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competent authority’s approval of the arbitration agreement (Article 5,1983 
Regulations). A majority vote of arbitrators could delay the time scale for the 
issuance of the award for reasons concerning the dispute. In practice, if the panel 
did not issue the award within 90 days, the dispute would be referred to the 
competent authority who would then make a decision (Article 15 of the 1985 Rule). 
This was another deficiency of the 1983 SAR that subjected the parties to the 
supervision of the court due to impractical timeframes. 
 
At this stage, it is important to take into consideration whether an arbitration award 
was res judicata in the KSA. Disputing parties were empowered by the 1983 SAR 
to challenge arbitrators’ awards within 15 days of the award being received (Article 
18). This challenge had to be made to the competent authority. Any referral to the 
competent authority stressed, again, the extent of the courts’ intervention in the 
process of arbitration in the KSA. Once the award became final, it was enforceable 
exclusively by order of the competent authority, provided the award complied with 
Sharia rules. The need for the competent authority’s approval in respect to the 
award suggests that the drafters of the 1983 SAR intended to give any decisions 
made by arbitral tribunals less force than those decided by the judiciary (El-Ahdab, 
1999).  
 
After the competent authority’s approval, the award became enforceable and, 
therefore, the clerk of that authority would send a copy of the execution decision 
demanding the execution of the award to the winning party and to all related 
government authorities and departments (Article 44 of the 1985 Rule). The 
competent authority responsible for executing foreign awards in the KSA was 
Diwan Al mazalim, which was given this role in response to the KSA’s accession to 
the NYC, as will be discussed later (Article 13 of Diwan Al mazalim Law 2007). This 
is no longer the case since the 2013 Royal Decree established enforcement courts 
with the responsibility of executing all domestic and foreign awards (see Chapter 
Three). 
 
5.8.7. Enforcing International Awards 
With regard to the enforcement of foreign awards, the KSA’s arbitration system was 
complex, since the reciprocity reservation was applied even between the NYC 
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ratifying states. Diwan Al Mazalim was enabled by Royal Decree to consider the 
enforcement applications of foreign awards in the KSA (Article 8(1)(g) of Royal 
Decree No. M/51). According to the procedural rules of the Diwan Al Mazalim, 
foreign awards were to be enforced in the KSA only if they met certain conditions 
(Article 6). Primarily, any evidence was to be presented by the party seeking 
enforcements, confirming the willingness of the award’s jurisdiction to enforce the 
KSA’s arbitral awards. Additionally, the same party had to demonstrate the award’s 
compliance with Sharia rules, as enforced in the KSA. It was significant that foreign 
awards normally failed to comply with this requirement since common commercial 
practices include the application of Usurious interest, which is prohibited under 
Sharia principles and, consequently, their enforcement in the KSA was rejected 
(Group, 2007). In Ninivo Company v The Redec Company 185/2/q/149, the KSA 
court decided that the English court’s award was not enforceable, notwithstanding 
the applicant’s presentation of the British government’s letter confirming the UK 
court’s general willingness to enforce foreign awards. Diwan Al mazalim decided 
that, because of the letter’s failure to guarantee reciprocity, the award would not be 
enforced. It is, nevertheless, important to note that Diwan Al mazalim considers the 
reciprocity requirement on a case by case basis, without being bound by prior 
decisions. 
 
5.8.8. Public Policy in Saudi Arabia 
Public policy provides the grounds upon which member states could reject the 
recognition and enforcement of awards (NYC section V). It is of considerable 
significance to arbitration, particularly when considering the enforcement of awards 
irrespective of nationality. Generally, an arbitration award is not enforceable if it fails 
to comply with the enforcing state’s public policy requirements (Albejad, 1999). This 
applies in the KSA for both international and national arbitration awards, 
notwithstanding the fact that when national awards reach the enforcement stage, 
they would have already been carefully scrutinised by the competent authority 
(Abdulrahman and Bantekas, 2009). Therefore, the unenforceability of awards was 
very often applied to international awards, since KSA public policy was not clear 
and might cover a broad range of practices that were likely to be unknown to 
international arbitrators applying a non-Saudi lex arbitri.  
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When considering what amounts to a breach of the KSA’s public policy, there is a 
real need to highlight the plurality of norms from which public policy could be 
inferred. Firstly, the principles and rules of Sharia do not appear to have a clear 
definition of what it encompasses under the KSA law. Nevertheless, several 
attempts were made to elucidate the public policy notion under both Islamic law and 
Saudi domestic law.  Jalal argues that, under Islamic law, public policy is grounded 
in compliance with the general principles of Sharia, the Quran and Sunnah, in 
addition to the belief that “individuals must respect their clauses, unless they forbid 
what is authorised and authorise what is forbidden under Sharia law” (Jalal, 1998, 
pp 49). Asouzu, on the other hand, stated that the term public policy in Islamic law 
is ‘the common interest’ ‘Masaleh Morsalah’ (Asouzu, 2001, p46). Therefore, any 
principle advancing the common interest – i.e., the public interest – denotes public 
policy.  
 
Another attempt to elucidate Islamic law as an effective norm for shaping the 
Kingdom’s public policy was made by Alassaf and Zeller (2010). They argued that 
the KSA’s public policy is founded on its Basic Law of 1992, which provides that the 
Quran and the Prophet’s Sunna are the KSA constitution (Article 1). These sources, 
alongside the secondary sources of Sharia, such as Ijma and Qiyas, have to be 
taken into account by foreign lawyers when a Saudi national becomes party to a 
contract, since non-compliance with these sources would infringe the public policy 
of the KSA and lead to the rejection of awards or judgments (Gemmell, 2003). 
 
The use of these secondary sources forms Islamic jurisprudence, an understanding 
of which is based upon the understanding and interpretation of these principles by 
religious scholars and judges (Abdulrahman and Bantekas, 2009). Since sources 
of Sharia form the basis of the KSA’s public policy legal reasoning and, therefore, 
only Islamic scholars and judges are able to interpret them, any issue fully clarified 
by the Qur’an or Sunnah, will not be construed by the KSA’s judges (see Chapter 
Two). However, previously, it was hard to know whether a particular foreign award 
was being rejected by a judge on public policy grounds, or even if the Kingdom’s 
policy was limited to the Basic Law of 1992, the interpretation of which can, based 
on the individual analysis and the understanding of each judge, be either narrow or 
broad. That individual understanding can vary from one judge to another and from 
one time to another since no precedent is binding on a future judge (Alassaf and 
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Zeller, 2010). Consequently, ascertaining a list of issues that infringes the KSA’s 
public policy is fraught with risk.  
 
Alongside the norms of Sharia, the KSA’s own regulations and ratifications of 
international conventions are another important norm that determines the essence 
of the Kingdom’s public policy (Bühring-Uhle and 2006). The importance of local 
regulations in determining a state’s public policy was highlighted by Redfern and 
Hunter, where they stated that: 
“Public policy is based on the citizens in a given society and can be 
characterised as a single pattern, flow or path, often its most basic 
values that are embodied in domestic legislation; hence, each state 
has its own notion about what is required by its own public policy” 
(Redfern and Hunter, 2015. P 419).   
Therefore, the term public policy is highly influenced by the state’s domestic 
regulations, particularly those of a mandatory nature. Moreover, such regulations 
are largely associated with the notion of public policy, since the values that are 
advanced by such rules are normally of a public policy nature (Bermann and 
Mistelis, 2011). Courts could rely on mandatory rules to reject the enforcement of 
foreign judgments and awards on its being part of a state’s public policy (Zhilsov, 
1995). To that end, the KSA courts may interpret public policy widely to include all 
mandatory rules of the KSA. Accordingly, it is particularly important for any foreign 
party seeking enforcement in the KSA to ensure that the KSA’s mandatory rules 
are not infringed. This is important because the lack of compliance with the KSA’s 
mandatory rules would lead to the award’s enforcement being rejected on public 
policy considerations. 
 
The final norm influencing the Kingdom’s public policy is society’s common values 
(Urf).  Such values are very influential in determining the scope of a particular 
country’s public policy. This is because the formulation of a state’s public policy 
needs to take into account the public values where such values define how public 
policy is to be perceived by business-men and -women from other states and 
cultural backgrounds. The importance of such values lies in their ability to ascertain 
the limit of what society would view as acceptable and such ascertainment plays a 
significant role in the success of transnational commerce (Gerston, 2014). 
Consequently, it is imperative for Saudi legislators to draft regulations that would 
enable the enforcement of Saudi perspectives on public policy in clearer terms 
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(ibid). Such regulations should highlight differences in position between Saudi 
Arabia and other countries when interpreting and applying public policy reservation, 
as per each state’s societal values (Al Saman, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, it is valid to say that a state’s public policy would encompass the moral 
and social values of its society. Therefore, any infringement of a state’s public policy 
would result in a direct and explicit breach of the legal text, in addition to the breach 
of that state’s social and ethical values (Zaid, 2014). This is because the state’s 
public policy includes a variety of aspects, from upholding trade and preserving the 
interest of those involved, as well as public interest at large. Accordingly, any 
detraction from such harmonious consideration would disturb the state’s public 
policy in commerce (Brekoulakis and Devaney, 2017). 
 
5.9. The Riyadh Convention 1983 
The Riyadh Convention 1983 was ratified to meet the growing demand for Arab 
countries to liberalise their commercial legal frameworks for the purpose of allowing 
greater participation from international commerce (John, 2004). With the KSA being 
a signatory to both the Washington Convention and the NYC, the Riyadh 
Convention served as a method for recognising and enforcing judgments between 
Arab states in a manner similar to that provided for under the NYC member states 
(Mohd and Al Mulla, 1999). The Riyadh Convention is the Arab League’s equivalent 
of the NYC, and covers more details, including court rulings and arbitration awards, 
thus making it a more comprehensive mechanism (Mohd and Al Mulla, 1999). 
 
Article 37 sets out the basic requirements of this Convention, which starts with the 
requirement that all arbitral awards issued in one state be enforced and recognised 
by all others, although some exceptions are allowed. Grounds for non-enforcement 
include: void or expired arbitration agreements, incompetence of the arbitrator, the 
parties not being duly summoned to appear and the public policy considerations of 
the recipient state (Articles 28, 30 of the Convention). These exceptions have been 
relied upon by the KSA as grounds for the non-enforcement of awards rendered 
within the nations of the Arab League (John, 2004). These exceptions are similar 
to those specified in the NYC, particularly those concerning public policy, non-
arbitrable disputes, incapacity and invalidity. Nonetheless, there are some 
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reservations in this Convention that are not specified by the NYC, such as the 
requirement for conformity with Sharia law. This is not expressed literally in the 
NYC, but it is implied because public policy in the KSA requires compliance with 
Sharia (John, 2004). 
 
5.10. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Commercial 
Arbitration Centre 
In 1993 leaders from the Gulf countries established this centre as a non-profit, 
independent institution (The GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre, 2016). The 
Centre was announced during the fourteenth summit of the GCC states, held in the 
KSA and with offices in both the KSA and Bahrain. In 1994 the centre’s rules were 
published and became functional the following year (The GCC Commercial 
Arbitration Centre, 2016). It is the busiest centre in the Gulf area for arbitrating 
disputes because its procedural rules are in full compliance with the legal systems 
of member states (Alyaum Newspaper, 2003). Choosing the GCC Arbitration 
Centre is beneficial for international parties seeking enforcement in the KSA, since 
the centre’s procedural rules state that: 
“An award passed by the Tribunal pursuant to these rules shall be 
binding and final. It shall be enforceable in the GCC member states 
once an order is issued for the enforcement thereof by the relevant 
judicial authority” (Article 36, The GCC Commercial Arbitration 
Centre, 2016). 
The rules of the centre also provide grounds upon which an award could be 
rejected, which include rendering an award with no arbitration agreement or 
following one that is void (Article 36). 
5.10.1. The New York Convention 1958 
The United Nations Convention on recognising and Enforcing International 
Arbitration Awards 1958, generally known as the NYC, obliges its member states 
to enforce an award rendered within any other member state. The NYC was ratified 
by the KSA in 1994, making it the 94th contracting state. One of its key features is 
the empowerment of its members to rely on the following reservations to reject the 
enforcement of an award rendered in another state (Article 5.2). The first 
reservation for refusing an award is related to the dispute’s matter being incapable 
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of being settled through arbitration under the state’s national rules (Article 5.2(a)). 
The second is related to awards being contradictory to the state’s national public 
policy (Article 5.2(b)). Both grounds can be problematic, depending on how states 
apply them. Therefore, it is important to establish whether the public policy 
reservation includes the non-arbitrability of the dispute and, if so, whether it should 
be viewed as an independent reservation stemming from the one based on public 
policy. Redfern and Hunter (2015) argue that: 
“making non-arbitrability a distinct ground for resisting enforcement 
is unnecessary since its subject matter is considered as forming a 
section of the notion of public policy specified in Article 5(2)(b)”.  
This is problematic in the KSA context since the public policy notion is broadly 
construed by the KSA’s courts, which may result in the Convention being 
ineffective. When considering non-arbitrable disputes under the 1983 SAR, such 
as those involving government agencies, it is clear that such disputes were also 
unenforceable on public policy grounds because, following the Aramco award, such 
agencies were prohibited from resorting to arbitration for public policy reasons.  
 
The latter ground for refusal could be applied broadly because the KSA’s public 
policy encompasses many aspects which could be relied upon to reject any award. 
Hence, there was an argument claiming that the ratification of this Convention by 
the KSA does not oblige it to enforce other state’s arbitral awards (Roy, 1994). This 
is because of its broad interpretation of Article 5(b) which should, therefore, be 
narrowly interpreted in order for the Convention to be of practical effect (Roy, 1994). 
Roy (1994) contended that the KSA’s accession to the NYC dealt with its historical 
resistance to foreign arbitration because it facilitated a method through which 
foreign arbitral awards were recognised and enforced and, hence, it achieved the 
KSA’s ambition of modernising its arbitration system. At the same time, the 
Convention offered, in Article V (2) (b), a safe harbour wherein the KSA would not 
be obliged to recognise international awards that were against its public policy. This 
article enables the KSA to correspond with international arbitration standards and 
practices and still apply its national public policy. Consequently, this article enabled 
the KSA to achieve both its needs: the modernisation of its arbitration system to be 
consistent with international arbitration, while preserving its rigid interpretation of 
religious teachings (Roy, 1994).  
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As has been mentioned a number of times in this thesis, foreign investors and 
contractors encounter problems when deciding to conduct business in the KSA. 
The KSA’s accession to the NYC aimed at increasing the confidence of foreign 
commerce entities in concluding business transactions in the KSA, while being 
assured of a fair arbitration to any arising disputes (Roy, 1994). Article III of the 
Convention also aims to provide assurance for foreign investors and contractors 
that an arbitration award issued in one of this Convention’s ratifying states will be 
enforced in the KSA. However, the public policy reservation in the Convention 
seems to invalidate this assurance, by allowing the Kingdom to refuse all arbitration 
awards that violate its public policy. Since the KSA’s law and policy is completely 
different to the laws of most contracting states, its courts will find it easy to refuse 
foreign arbitral awards in accordance with these provisions (Roy, 1994). In fact, the 
KSA could find itself not obliged to enforce any more foreign arbitral awards than it 
did before entering into this Convention (Roy, 1994). Article 5(2) (b) allows the KSA 
to achieve its aim of acquiring acknowledgement from the international community 
while keeping its historical laws and religious interpretations. As a result, this article 
works against the main purpose on which the NYC was founded. The Convention 
was written to provide the international community with a tool that demands 
contracting states to enforce other signatory state’s arbitration awards, as is clear 
from Article 3. However, the broad interpretation of Article 5 provides contracting 
nations with the ability to avoid this obligation and refuse to enforce awards that 
they have agreed to uphold. 
 
5.11. Enforcement Regulation 201317 
On 3rd July 2012, Royal Decree No. M/53 was issued, approving the SER, which 
came into force in February 2013. This was followed by the issuance of its 
Implementation Act of 2013 in the same month that the 2013 Regulation came into 
force (Royal Decree No. M/53). This implementation act was later amended, in 
2017, to clarify some ambiguities of the 2013 SER. This enforcement regulation is 
the first unified enforcement regulation in the KSA. Before its introduction, there 
was no single legal framework governing the enforcement of decisions and awards 
within the KSA. However, there were a number of regulations dealing with the 
                                                 
17 These regulation articles could be accessed on: The KSA Ministry of justice website: Available at: 
https://www.moj.gov.sa/Documents/Regulations/pdf/En/76.pdf. Accessed on 12/01/2019. 
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enforcement process, such as Diwan Al mazalim Law 2007 and the Law of 
Procedure before Sharia Courts 2007; both have now been replaced by the 2013 
SER (Royal Decree No M/78 of 1st October 2007). These developments are 
considered to have transformed enforcement procedures in the KSA, in addition to 
being an important step towards codifying the KSA’s legal system and creating an 
attractive forum for enforcing both local and international awards and decisions. 
 
This 2013 SER and its Implementation Acts of 2013 and 2017 contain provisions 
governing the entire process of enforcing awards and decisions reached inside or 
outside the Kingdom’s territory. Consequently, this regulation influences both 
corporate and personal entities operating in the KSA or conducting business with a 
Saudi party, by controlling the enforcement process of their dispute resolution 
decisions (Royal Decree No. M/53). The 2013 law clearly describes the 
enforcement judge’s roles and responsibilities in enforcing court judgments’ and 
arbitral awards in the KSA. Article 2 of the Law enables the judge to “enforce and 
oversee the enforcement of all judgments and awards in KSA except for judgments 
and decisions related to administrative and criminal cases”. This article further 
provides that an enforcement officer should lend assistance to the enforcement 
judge and it requires judges to abide by the Sharia court hearing procedures, unless 
otherwise provided in this law (Royal Decree No. M/53). 
 
Before the 2013 SER and its Implementation Acts were issued, the competent court 
for enforcing both foreign awards and judgments was Diwan Al mazalim. This led 
to parties wanting to enforce their awards or decisions being caught in the rigidity 
and slow procedures of Diwan Al mazalim. Such procedures may even have 
resulted in the parties seeking enforcement being adversely disadvantaged (Shoult, 
2006). This deficiency in the enforcement process has been addressed by the 2013 
law enabling enforcement courts to enforce all awards within the KSA’s jurisdiction. 
It also prevented judges from reviewing the merits of foreign decision requiring them 
to enforce such decisions if they met certain criteria as shall be illustrated in Chapter 
Eight. This, in turn, has limited the scope of judge’s discretion in ascertaining 
whether a particular foreign decision is to be enforced or not. The 2013 SER has 
also created some certainty in the KSA, enforcement procedure whereby all 
decisions seeking enforcement in the KSA are to be subject to the same single 
enforcement framework. In addition, the legislation of the 2013 Regulation forms 
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another step taken by the Saudi legislature to codify its legal system and make it 
more accessible and attractive to foreign commerce.   
 
5.12. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to provide a historical overview of the development of laws as 
well as approaches to arbitration in the KSA. This included laws promulgated within 
the KSA by Royal Decree as well as regional and international instruments 
governing the arbitration process and its enforcement within the Kingdom. This 
chapter demonstrated the influence of the Aramco decision as the driving force for 
the codification of laws regulating arbitration in the KSA. It also highlighted the fact 
that the main factors inhibiting successful international commercial arbitration in the 
KSA were, (i) Sharia as the body of principles underpinning the legal system, and 
(ii) public policy constraints leading to the non-enforcement of arbitral awards. Both 
are inter-connected concepts not easily subscribing to the written law in view of the 
ambiguity surrounding their meaning, scope and interpretation. This, it is submitted, 
is the core challenge in attracting international commerce as well as its resolution 
through arbitration in the KSA and the main subject of this study. 
 
This chapter also discussed the KSA government’s attitude towards ICA, which was 
initially welcomed and relied on by the KSA to resolve its dispute with the ruler of 
Abu Dhabi, as evidenced by the Buraimi case in 1955. However, the Aramco case 
changed this attitude to a hostile one, since its outcome was considered by the KSA 
government to be a violation of its national sovereignty (Saudi Arabia v. Aramco, 
1958). Consequently, the government’s view of arbitration after the Aramco award 
changed and became more hostile.  This hostile attitude did not last for long, as the 
world’s increasing reliance on oil forced the KSA to adopt a more flexible attitude. 
This flexibility began when the KSA accessed the ICSID and the New York 
Convention in order to embrace internationally legal standards, which functioned 
as an attractive legal feature for international commerce. It also enacted the 1983 
SAR and its implementation rule of 1985 in order to depart from this hostile attitude 
towards ICA, Nevertheless, Aramco’s influence remained clear in the KSA’s 
arbitration practice.  This was clearly demonstrated in the state’s excessive control 
over the arbitration process from its start until the enforcement stage. This resulted 
in the KSA’s enactment of the 2012 SAR, with the goal of removing any legal 
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obstacles facing foreign investors, in order to gain their trust in the KSA’s legal 




































Following the previous chapter, which provided a detailed discussion of the 
development of arbitration regulations in the KSA, it is now imperative to critically 
assess the last enactment of the Saudi Arbitration Regulation 2012 (2012 SAR). 
With the continuous development in global commercial and international relations 
between states and business corporations, the legislative body of the KSA realised 
the need for change in the KSA’s legal framework. This change is particularly 
needed to help create certainty in the KSA’s legal system through the development 
of a codified legal system that is easily accessible to both local and foreign entities. 
With this aim in mind, more than ten regulations were introduced in the last decade 
alone, with the 2012 SAR and the Saudi Enforcement Regulation 2013 (SER 2013), 
being the most important enactments. The KSA’s efforts to modernise its legal 
system were accompanied by considerable caution, so as not to influence the 
significant status of Sharia in the KSA’s existing legal practices. Therefore, the 
present chapter, as well as Chapter Seven, will critically analyse the 2012 SAR and 
compare it with its predecessor, as well as other known international institutional 
rules, where relevant. Both chapters will also rely on the researcher’s interviews 
with a number of relevant professionals in the field with the purpose of providing 
better insights into how this new law is being applied in practice. These interviews 
were conducted with five participants, including three judges and two arbitrators, 
and their views inform the analysis of the 2012 SAR (see Chapter One).  
6.2. Sources of the 2012 SAR18 
Drafters of the 2012 SAR made a conscious decision to rely on the UNICTRAL 
Model Law on ICA as the basis of this new arbitration regulation. This model is used 
by more than 80 states as the basis of their respective arbitration systems 
(UNICTRAL, 1985).19 It represents a common consensus on key arbitration rules 
                                                 




by a large number of states employing different legal and economic systems. The 
model encourages member states to adopt it into their legal systems with minimum 
changes, which has led to some states adopting the same version (Al-Fadhel, 
2010). The KSA has relied on this model as its starting point but introduced a 
number of important amendments to ensure that certain issues of domestic concern 
were effectively addressed, such as emphasising the compelling need for the 
arbitral process not to violate Sharia, as applied in the KSA (Al-ammari & Martin, 
2014). This is done by enabling the enforcement judge to ensure that the award 
does not contain any element that would infringe the KSA’s public policy, which is 
informed by Sharia. The KSA’s public policy, as interpreted today by enforcement 
judges, is considered in detail in Chapter Seven. The KSA’s approach towards the 
UNICTRAL model is justified by its desire to develop an attractive legal system 
accessible to, and reliable for both local and foreign commerce, while at the same 
trying to preserve its Islamic values. The UNCITRAL model is globally recognised 
by arbitrators and is also applied either fully or partially by numerous states. 
Therefore, its adoption into the KSA’s arbitration regulation is likely to make it more 
attractive to foreign commerce. At the same time, the KSA’s reservation of its right 
to uphold its public policy is a guarantee for preserving sovereignty over disputes 
enforced within its jurisdiction. 
 
In this regard, participant 3 stated that “the fact that the new arbitration regulation 
is largely based on the UNICTRAL model makes foreign investors less worried 
about their lack of knowledge of disputes’ adjudication procedures in Saudi 
Arabia”20. He further added that “one of the most important factors in attracting 
commerce both locally and internationally is the existence of a clear and reliable 
legal framework, as well as the existence of an independent arbitration centre that 
applies widely recognised legal principles”. This sentiment was also emphasised 
by participant 4, a senior judge in the Board of Grievance who is also in charge of 
reviewing and enforcing foreign awards. He stated that “the main feature of this new 
regulation is its compatibility with the developed world’s arbitration regulations, 
which are mostly influenced by the UNICTRAL model in one way or another”. 
Therefore, such compatibility has strengthened this new regulation and provided 
an additional economic feature to attract foreign investors, who will find this new 
                                                 
 
20  Participant 3 is a previous judge and a practicing arbitrator. 
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arbitration regulation more in line with international practices than the old one. 
Although this sounds promising in theory, in practice things are still developing and 
it is yet to be seen whether this new regulation will successfully attract foreign 
commerce. 
 
The KSA’s emphasis on Sharia is understandable considering its legal system. 
Which is based on Sharia, unlike other Arab states that rely on Sharia alongside 
other sources in their issuance of legislation (Nesheiwat and Al-Khasawneh, 2015). 
It is also worrying to realise that Sharia is not codified and could not be resorted to 
in the form of listed rules, as opposed to the civil codes that exist in some other 
Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon (ibid). The KSA, in the process 
of legislating new regulations such as the 2012 SAR, is attempting to create a 
codified legal body of rules that could be accessed by any interested party. 
However, when the regulation does not provide for a particular rule, or is silent 
about it, the legal rule on this specific matter will only be extrapolated by scholars 
of Sharia. This being said, it is important to note that the continuous development 
of regulations in the KSA, as well as its recent trend of publishing case decisions, 
means that most of the outstanding ambiguities are likely to be clarified with the 
passage of time.  
 
6.3. General Provisions 
We now turn to some important general provisions of the 2012 SAR with a view to 
highlighting some important changes from previous legislative enactments. 
 
6.3.1. Arbitration Agreement 
The terms “arbitration clause”, “arbitration instrument” and “submission agreement” 
were first introduced into the KSA’s arbitration practice by the 1983 SAR. This 
regulation made a distinction between two kinds of arbitration agreements – the 
submission agreement and the arbitration clause (Article 1, 1983 SAR). This 
distinction existed only in theory, while in practice they have both been used as if 
they were the same; this is seen in the fact that both types had to be redrafted into 
an arbitration instrument prior to their submission (ibid). This need for an arbitration 
instrument opened a window for the party who is looking to delay the arbitration, or 
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prevent it from taking place, to do so through a sustained lack of cooperation with 
the other party in the drafting of such an instrument.  
 
This is no longer the case because the 2012 SAR has closed such a window 
through its clear definition of what constitutes an arbitration agreement. Article 1 of 
the 2012 SAR states that “An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an 
arbitration clause in a contract, or in the form of a separate arbitration agreement”. 
The 2012 SAR also provides that an agreement to resort to arbitration could be 
made before or after the dispute takes place and this could be made in a separate 
document such as an email or letter, or as part of the parties’ contractual agreement 
(Article 9). The parties’ reference to a different document in their contractual 
agreement – involving a clause for arbitration such as FIDIC – is sufficient to create 
a legally binding arbitration clause (Nesheiwat and al-Khasawneh, 2015).21 Article 
9 (2) of the 2012 SAR stresses the importance of the arbitration agreement being 
in writing and states that “The arbitration agreement shall be in writing; otherwise, 
it shall be void”. The 1983 Regulation did not stress the importance of this being in 
writing, which could be justified if the law-makers believed that it is sufficient that 
the agreement has to be redrafted into an arbitration instrument before being 
approved (Article 1, 1983 SAR). Article 9 (3) of the 2012 SAR further stipulates the 
circumstances in which an arbitration agreement is deemed to be written and such 
circumstances are similar to those in the UNICTRAL model provided under Article 
7 (UNICTRAL, 1985). This reflects the KSA’s changing attitude and its desire to 
become more in line with international standards in order to help achieve its goal of 




Another important development introduced by the 2012 SAR is the principle of 
severability, whereby the invalidity of the main contract does not invalidate the 
arbitration clause provided in it (Saleh, 2012). This is very important because, in a 
number of disputes, a challenge is made to invalidate the parties’ contract by 
arguing that the agreement has not been performed, the agreement is void or on 
other possible grounds. Without this principle of severability, as soon as the 
                                                 
21 FIDIC: International Federation of Consulting Engineers 
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agreement becomes invalid, the arbitration clause will also be automatically 
invalidated (Scanlon and Clare, 2007). However, with the severability principle in 
place, the arbitration clause is separated from the main contract in the sense that 
any invalidation of the main contract will not affect the validity of the arbitration 
clause (ibid). Article 21 of the 2012 SAR particularly introduced the severability of 
the arbitration clause principle by stating that: 
 “An arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated 
as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. The 
nullification, revocation or termination of the contract which includes 
said arbitration clause shall not entail nullification of the arbitration 
clause therein, if such clause is valid.” 
This provision introduces the severability principles in a similar way to that provided 
for by the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 16.1 of the model law provides that:  
“An arbitration clause which forms part of the contract and which 
provides for an arbitration under these rules shall be treated as an 
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision 
by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail 
ipso jure the validity of the arbitration clause” (UNICTRAL Model, 
1985).  
This principle was not covered by the old law, despite its importance. This is 
indicative of the KSA’s effort to depart from the close-minded view on arbitration it 
used to hold, in an attempt to become more harmonised with internationally 
accepted standards. 
 
In this regard, participant 2 stated that the new law is more open to recognising 
most internationally accepted principles, as long as they do not contradict Sharia.22 
The default rule in this regard is that everything is permissible under Sharia unless 
there is a clear statement providing for the contrary. This participant further stated 
that “the severability principle is one of the most crucial and widely accepted 
principles and, as such, the KSA recognised it in its 2012 Arbitration Regulation”. 
This principle is very important because, with the increasing number of global 
commercial transactions, foreign commercial actors enter into contracts with their 
Saudi counterparts and, therefore, in some instances, the contractual agreements 
between them have some elements that contradict Sharia rulings. This makes them 
                                                 
22 Participant 2 is an enforcement judge in the capital city of Saudi Arabia (Riyadh). 
 150 
invalid under Saudi public policy. As a result, unless the arbitration clause is 
severed from this contract, the foreign party may find themselves in a position 
where they have no recourse to arbitration under the KSA’s legal framework, 
despite their agreement’s arbitration clause. This issue has been resolved with the 
introduction of this principle in the 2012 SAR, thus creating a more reliable legal 
framework for attracting foreign commerce. 
 
6.3.3. Institutional Arbitration 
The 2012 SAR also enabled the arbitration parties to resort to any procedural rules, 
including those of international arbitration institutions, as long as Sharia rules were 
not infringed (Article 4 and 5, 2012 SAR). These institutions include, but are not 
limited to, the London’s Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and Dubai’s International Arbitration Centre (DIAC). 
The application of these institutional rules would, straightaway, give them 
precedence in the case of any contradiction with the 2012 SAR procedural rules, 
provided they did not contradict Sharia principles (Harb and Leventhal, 2013). 
Therefore, it is important for the disputing parties to be aware that the application 
of such institutional rules may lead to the infringement of Sharia principles, which 
will make any subsequent award unenforceable in the KSA. The infringement of 
Sharia could take many forms, such as preventing the party from settling his case 
fully or cross-examining any witness and so on (Nesheiwat and al-Khasawneh, 
2015). This openness to other institutional rules is in line with the KSA’s 
jurisdictional view of arbitration since it allows disputing parties autonomy to 
determine how their dispute is to be governed, while stressing that such rights stem 
from state law. Although the currently-practiced form of jurisdictional theory in the 
KSA is less rigid than its predecessor under the 1983 SAR, the liberalisation of its 
regulation remains within the boundaries of such theory’s scope. 
 
In addition to the above institutional rules, the Saudi Commercial Arbitration Centre 
(SCAC) is one of the most attractive options for arbitrating because it guarantees 
enforceable awards that comply with Sharia, while simultaneously meeting 
international standards and the autonomy of the disputing parties. This was 
illustrated by participant 1, who stated that: 
“the Centre is a perfect choice for both foreign and local parties to a 
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dispute, since it is in partnership with a well-known arbitration Centre 
in New York, which reflects that even foreign parties will be 
guaranteed an excellent and fair arbitration”.  
He further added that the centre is aiming to fulfil the needs of the KSA’s markets 
as, according to him, “more than 70 million Saudi riyals are leaving the country 
annually for foreign arbitration centres”. Although this sounds promising, the work 
of the centre is yet to be seen in practice, since it has only been effectively working 
since the beginning of 2017. In the same vein, participant 3 stated that “the SCAC 
is one of the motivating factors alongside the new regulation that seeks to 
guarantee flexibility in the arbitration process and in the application and facilitation 
of institutional arbitration”. This participant is a former judge and a current arbitrator; 
he further believes that “the SCAC has the same features as those provided by 
most reputable arbitration Centres in the region and worldwide”. He stated that the 
SCAC has a list of qualified arbitrators in various legal fields and is able to conduct 
arbitration hearings in both Arabic and English with the ability to also provide instant 
translation in both languages. These factors are seen as good motivators for foreign 




The 1983 SAR was rather vague when it came to determining arbitrable disputes, 
unlike the 2012 SAR, which provides a clearer view on the issue of arbitrability. 
Article 2 of the 2012 SAR provides that it “shall apply to any arbitration regardless 
of the nature of the legal relationship subject of the dispute”. The same article also 
excludes personal disputes and those that are not open for conciliation from being 
arbitrable, such as those of a criminal nature. This latter exclusion was firstly 
established by Resolution No. 58 and approved by both the 1983 SAR and the 2012 
SAR (See Chapter 5). The 2012 SAR prohibits government agencies from referring 
to arbitration until the prime minister’s consent is acquired or until the Council of 
Ministers approves a new law permitting such referrals on a regular basis (Article 
10 (2). The exclusion of family law disputes was considered by participant 1 to be 
unrealistic, especially when realising that Islam urges people to refer to arbitration. 
That being said, he further stated that: 
“you can understand the prohibition of arbitration in matters involving 
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Ahwal shakhsiah (personal affairs) but in matters such as 
inheritance, which sometimes involve a complicated commercial 
enterprise, then this is where arbitration and other ADRs should be 
allowed.”23  
Another participant considered the prohibition on government agencies from 
arbitrating and thought that this was a very unclear matter, especially when 
considering the KSA’s recent desire to transform its biggest oil company, Aramco, 
into a shareholding company (participant 5).24 He said that “This is a particularly 
important matter because there must be a clear definition of what is considered a 
government entity”. For example, it was the Aramco case that led the KSA to 
prohibit its government entities from resorting to arbitration without permission from 
the Council of Ministers. This was the case when the company was entirely owned 
by the KSA government, but if additional parties were to buy shares in the company, 
then it would technically become just a normal company, and it would resort to 
arbitration with no need for the Council of Ministers’ consent. Therefore, it seems 
that this provision needs to be revisited if the KSA’s plans to sell some of its Aramco 
shares to foreign investors are to be implemented. 
 
6.3.5. Court Supervision 
One of the main contentious issues facing arbitration parties prior to the introduction 
of the 2012 SAR was the Saudi judicial supervision of arbitration proceedings. This 
supervision was clearly stated in the 1983 SAR, whereby the entire arbitral process 
was supervised by the Saudi judiciary (Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 23). 
This supervision was seen in a number of articles under the 1983 SAR, such as 
Article 5, which compelled arbitration parties to file their arbitration document with 
courts and to obtain their approval before initiating the arbitration process. The 
arbitral practices under the 1983 SAR were very complicated because the 
requirement for the court’s approval of the parties’ arbitration document implied 
that, in the absence of such approval, it was still possible for the dispute to be 
referred to court by one of the disputing parties (Article 5). If this occurred, the court 
would not be obliged to decline its jurisdiction over the dispute (1983 SAR, Article 
5, 6, 7, 9 and 22). Another implication of the court’s approval is that the court could 
                                                 
23 Participant 1 is an arbitrator in the Saudi Commercial Arbitration Centre. 
24 Participant 5 is an arbitrator and a senior lecturer at one of the KSA’s universities. 
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still nullify the arbitration tribunal award, simply because the arbitration document 
had not been approved by it. This was seen in a number of cases, such as Decision 
No. 53/1415 in 1994 and Decision No. 99/1415 in 1994, where arbitral awards in 
both cases were nullified by the competent authority at the time because these were 
made without the approval and the supervision of the court.  
 
This requirement is no longer in force since the 2012 SAR provided in Article 26 
that “[t]he arbitration proceedings shall commence on the day a request for 
arbitration made by one arbitration party is received by the other party, unless 
otherwise agreed by both parties”. This means that the parties could start their 
arbitration without the need to obtain any approval from the relevant court. In 
addition, the 2012 SAR compels courts to decline their ongoing jurisdiction, should 
parties wish to change their mode of adjudication and go for arbitration (Article 12). 
A similar provision is also provided for in the UNICTRAL model, while the 1983 SAR 
was silent on this particular matter (UNICTRAL, 1985, Article 20). Moreover, the 
2012 SAR compels the KSA courts to decline jurisdiction over hearing any disputes 
involving a valid arbitration clause if this point is challenged in court by one of the 
arbitration parties (Article 11). This approach is in line with the UNICTRAL model 
law’s adopted approach and with domestic laws established in the region 
(UNICTRAL model, Article 8). For example, the UAE arbitration law of 2018 
requires courts to reject any claim involving an arbitration agreement, even after 
the commencement of a litigation process (Article 8). On this subject, participant 3 
stated that: 
“this requirement for court approval in the old law was one of the 
main deficiencies that made the old regulation unfit for the 21st 
century. This is because arbitration now is more focused on 
upholding the principle of party autonomy and enabling them to 
shape their dispute settlement mechanism. The fact that the new law 
has removed this requirement and enabled the party with an 
arbitration agreement or clause to begin its arbitration when it wants, 
has brought the KSA’s legal framework more in line with international 
standards and made it more attractive for international commerce, 
which wants to keep the court’s intervention to a minimum”.  
Whether this empowerment of the parties has motivated foreign commerce to invest 
in the KSA is yet to be seen, since those commercial actors want to see how this 
new regulation is implemented in practice. It is also important to note that when the 
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1983 SAR was introduced, it was thought that it would bring more certainty to the 
KSA arbitration practice and, as such, attract foreign commerce. This outcome was 
not achieved due to other limitations imposed by that law, which made the KSA 
arbitration regulation look backwards and unattractive for both local and foreign 
commerce. The courts’ excessive intervention and the ambiguity over what 
constituted the KSA public policy were two of the most encountered limitations 
under the 1983 SAR. It is expected that the 2012 SAR will help to ease these 
limitations. 
 
Furthermore, Article 20 (2) of the 2012 SAR provides that a challenge to the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction could only be made within a certain time limit, which was 
considered necessary for the maintenance of the stability of the arbitration 
proceedings. Another important limitation on the court’s intervention in the new law 
was also emphasised by participant 2, who stated that: 
“the other feature that provides comfort for the foreign investor is the 
fact that the court’s powers under the new law are very limited, 
meaning that the arbitral tribunal has the wider power and that after 
the issuance of the arbitral award the court’s power is limited to the 
invalidation cases provided under the law.”  
These limitations did not exist in the 1983 SAR which, in turn, resulted in the courts 
undermining the arbitration tribunals’ decisions and, in some instances, reviewing 
and overturning their decisions. 
 
This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Jadawel International v Emaar 
Property PJSC No. 4713/1/G in 1425 [2004]. This case involved an arbitration 
hearing that was commenced by Jadawel before an arbitral tribunal of three 
members, located in the KSA. Jadawel was seeking damages of US$1.2 billion due 
to Emaar’s breach of contract on a construction project. The arbitration process was 
too lengthy and took approximately two years but, finally, an award was issued in 
favour of Emaar; Jadawel’s claim was dismissed and it was asked to pay the legal 
costs. Emaar submitted the award to the Board of Grievances for it to be enforced. 
However, the board held a different view, because upon reviewing the merits of the 
case, it decided not only to decline the enforcement of the award but to reject it and 
issue an enforcement decision in favour of Jadawel. 
 
The 2012 SAR also increases the scope of the parties’ autonomy, whereby 
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arbitration parties can really benefit from the merits of resorting to arbitration as a 
method of solving their disputes away from judicial intervention. It is strongly argued 
that one of the main reasons for resorting to arbitration is to uphold the parties’ will, 
and this includes but is not limited to choosing the date the arbitration proceedings 
will commence, and the legal framework through which their arbitration should be 
dealt with and decided. 
 
Furthermore, the 2012 SAR enables the arbitration tribunal to seek assistance from 
the relevant agency with regard to the arbitration process, including witness 
summoning or ordering the production of documents (Article 22). This article shows 
that both the arbitration panel and the court judges are meant to cooperate to 
enhance the success of the arbitration process. This is unlike the situation before 
the introduction of the new law, when judges seemed to give minimum regard to 
arbitrators, particularly those who were foreign or non-Muslims. That being said, 
the new law also upholds the court’s power in the arbitration process, by enabling 
it to consider action for invalidating awards as per Article 8 of the 2012 SAR. This 
article specifies that only the Court of Appeal of the competent court is able to hear 
such claims, as opposed to the 1983 Regulation, which enabled the court of first 
instance to hear such claims, with the option of referring their decision to the Court 
of Appeal. Arbitration prior to the introduction of the new law was lengthy and 
enabled the party against whom enforcement was sought to rely on the court’s 
intervention to lengthen the process further and deprive the other party of the 
benefit of adjudicating through arbitration. 
 
The 2012 SAR emphasises the significant role of the KSA courts in the arbitration 
process since any breach of the arbitration procedure or infringement of the KSA 
public policy will result in the immediate court’s intervention. This matter only 
applies in so far as the Saudi Law is applied; however, if the arbitration follows 
another legal system, then the KSA court’s intervention is limited to ensuring the 
awards’ compliance with the KSA’s public policy (Harb and Leventhal, 2013). In this 
regard, participant 2 stated that “The new law strengthens confidence in arbitration 
practices since appeals are only allowed in local disputes, and in the event of a 
foreign award, it is only appealed in its country of origin and Saudi courts have no 
role in that regard”. This shows that the KSA is doing its best to create a reliable 
legal framework that will instil trust in both local and foreign commerce, while at the 
same protecting its sovereign rights over awards rendered or seeking enforcement 
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in its jurisdiction. 
 
Moreover, it is important to emphasise that in ICA conducted inside or outside the 
KSA, the court of appeal deciding the case in Riyadh will always have jurisdiction 
(2012 SAR, Article 8(2)). This development is also significant because it prevents 
cases involving international arbitrations from being heard by lower courts or by 
judges in some towns outside the capital city of Riyadh. This strategy could be very 
successful in attracting foreign investment to the KSA since their claims will be 
handled by specific appeal courts with judges who are well-trained in handling ICA 
disputes (Al-Ammari and Martin, 2014). The KSA government has heavily invested 
in ensuring that the Court of Appeal judges are receiving all the training they need 
(ibid).    
 
That being said, it is important to note that most of the world’s legal systems have 
some sort of supervisory powers over arbitrations conducted or seeking 
enforcement in their jurisdiction (Aleisa, 2016). However, the extent of such 
supervision varies depending on the state’s view of arbitration. As stated earlier in 
Chapter Four, some states believe their sovereignty must be upheld over every 
legal matter in their jurisdiction and, therefore, impose excessive supervision 
thereby disadvantaging the arbitration process, as was the case in the KSA before 
the 2012 SAR. Some other states’ view of arbitration is that it is a method of 
attracting more commerce and reliability to their legal system and, as a result, they 
aim to strengthen the arbitration party’s autonomy while still protecting their 
fundamental belief through a limited degree of supervision.25 The latter view is that 
which is currently in practice in Saudi Arabia, where court supervision has been 
limited to ensure that arbitral awards do not clash with the KSA’s public policy. The 
rest of the courts’ interference mainly takes the form of assisting the arbitration 
process, rather than monitoring it, as provided above. 
6.3.6. Extended Jurisdiction 
Although the KSA has been a member of the New York Convention for more than 
a decade, it nevertheless did not make a substantive distinction between domestic 
and international arbitration. Both the 1983 Regulation and its implementation rule 
                                                 
25 This includes UAE and particularly the city of Dubai and Switzerland. 
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of 1985 have failed to draw a clear distinction between international and local 
arbitration and that, in turn, negatively influenced every aspect of the arbitration 
practice in the KSA (Ahdab, 2011). The importance of distinguishing between 
international and domestic arbitration under the KSA Law lies in the fact that the 
KSA courts have different criteria for dealing with the recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards when the arbitration is international (Aleisa, 2016). This is 
especially the case with regard to arbitration proceedings and the enforcement of 
awards. This lack of distinction was discussed by Saleh, who stated that one of the 
main issues concerning arbitration in Arab states was “the lack of distinction in 
status between domestic arbitration and international arbitration” (Saleh, 1985, p 
283). He further said that “the effect in practice of this lack of distinction in the 
countries of the Arab Middle East is a ‘nationalisation’ of international arbitration, a 
kind of phagocytosis of the international by the local” (ibid). 
 
The 2012 SAR, on the other hand, applies by default to all arbitral disputes taking 
place in the KSA. In addition, the 2012 SAR may apply to all other ICAs conducted 
abroad, if the disputing parties agree to apply it, something which the 1983 SAR did 
not provide for (2012 SAR, Article, 2). The new law states that, in order for an 
arbitration to be deemed international, it must meet the criteria stipulated in Article 
3 of the regulation (2012 SAR). In this regard, Article 3 of the 2012 SAR defines 
international arbitration in a similar manner to that set out in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law (UNICTRAL model, 1985, Article 1 (3)). Therefore, it is now possible for parties 
to international commercial disputes involving the KSA to agree to apply the new 
law to arbitral proceedings, with a view to increasing the chances of the successful 
enforcement of an arbitral award in the KSA (Nesheiwat and Al-Khasawneh, 2015). 
This, again, shows the KSA’s commitment to liberating itself from the deficiencies 
embodied in the 1983 SAR in order to create an attractive legal system for 
international commerce. While doing so, the KSA continues to stress the 
importance of upholding its Islamic values by limiting every provision of this 
regulation with the requirement of compliance with Sharia. 
 
6.4. Applicable Laws 
6.4.1. Arbitration Procedural Rule 
Arbitration systems nowadays, are assessed by the amount of autonomy and 
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discretion the parties have in selecting the applicable procedural and substantive 
laws for their arbitration. Unlike its predecessor, the 2012 SAR enables disputing 
parties to rely on any procedural rules they prefer, including those of international 
arbitration institutions, providing they do not contradict with Sharia and the KSA 
public policy (Article 25). Before the 2012 SAR was introduced, all institutional 
arbitration under the KSA’s legal framework was automatically governed by the 
Chamber of Commerce arbitration rule. This chamber was the only arbitration 
institution in the KSA at the time (Ahdab, 2011). However, after the new law was 
introduced, the SCAC was established and equipped to handle all alternative forms 
of dispute resolution mechanisms, with the greatest focus on arbitration. 
 
The 2012 SAR has further freed the parties from any procedural limitations, 
enabling them to refer their dispute to any arbitration institution. If the parties do not 
reach an agreement on such a matter, the arbitration tribunal should choose the 
procedures it sees fit, while taking into account the KSA’s public policy (Article, 25). 
The effect of Article 25 is seen throughout the 2012 SAR, which frequently states 
‘unless the parties agree otherwise’, thus reflecting the great credit being given to 
the parties’ autonomy and discretion. This article also implies that the parties’ 
choice of the rule of any international arbitration institution will automatically 
overcome most of the 2012 SAR default provisions, which is something that the 
1983 SAR failed to provide for (Harb and Leventhal, 2013). That being said, it is 
mandatory under the 2012 SAR to respect the due process of the arbitration; all 
parties must be heard equally and given the opportunity to present their case in full 
(Article 27). 
 
This right of relying on another procedural rule was also given in the old law, but 
with very undesired restrictions (SAR 1983, Article 39). Article 39 states that “The 
arbitrators shall issue their awards without being bound by legal procedures, except 
as provided for in the arbitration regulations and its rules of implementation...”. In 
the case of any infringement of this article, there is evidence that the court would 
be willing to reject the arbitral award on the basis that both the 1983 SAR and its 
implementation rule of 1985 were not complied with. This was demonstrated in 
Decision No. 93/ T in 2001, which shows that the Board of Grievance rejected the 
arbitral award on the basis that the arbitral proceedings that were followed did not 
correspond with the ones provided for under the 1983 SAR and its 1985 
implementation rule. This decision was analysed by Alsaman as follows: “The 
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officials based their rejection on the grounds that, since the Arbitration Code 
provides sufficient procedural rules, there is no need for foreign arbitration rules” 
(Alsaman, 1994, p 233).  
 
The way in which such a provision was drafted reveals a lack of vision and 
appreciation of the principle of party autonomy and the evolution of law and 
practice. Apparently, the drafters of SAR 1983 did not foresee that the regulation 
would become outdated with time; the fact that arbitrators were limited by the 1983 
procedural law and its implementation rule has resulted in the KSA’s arbitration 
regulation becoming less attractive with time. In addition, drafters of this provision 
seemed to be more influenced by a narrow interpretation of jurisdictional theory, 
which promotes upholding state sovereignty over domestic disputes, regardless of 
the disputing parties’ will. With the way commercial transactions are developing and 
the continuous growth in commercial activities, if this regulation had not been 
repealed it would have had a catastrophic impact on the KSA’s ambitions of 
attracting foreign commerce. 
 
6.4.2. Default Procedural Rule 
Even though, under the 2012 SAR, disputing parties are able to choose the 
procedural law applicable to their arbitration, this regulation still provides default 
rules to be applied when the parties do not have a prior agreement about such a 
law. This new regulation provides several procedural provisions designed to further 
facilitate arbitration and liberate it from its inherited limitations (Harb and Leventhal, 
2013). Article 26 of the 2012 SAR states that the arbitration procedure starts when 
one of the parties receives the arbitration request, unless otherwise decided by the 
parties. The 2012 SAR also provides further instruction regarding how the notice 
should be communicated, stating that:  
“Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties to arbitration 
regarding notifications, the written notice shall be delivered to the 
addressee personally or to his designee, or to the mailing address 
specified in the contract subject of the dispute or in the arbitration 
agreement or the document governing the relationship addressed by 
the arbitration” (Article 6).  
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This new regulation further requires parties to raise any known violations of the new 
law within 30 days of their occurrence, otherwise, the right to invoke such a claim 
will be waived (Article 7).  
 
This provision was considered by participant 2 as follows:  
“the fact that the 2012 SAR requires parties to report any 
encountered violation of this regulation within 30 days is unrealistic, 
because this provision requires the 30 days to start from the day the 
violation took place, which may leave the other party with a much 
shorter period if he only knows about the violation just before the 30 
days’ period expires”.  
This provision is important since it guarantees certainty and ensures that the parties 
do not have an open-ended time-period in which to raise any violations allegedly 
encountered; this is something that could be resorted to by some parties in order 
to extend the arbitration period and negatively influence the arbitration proceedings. 
However, this provision should be reworded so that the violation could be reported 
within 30 days of the party becoming aware of it since otherwise this right will 
occasionally be waived before the disadvantaged party becomes aware of the 
violation. Furthermore, the new law allows, in a similar way to the UNICTRAL 
model, that one or more experts could be appointed for oral or written assessment 
on a particular issue and that the parties must cooperate and provide any 
information or documents needed by such expert(s) (Article 36). This being said, 
the most important provisions related to the default procedural rules were those 
related to the removal of the condition that the proceedings must be conducted in 
Arabic and the introduction of interim relief, which will be discussed next. 
 
6.4.3. Language 
One of the most important provisions introduced by the 2012 SAR was, perhaps, 
the removal of the prohibition on conducting the arbitration in any other language 
than Arabic. The 1985 implementation rule provided that:  
“Arabic shall be the official language to be used before the arbitral 
tribunal whether at the hearing or in correspondence. Neither the 
tribunal nor the arbitrators shall speak any language but Arabic. The 
foreigner who cannot speak Arabic may bring an interpreter who will 
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sign with him the record of the interpreted statements from the 
session” (Article 25).  
This shows that this regulation was never intended for international use, but merely 
for domestic use or regionally among the Arabic-speaking nations. It also reflects 
the short-sighted vision of the drafters of that regulation since, from that time, the 
KSA has been entering into major commercial transactions with global companies 
at both government and private business levels.  
 
This condition for proceedings to be conducted in Arabic no longer applies, as under 
the 2012 SAR, Article 29 states that:  
“Arbitration shall be conducted in Arabic, unless the arbitration 
tribunal or the two parties to [the] arbitration, agree on another 
language or languages. Such agreement or decision shall apply to 
the language of the written statements and notes, oral arguments 
and any decision, message or award made by the arbitration 
tribunal, unless otherwise agreed by both parties or decided by the 
arbitration tribunal”.  
This means that the parties are able to select another language for their contract 
and, accordingly, conduct their arbitration hearings and issue their award in their 
chosen language and they will still be enforced in the KSA. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that, if the parties want to employ a foreign language, they must 
state the selection of that other language clearly in the arbitration clause (Al-Ammari 
and Martin, 2014).  
 
Alternatively, in the absence of such a clear choice, the default language will be 
Arabic as per Article 29 of the 2012 SAR. If a language other than Arabic is chosen, 
then the party seeking enforcement must submit to the enforcement court an 'Arabic 
translation of the arbitration award attested by an accredited authority' (Article 
53(3). This accredited authority must be one of the translation service providers 
accredited by the KSA Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Al-Ammari and Martin, 
2014). In this regard, participants 2 and 5 agreed that such openness in the use of 
a foreign language as per the parties’ wishes is a major development that will gain 
the trust of foreign companies, who would rather use a universal language such as 
English in their arbitration proceedings. Such trust in the 2012 SAR will mean that 
foreign commercial corporations will be more willing to invest in the KSA while, at 
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the same time, being able to conduct any dispute resolution in a language that they 
and their legal advisors feel comfortable with. 
 
6.4.4. Interim Measures 
The provision of interim relief is another significant feature introduced by the 2012 
SAR; this is something that both the 1983 SAR Regulation and its implementation 
rule failed to provide (Aleisa, 2016). Article 22 of the 2012 SAR enables competent 
courts to order temporary or precautionary measures if either party or the arbitral 
tribunal request so and before the arbitration proceedings commence. The arbitral 
tribunal is also enabled, by the same article, to seek the competent court’s help with 
whatever actions it needs assistance with, such as calling witnesses, the production 
of documents and so on. Participant 4 commented on this issue by saying that 
“arbitrators’ power to resort to such interim measures is very important in advancing 
the arbitration practice in the KSA”. The 2012 SAR empowers the tribunals further 
and enables them to take precautionary or temporary measures, subject to both 
parties’ consent to such a procedure (Article 23). This was also viewed by 
participant 4 as a reflection of the party’s autonomy in shaping arbitration 
proceedings under the 2012 SAR. The above two articles reflect important 
developments in the KSA’s arbitration practice, since they enable both courts and 
the arbitral tribunal to pursue interim measures whenever required. In addition, such 
improvements in the KSA’s arbitration regulations bring the country’s legal 
framework closer to international arbitration institutions’ standards, which have 
recently started to provide for such measures in their arbitration rules (Harb and 
Leventhal, 2013). For example, the ICC has clearly recognised such interim 
measures in Article 28 of the ICC rule of 2012. 
 
This being said, it is important to note that the parties’ application for interim 
measures before courts is likely to give rise to two contentious issues. The first is 
related to such an application being regarded as a waiver of the parties’ right to 
arbitrate and this is a clear breach of their arbitration agreement (Redfern and 
Hunter, 2015). This issue has been viewed by most arbitration rules which 
confirmed that such an application does not affect the validity of the parties’ 
arbitration agreement (ibid). In this regard, both the ICC in article 28 (2) and the 
UNICTRAL model in article 26(9) have been explicit in confirming that any 
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application for interim measures from court will not be considered as a waiver of 
the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.  
 
The second issue is related to whether such an application for interim measures 
should be made to the courts or to arbitration tribunals. This issue is entirely based 
on the applicable law and the nature of the measures sought. Some legal systems, 
such as the Swiss one, have empowered the arbitration tribunal by making it 
conditional for such measures to be sought from them in the first instance and 
followed by the issuance of orders for such measures or by seeking the court’s 
assistance, where needed (Swiss PIL, Ch.12, s. 183(1,2). However, some other 
legal systems, such as the English one, have no clear answer but depend entirely 
on the circumstances of the dispute, such as the urgency of it and the possibility of 
enforcing such an order if it were to be made by the arbitral tribunal (S 44 (3, 5)). 
The KSA, on other hand, has a clear view in this regard and only the courts are 
allowed to issue such orders. This reiterates the KSA’s exercise of its sovereignty 
over arbitration disputes conducted within its territory. 
 
6.4.5. Substantive Law 
 Arbitration parties frequently rely on ICA as a mechanism of resolving their 
disputes because it guarantees them more certainty and predictability regarding the 
legal framework governing their dispute resolution (Almeida, 2015). This certainty 
and predictability are vital for commercial disputes (ibid). ICA attempts to ensure a 
sufficient degree of predictability and certainty with respect to substantive matters 
by merging the choice of law clause with the arbitration agreement (Redfern and 
Hunter, 2015). The importance of these two elements was explained by the United 
States Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co (1974):  
“uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract 
touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws 
and conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision specifying in 
advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to 
be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to 
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any 
international business transaction.” 
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This clearly demonstrates the important role played by the disputing parties when 
they choose the law applicable to the substance of their dispute. This role reflects 
the continuous trend in international commercial arbitration towards recognising the 
principle of party autonomy and its importance to the development of arbitration 
practices. 
 
In this regard, the KSA’s enactment of the 2012 SAR reflects its active effort to 
develop a friendly legal system whereby the principle of party autonomy is 
respected and recognised. Article 38 of the 2012 SAR provides that the arbitration 
tribunal shall: 
“Apply to the subject matter of the dispute rules agreed upon by the 
arbitration parties. If they agree on applying the law of a given 
country, then the substantive rules of that country shall apply, 
excluding rules relating to conflict of laws, unless agreed otherwise”.  
This article further enables the arbitration tribunal to apply the law most relevant to 
the dispute if the parties fail to select the substantive law that is most applicable. 
However, the fact that this article provides only for the application of the law of a 
country might raise some concerns regarding the applicability of other conventional, 
non-national rules. This matter of applying non-national rules was considered by 
the English courts in Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC v Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd 
[2004] EWCA Civ 19 case, where the arbitration agreement took Sharia as the 
applicable law. Since Sharia rules are not national rules, the English courts decided 
that, as per the Rome Convention, it is not possible for two laws to govern a 
particular contract or for a non-national rule to do so; instead, a particularly defined 
national rule shall be applicable. Since the arbitration clause made reference to 
Sharia in general without specifying which aspects of Sharia were meant to be 
incorporated into the contract, English law was held to be the applicable law. Similar 
conclusions were reached by the English courts in Halpern v Halpern (2007) EWCA 
Civ 291 which made its way to the English courts of appeal. The court of appeal 
decided that the arbitration tribunal could refer to non-state rules or parties’ 
considerations if this reflects the parties’ choice and, consequently, an award based 
on such rules or considerations will be enforceable by the English courts (Chapter 
Four). This matter has not been considered by the 2012 SAR and it is not yet clear 
whether a similar approach to the one followed by the English court of appeal will 
be adopted or not. The researcher believes that, since the 2012 SAR has enabled 
disputing parties to select any applicable rules as long as they do not contradict 
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Sharia, it would mean that any application of non-national rules would not be 
problematic as long as such rules do not clash with Sharia rulings. This is 
particularly important when taking into account that the KSA is currently in the 
process of updating its national laws to be more attractive to international 
commerce. Therefore, it is unlikely that the KSA will reject the widely recognised 
non-national rules because such rejection would directly clash with its continuous 
attempts to modernise its regulation for the purpose of attracting foreign 
investments. 
 
The 1983 SAR limited the applicability of foreign substantive laws and this was 
demonstrated in case No 155/T/4 of 1415 H (1995), in which the defendant (a 
foreign corporation) asked for arbitration to be held outside of the KSA. This request 
was denied by the competent court, which decided that the KSA law is the 
applicable law and, as such, the arbitration must be held in the KSA, following the 
KSA’s law, as per the substantive law of the arbitration agreement. This right to 
apply foreign law to the substance of the dispute did not exist when both parties 
were from the KSA. This was clearly exposed by case 143/T/4 of 1412 H (1992), 
where both parties were KSA nationals and had mutually agreed to have their 
dispute solved through arbitration in Zurich following the ICC procedural rules. 
Since both parties were KSA nationals, and the subject matter of the dispute was 
related to the KSA, the arbitration clause was considered void on public policy 
grounds. This shows the outdated mentality governing arbitration practice in the 
KSA under the 1983 SAR and its implementation rule, which viewed every foreign 
arbitral element with suspicion, as discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
Unlike this previous regulation, the 2012 SAR is open to foreign substantive laws, 
providing that such laws did not clash with Sharia or the KSA’s public policy (Art 
38). Although this is a major development from the situation under the 1983 SAR, 
there is a continuous and imposed limitation of complying with Sharia, which is quite 
problematic. This is because such a condition may render this new recognition of 
party choice ineffective, as both Sharia and public policy are very controversial 
terms when applied. Most of the world’s legal systems recognise legal rules that do 
not conform to Sharia, as applied in the KSA; therefore, it is important that when 
the parties choose a foreign substantive law, they ensure that the award does not 
infringe Sharia or the KSA’s public policy, or it will not be enforceable in the KSA. 
Although this restriction may look disappointing, it can be avoided by selecting an 
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arbitrator with knowledge of Sharia in the arbitration tribunal, who will then ensure 
that any subsequent award does not clash with Sharia. Even if the award involves 
elements that clash with Sharia, the offending element will not be enforced, but the 
remaining awards will still be enforced. This partial enforcement will be discussed 
later when considering the enforcement of arbitral awards in Chapter Eight. 
 
6.5. Arbitration Seat 
Normally, ICA is conducted in a neutral state, one in which the disputing parties are 
neither resident nor have a place of business (Redfern and Hunter, 2015). In 
practice, this implies that the law of the seat of the state where arbitration is 
conducted will normally be different from that which governs the dispute’s 
substantive matter (ibid). The applicability of the law of the state hosting the 
arbitration is recognised in both the theoretical and practical aspects of ICA 
(Kaufmann, 1999). This arbitration seat concept has had an impact on the way that 
international conventions are worded, such as in the 1923 Geneva protocol to the 
New York Convention (Redfern and Hunter, 2015). 
 
The law of the seat status in the KSA has been improved by the 2012 SAR, as it 
enables arbitration parties to choose their arbitration seat in either the KSA or 
outside of it (2012 SAR, Article 28). It may be argued that, as a result of this 
provision, the notion of party autonomy is appreciated and applied in this recent 
regulation, unlike the situation of its predecessor – the 1983 SAR. When 
considering the 1983 SAR, it is notable that the lex arbitri concept was not 
mentioned at all in any of this regulation’s provisions, unlike the 2012 SAR (Aleisa, 
2016). The 2012 SAR requires Saudi courts to acknowledge and enforce awards 
issued by foreign institutions outside of the KSA (2012 SAR, Article 4, 5). Yet, it is 
important to note that the position of the KSA courts has been of concern to foreign 
arbitral awards on the basis that there is a larger possibility that they will infringe 
upon Sharia rules (Sayen, 2003). This issue is of less concern following the 
enactment of the 2012 SAR, since the general attitude is now moving towards 
embracing international standards and, as such, foreign awards are likely to be 
enforced. In order to increase the potential of an award being enforced, parties to 
the dispute could select any of the Arabian Gulf states’ arbitration centres or 
preferably the Saudi Commercial Arbitration Centre. This centre was not available 
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when the 1983 SAR was in force, but nowadays foreign and local commerce can 
utilise this centre, which was set up to strengthen the KSA’s embracement of 
international standards. If some elements of the award contradict Sharia provisions 
then, as stated by participant 4, there will be a partial enforcement of the awards 
whereby such offending elements will not be enforced, whereas the remainder will. 
This issue will be discussed later when this thesis considers the enforcement of 
awards under the SAR 2012. 
 
6.6. Arbitration Tribunal 
Following the parties’ decision to commence arbitration proceedings and the 
communication of the notice or request for such proceedings, selection of the 
arbitral tribunal is the next important step. Unlike national courts – before which 
parties can bring their claims any time they wish since they are fully formed standing 
bodies of law – an arbitral tribunal is established by the parties’ will and, until they 
are fully formed, they have no jurisdiction over either the parties or their dispute 
(Redfern and Hunter, 2015). Therefore, selection of the arbitral tribunal is an 
important step in the success of the arbitration process and it must be carefully 
executed in order to ensure an effective adjudication (ibid). In this regard, both old 
and new arbitration regulations in the KSA have put forward provisions regulating 
the process of establishing the arbitral tribunal. The 1983 SAR was considered to 
be restrictive regarding the qualification and formation of arbitral tribunals. These 
restrictions were eased by the 2012 SAR in order to create an attractive arbitration 
system in line with international standards. The 2012 SAR’s development with 
regard to arbitration tribunal provisions will be discussed next in terms of the 
tribunal’s appointment, qualifications, independence and impartiality, challenges, 
fees and expenses. 
 
6.6.1. Appointment of Arbitrators  
As stated earlier, the selection of arbitrators is one of the most important phases 
prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings. One of the most important 
features of arbitration is the parties’ ability to select an arbitrator for their dispute 
without the intervention of a third party (Ahdab, 2011). In the KSA context, both the 
1983 Regulation and the 2012 Regulation allow an arbitral tribunal to be formed of 
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one or more arbitrators, provided that the number of arbitrators is odd (Article 13, 
2012 SAR, Article 4, 1983 SAR). Article 15 of the 2012 Regulation enables 
arbitration parties to agree on how to select their arbitrators in the way they see fit 
and this is also provided for in Article 11(2) of the Model Law of 1985. However, if 
they fail to reach an agreement, the 2012 SAR enables the court to decide on the 
matter (Article 15 (1)). Therefore, if the arbitral tribunal consists of a sole arbitrator, 
then the court will appoint him and must do so within thirty days of the petition 
submission date (Article 15 (3)). The 2012 SAR’s empowerment of the court, 
enabling it to appoint a sole arbitrator when the parties fail to do so, is also provided 
for in other well-known institutional rules, such as Article 12 (2) of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) rule and Article 5 (8) of the London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA) rules. This, again, shows that the KSA is making a 
real effort to harmonise its domestic regulations so that they are in line with widely 
recognised international standards. 
 
However, if the tribunal is formed of three arbitrators, as is mostly the case, each 
party will select one arbitrator and these arbitrators then appoint the third. In the 
event of one or both parties failing to appoint an arbitrator within fifteen days of 
receiving the petition, the umpire is appointed by the competent court (Article 15 
(1)). Additionally, if the appointed arbitrators fail to assign the third arbitrator within 
fifteen days of their appointment, the competent court will also appoint an umpire 
within fifteen days of the petition submission date. The competent court’s 
appointment of an arbitrator is not subject to any kind of appeal (Article 15 (4)). A 
similar provision was also present in Article 10 of the 1983 SAR, as well as in Article 
11(3) of the Model Law. This being said, it is important to note that the 1983 SAR 
and its implementation rule of 1985 failed to specify a deadline by which both parties 
and the competent court had to appoint the arbitrators. This was one of the 
significant shortcomings of the old arbitration regulation since it allowed some 
dispute parties to rely on time wasting as a method of depriving the other party of 
the merits of resorting to arbitration as a fast dispute resolution mechanism. 
 
6.6.2. Qualifications of Arbitrators 
Most of the world’s legal systems enable any natural person to act as an arbitrator, 
providing that the person has the required legal status (Redfern and Hunter, 2015). 
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The situation in the KSA is a little different since the KSA is entirely governed by 
Sharia rules, unlike any other state around the world. The way in which Sharia rules 
are interpreted determines the flexibility, or otherwise, of the KSA’s legal system. 
This is reflected in the development introduced by the 2012 SAR which, unlike its 
predecessor, was legislated with a more flexible view of Sharia rulings. The 1983 
SAR and its implementation rule of 1985, required an arbitrator to be either a Saudi 
Muslim male or a Muslim foreigner (Article 4 1983 SAR; Article 3, 1985 
implementation rule). This short-sighted aspect of the regulation made it suitable 
only for domestic application or among Muslim-majority states. With the increasing 
development of international commerce and the lack of qualified arbitrators in the 
KSA, the application of this regulation became particularly impractical. Therefore, 
the 2012 SAR was enacted which successfully removed the religion and gender 
requirements; it required only that one arbitrator possess legal capacity, good 
conduct and a Bachelor degree either in law or Sharia. It also demanded that the 
chairman of more than one arbitrators’ tribunals meet such requirements (Article 
14). 
 
The fact that the 2012 SAR did not mention the arbitrator’s gender or religion as 
part of the arbitrator’s qualifications raises contentious issues. Firstly, it could be 
argued that the arbitrator’s religion is only important when there is a sole arbitrator 
since Article 14 only emphasises the importance of Sharia knowledge when there 
is a sole arbitrator or the chair of more than one arbitrators’ tribunal. As a result, 
when there is more than one arbitrator, the disputing parties may choose two non-
Muslim arbitrators, provided that the chair of the tribunal is Muslim. However, a 
contrary argument may be raised when considering the Sharia view of non-Muslim 
arbitrators.  
 
In this regard, a distinction must be made over whether non-Muslim arbitrators will 
be appointed to adjudicate a dispute between two Muslim parties, or a dispute 
where one of the parties is not a Muslim. If the dispute involves a party who is not 
Muslim, the Sharia view is in favour of permitting non-Muslim arbitrators to 
adjudicate such a dispute (Alkhudair, 2011). This position stems from the view that 
arbitrators are not to be considered as judges and, as such, the requirement related 
to acting as judge do not apply to an appointed arbitrator (Alghannam, 2016). 
However, if the disputing parties are all Muslim and the dispute takes place within 
a Muslim territory, then a non-Muslim arbitrator is prohibited from adjudicating such 
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a dispute under the Maliki, Hanbali and Shafie schools of jurisprudence (Al-Kenain, 
2000). However, the Hanafi school of jurisprudence allows a non-Muslim arbitrator 
to act as such on the basis that the other schools’ views contradict with the following 
Quranic verse “So let the People of the Gospel judge according to what God has 
sent down therein” (Chapter Five, verse no 47). Therefore, parties to the dispute 
must be aware of this Islamic ruling because any infringement of this rule will make 
any subsequent award unenforceable the 1983 SAR. This is no longer the case 
under the 2012 SAR, which allows the enforcement judge to rely on any school’s 
jurisprudence to accept the enforcement of an award (see Chapter Eight). 
 
Another equally contentious issue, raised by the omission in Article 14 of the 2012 
SAR, is the ability of women to act as arbitrators. Historically, Saudi women have 
never occupied the role of an arbitrator in the KSA due to legal and religious 
prohibitions. It was the 2012 SAR that gave women arbitrators hope regarding a 
change in their status due to the deliberate omission of the condition for an arbitrator 
to be a male, as stipulated in the 1983 SAR. This omission left the matter in the 
hands of the judiciary, who were tasked to decide whether or not to accept the 
appointment of a female arbitrator. Participant 2, who is an enforcement judge, 
when asked whether or not he would accept the enforcement of an award rendered 
by a female arbitrator, replied that “there is no legal basis at the moment for not 
enforcing it”. He further stated that there is substantial scholarly debate over 
whether an arbitrator should be considered as a judge and that this debate 
determines women’s status. If an arbitrator is not to be considered a judge, then 
there is no reason for preventing women from being arbitrators. However, if an 
arbitrator is considered a judge, with the same qualifications therein, then the matter 
is subject to various views, with the majority being in favour of disqualifying women 
from acting as arbitrators. 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to discuss the Damam Administrative Court of Appeal’s 
lack of objection to the appointment of Shaima Aljubran (a Saudi female arbitrator) 
to adjudicate a commercial dispute in May 2016 (Almulhim, 2016). This case was 
a breakthrough since it was considered by many commentators as an approval of 
women acting as arbitrators and a dismissal of the practice of disqualifying 
arbitrators based on their gender. In this regard, participant 2 stated that this 
decision brought more clarity to the issue and that, in the same way as in other 
developed states, the judiciary has the power to interpret any ambiguity in any 
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legislation. However, since the KSA is not a common law county and does not 
recognise the precedent system, the field is still open for another judge to rule in 
the opposite direction, based on his understanding of the 2012 SAR and Sharia 
principles. Commenting on this issue, participant 3 stated that: 
“A lot has been said about this decision, but it is mostly imprecise 
because the issue that took place was regarding the parties’ 
appointment of their arbitrators as per Article 16 of the 2012 SAR. 
One of the parties (the defendant) failed to appoint his arbitrator and, 
as such, the claimant, who was looking to expedite the process, and 
in accordance with Article 16, asked the court to appoint an arbitrator 
on his behalf. The defendant replied by appointing a female 
arbitrator so, to be precise, the court ruling was not an approval of 
women’s appointments as arbitrators, but a confirmation that the 
claim, which is the court’s appointment of an arbitrator on behalf of 
the defendant, is over. It was over by the defendant’s appointment 
of an arbitrator, regardless of his/her gender and the court cannot 
hear any challenge against any arbitrator until the arbitral tribunal is 
fully formed”.  
Therefore, it is clear that the judge was not concerned about the arbitrator’s 
qualifications, as long as he/she was appointed. It will be interesting to see what 
happens if the claimant challenges her appointment after the arbitral tribunal has 
been established. Participant 3, who was interviewed in September 2017, said that 
“I am not aware of any decision literally approving or disapproving a female 
arbitrator since the 2012 SAR came into existence”. This shows that the issue is 
not yet resolved; however, the fact that all of the participants thought that there was 
nothing to prevent a female from being an arbitrator, is indicative of the currently 
welcoming environment for women’s empowerment and equality. 
 
6.6.3. Arbitrators’ Independence and Impartiality 
It is a fundamental principle in international arbitration that arbitrators must remain 
independent and impartial with regard to parties and disputes (Steenkamp, 2007). 
This matter has been emphasised by both the 1985 implementation rule and the 
2012 SAR, both of which require appointed arbitrators to have no vested interest in 
the dispute. The 1983 SAR did not cover this matter at all; its implementation rule 
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simply stated that it was one of the disqualifying factors for the appointment of an 
arbitrator, without clarifying it further (Article 4). The 2012 SAR, on the other hand, 
considered this matter in detail in Article 16 of the regulation. Article 16(1) states 
that the arbitrator shall have no interest in the dispute and must, from the day he/she 
is appointed until the end of the arbitration proceedings, declare (in writing) any 
situations that may raise justifiable doubts over his/her impartiality or 
independence, unless such situations have already been raised before the 
beginning of the arbitration proceedings. This provision is very similar to that 
provided for under Article 12(1) of the UNICTRAL Model Law 1985, which again 
demonstrates the KSA’s attempt to move in line with internationally recognised 
standards. The legislature of the 2012 SAR shifted the focus from the selected 
arbitrator’s gender and nationality to more important factors – their independence 
and impartiality. These two terms exist in almost every developed country’s legal 
framework as, without them, the arbitration would lose its effectiveness and the 
parties would lose the right to fair adjudication. 
 
6.6.4. Grounds for Challenging Arbitrators 
Challenges to arbitrators were, at one time, very rare events. This is because, if a 
vacancy occurred, it was usually because of the death or resignation of an arbitrator 
(Redfern and Hunter, 2015). However, the last decades have witnessed an 
unprecedented number of challenges to arbitrators’ appointments (Baker and 
Greenwood, 2013). A look at the statistics of the ICC (one of the major arbitration 
institutions) confirms that, in the period between 2000 and 2009, challenges were 
raised against 3.43 percent of arbitrators appointed by the parties (Ibid). Therefore, 
most legal systems and international arbitration institutions have set clear 
guidelines to govern the process of challenging arbitrators, to help ensure that the 
challenge is only accepted if there are genuinely acceptable grounds for it (Horn, 
2014). The 2012 SAR states that an arbitrator should be treated as a judge in the 
sense that any factors that may lead to a judges’ prohibition from hearing a 
particular case should also apply to arbitrators, even if none of the parties so 
request (Article 16 (2)). Article 16 further states that an arbitrator may be disqualified 
only if there is a circumstance that leads to a justifiable doubt about the arbitrator’s 
impartiality (Article 16 (3)). The use of justifiable doubt as a measure for determining 
independence and impartiality is also provided for in Article 12 (1) of the UNICTRAL 
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Model Law, Article 24 (1) of the English Arbitration Act and Article 10 (3) of the LCIA 
rule. 
 
The use of the phrase ‘justifiable doubt’ in Article 12 (1) of the UNICTRAL Model 
Law was viewed by some commentators as a sign of a clear will to introduce an 
objective standard for arbitrators’ impartiality and independence (Caron and 
Caplan, 2013). The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), on the other hand, took further measures to ensure the arbitrators’ 
impartiality and independence by requiring them to sign a declaration confirming 
that there were no disqualifying factors, such as a vested interest in the dispute, 
before embracing the arbitration process (Article 57). The lack of this requirement, 
in the Saudi legal context, to sign a declaration would not affect the express 
obligation provided in Article 16 (1) that arbitrators must be totally independent and 
impartial. Article 16 of the SAR also prohibits a party from disqualifying an arbitrator 
appointed by them, unless reasons for this become known after the appointment 
(Article 16 (4)). Therefore, if a party knew of any circumstances that might disqualify 
an arbitrator prior to the commencement of the arbitration proceedings, but chose 
to ignore them, this would be considered a waiver of their right to disqualify the 
appointed arbitrator (Article 4, the Model Law 1985). This particular provision is 
important since it stops parties from treating arbitrators as their own agents and 
deprives them of any influence over the appointed arbitrator. 
 
Moreover, an arbitrator could also be disqualified if they fail to carry out their duties 
or cease to do so in a way that would lead to an unreasonable delay in the 
arbitration proceedings (Article 18, 2012 SAR). This ensures that arbitral 
proceedings remain attractive in terms of the time taken for the adjudication, which 
matters a great deal to large commercial entities. This provision was derived from 
Article 14 (1) of the UNICTRAL Model Law 1985 and was included in most of the 
developed world’s legal systems because it represents a situation of impossibility 
to act. That being said, it is important to note that all grounds for refusal included in 
the 2012 SAR are directly quoted from the UNICTRAL Model Law 1985 provisions. 
This reliance on the Model Law provisions shows the KSA’s relentless desire to 
gain the trust of foreign investors by modernising its legal system and making it 
more accessible and reliable for any interested party. 
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6.6.4.1. Challenge Procedures 
The 1983 SAR and its 1985 implementation rule were unclear regarding the 
procedure of disqualifying an appointed arbitrator. Although they stated that 
arbitrators must have no vested interest in the dispute, it was not clear from either 
the regulation or its rule which other factors could lead to the disqualification of an 
arbitrator and who could commence the disqualification procedure. This issue was 
considered by Article 17 of the 2012 SAR in more detail. Article 17 (1) of the 2012 
SAR states that, in the event of the parties failing to agree on the disqualification 
procedure for arbitrators, the party wishing to disqualify an arbitrator must send a 
written statement providing the basis for this disqualification order within five days 
of becoming aware of the arbitral tribunal’s formation. If this submission is rejected 
by the other party within five days of it being sent, then the arbitral tribunal is 
required to make a decision on the matter within fifteen days of receiving the 
disqualification petition. The party seeking disqualification can then take the matter 
to the competent court within 30 days, and the decision of the court is not 
appealable.  
 
This article is derived from Article 13 of the UNICTRAL model, but with a slight 
amendment. Article 13 of the Model Law enables a party to send their statement 
within fifteen days, which is a more reasonable period than the five days provided 
for in the 2012 SAR. This five-day period was considered by participant 5 to be 
“unreasonable and disadvantageous for disputing parties since they will have a 
short time in which to ascertain and write the grounds on which the appointed 
arbitrator should be disqualified”. Article 17 (2) of the 2012 SAR states that a 
disqualification provision may not be accepted by the other party if this party has 
already submitted a petition for disqualification of the same arbitrator for the same 
reasons. Once a petition is submitted for the disqualification of an arbitrator, arbitral 
proceedings are be suspended and any appeal of the tribunal’s subsequent 
decision shall result in the same effect (Article 17 (3)). If the disqualification petition 
succeeds, then all of the arbitral procedure prior to this petition will be null and void 
(Article 17 (4)). 
 
 175 
6.6.5. Fees and Expenses for Arbitrators 
A party that enters into a litigation dispute is likely to incur lower costs than if the 
same dispute were to be heard by an arbitral tribunal. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the dispute parties not only pay for the cost of adjudication but arbitrators’ fees, 
costs for the arbitration venue and the institution fees if the dispute is referred to 
one of the arbitration institutes (Redfern and Hunter, 2015). Generally speaking, 
arbitration fees are determined by the parties of the dispute and the appointed 
arbitrators, or by the institution hosting the arbitration proceedings in the case of 
institutional arbitration (Thacher and Bartlett, 2013). Both the 1983 SAR and 2012 
SAR enabled parties to negotiate and agree on the arbitrator fees with their 
appointed arbitrator. They also empowered the competent court with the authority 
to appoint the arbitrator and determine their fees if the parties failed to do so. The 
only difference between the 1983 SAR and the 2012 SAR in this regard is that the 
latter imposed an obligation on the parties to conclude a separate contract with the 
appointed arbitrator, specifying their fees (Article 24). This shows that the 
relationship between the arbitrator and the party appointing him is contractually 
distinct from that of the disputing party’s contract. Article 24 also states that if both 
parties fail to determine the arbitrators’ fees then these fees shall be determined by 
the competent court. This court interference is of a supportive nature and only takes 
place if the parties do not exercise their right to specify the arbitration tribunal’s 
fees.  
 
The parties’ right to appoint arbitrators is often misunderstood by some arbitrators. 
This was illustrated by participant 4, who stated that “We are faced in courts with 
cases involving arbitrators who do not understand the limits of their role since they 
believe that they are working for the party who appointed them because he is paying 
their fees”.  The payment is not directly made to them but to the competent court of 
hearing the dispute, as per article 22 of the 1983 SAR. Still, the fact that they were 
chosen by them and the price negotiated by these parties, resulted in the 
occurrence of unprofessional practice. He further states that, sometimes, arbitrators 
come to court to trace the enforcement of their arbitrated case and try and represent 
the party who appointed them in the enforcement courts. Such a lack of awareness 
is also seen in the fact that most arbitrated cases in the KSA fail to reach unanimous 
decisions, even if the disputed case is straightforward and lacks any real 
complications. When reviewing each party’s decision, it appears that each arbitrator 
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decides in favour of the party appointing him. Participant 4 further believes that the 
main reason for this issue is a lack of qualified arbitrators who have the right legal 
background and are fully aware of the rights and roles in the arbitral process. This 
problem could be solved by assigning the role of appointing arbitrators and 
determining their fees to the competent court originally in charge of hearing the 
case. However, this would reduce the parties’ autonomy and take away their right 
to decide how their dispute should be adjudicated. Alternatively, the legislature 
could set stricter qualification criteria for acting as an arbitrator, such as requiring a 
certain number of years’ experience, in addition to the current qualifications 
stipulated in section 14 of the 2012 SAR. 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the significant developments introduced by the 2012 SAR 
and how such developments have brought the KSA’s legal framework in line with 
internationally recognised arbitration standards. Harmonisation with these 
standards is likely to create greater reliability within the KSA’s legal system and, as 
a result, remove some major concerns felt by foreign investors over subjecting their 
disputes to a backward and outdated legal system. One of the major developments 
introduced by this regulation was the advancement of the principle of party 
autonomy, as reflected in almost every section of this regulation. In many places, 
this regulation emphasises, through different phrases, the fact that party choice has 
precedence over any other standard rules, providing that such a choice does not 
infringe upon Sharia rules. This empowerment of the arbitration parties comes at 
the expense of the court’s supervisory powers since the 1983 Regulation provided 
courts with more power than the dispute parties. The situation is now the opposite 
because disputing parties are now able to choose how their disputes shall be 
adjudicated while, at the same time, being able to resort to courts for any further 
assistance.  
 
This new regulation has also, for the first time in the KSA’s legislative history, 
introduced the principle of severability, whereby invalidation of the parties’ contract 
will not affect the validity of the arbitration clause stipulated within it. This major 
development, in particular, exists in most developed states’ legal systems and the 
KSA has finally adopted this internationally recognised practice (Redfern and 
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Hunter, 2015). Last but not least, the new regulation deliberately omits to specify 
the arbitrators’ gender and religion, showing a significant departure from the rigid 
religious interpretations of women’s status in arbitration. Looking at the developed 
world, it is clear that women are more than capable of not just deciding on a dispute, 
but accepting much larger responsibilities, such as deciding on international 
relations between states. Although the regulation did not expressly allow women to 
act as arbitrators, both judges and arbitrators interviewed for this research believe 
that such an omission is an implied recognition of women’s ability to act as such. 
The 2012 SAR analysis will be continued in the next chapter, covering the following 
























Chapter Seven: The Enforcement of Awards Under the 
Saudi Arbitration Regulation 2012 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Following the discussion of the arbitration tribunal and the applicable procedural 
and substantive rules for governing arbitral disputes under the 2012 SAR, it is 
pertinent to consider the mode of issuance of arbitration tribunal awards and what 
happens thereafter. This is very important, since reaching an award is the fruit of 
any arbitration process and, as such, both the way in which an award is reached 
and its contents will largely determine the enforceability of the award (Bermann, 
2017). This is particularly relevant when considering the enforcement of an award 
in a country like the KSA which strictly applies Islamic Sharia rules. Therefore, this 
chapter will build on the comparative analysis of the 2012 SAR with its predecessor, 
the 1983 SAR, with particular focus on the award issuance and challenge process. 
In addition, it will discuss the process of recognising and enforcing any issued 
awards under both the 2012 SAR and the 2013 SER. To this end, this chapter will 
be informed by interviews with the same five research participants, in order to 
assess the practical influence of these regulations on the practice of enforcing 
awards in the KSA (See Chapter One research methodology details). This will then 
be followed by a critical analysis of the 2012 SAR implementation rule of 2017 and 
whether or not it has met the expectations of the KSA arbitration community. 
 
7.2. Issuance of Arbitral Awards 
Parties to an international commercial activity refer disputes to international 
arbitration, with the hope that an award will result from this process, unless a 
settlement is reached prior to the issuance of the award (Redfern and Hunter, 
2015). These disputing parties also expect that such an award will be final and 
binding on both parties, with the possibility of appeals and recourse being in 
accordance with the law applicable to their arbitration agreement (ibid). Rendering 
awards and enforcing them in the KSA was one of the main deficiencies of the 1983 
SAR, particularly in the case of foreign arbitral awards. It is, therefore, important to 
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see whether such deficiencies have been removed by the 2012 SAR because, if 
not, the KSA’s goal of attracting foreign commerce will be hard to achieve. 
 
7.2.1. Majority Voting 
In arbitration tribunals with more than one arbitrator, different institutional and 
national rules have adopted different ways of regulating the voting process when 
issuing awards. The UNICTRAL model, for instance, provided in Article 29 that, 
when there is more than one arbitrator, the decision should be reached by a majority 
vote (UNICTRAL 1985). However, the same article made an exception for 
procedural questions, which are to be decided by the presiding party, if authorised 
to do so by the rest of the tribunal (Art 29). Article 39 of the 2012 SAR adopted the 
same position as that stipulated in the Model Law and addressed certain areas that 
were not considered by it. An example of such areas is seen when the arbitration 
tribunal cannot reach a majority vote, which is generally possible, particularly in 
construction contracts. This is mainly due to the fact that there are often various 
issues related to different claims and, as such, it is possible for each member of the 
arbitration tribunal to hold a distinct view on these various issues (Tokios Tokelés 
v. Ukraine, 2004 No. ARB/02/18). Commenting on this issue, Professor Sanders 
stated that “the arbitrators are… forced to continue their deliberation until a majority, 
and probably a compromise solution, has been reached” (Sanders, 1977). 
 
The 2012 SAR, on the other hand, stated that: 
“If members of the arbitration tribunal fail to reach an agreement and 
a majority decision is not attainable, the arbitration tribunal may 
appoint a casting arbitrator within fifteen days. Otherwise, the 
competent court shall appoint a casting arbitrator” (Article 39 (2)).  
Although this solution might lead to the intervention of the court, this is only possible 
if arbitrators have exhausted all other options for reaching a majority vote or 
appointing a casting arbitrator. The ICC rule introduced another remedy for the 
failure to reach a majority vote by enabling the chairman of the arbitration tribunal 
to reach a decision alone (Article 31 (1), ICC Rules, 2012). Although this practice 
might seem odd, it is indeed better than losing the merit of arbitrating the parties’ 
dispute due to the court’s intervention, as proposed by the 2012 SAR. The ICC rule 
approach is also adopted by Section 20 (3) and (4) of the English Arbitration Act 
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1996, Chapter 12, s. 189 of the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987 and other 
institutional rules (Article 26 (3) LCIA Rules, 2014). 
 
It is important to highlight that, in this regard, the 1983 SAR only provided that 
awards have to be issued by a majority, with no further details on what should 
happen when this option is not possible (Article 16). The 1983 Regulation also did 
not provide any rules on what to do with questions of procedure and who is entitled 
to decide them. Instead, Article 38 of the implementation rule of 1985 provided that 
the rules of procedure before the national court are applicable in this regard. Such 
a lack of procedural rules and the invitation of court jurisdiction on arbitration 
matters are an example of how the 1983 SAR is outdated and incapable of 
governing 21st-century disputes. It also demonstrates the improvement introduced 
by the 2012 SAR in developing the KSA’s arbitration practice by bringing it in line 
with the developed world’s legal standards. As a result, the KSA’s attempt to attract 
foreign commerce is much more achievable now than under the 1983 SAR. 
 
7.2.2. The Arbitral Award: Form and Content 
The 2012 SAR specifies certain requirements that have to be followed in regards 
to the content and manner of deciding arbitral awards (Article 41 (3)). Such 
requirements exceed the ones specified in Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
despite being adapted from it. The 2012 SAR follows the Model Law in requiring 
awards to be in writing and signed by the arbitration tribunal members; 
nevertheless, it does not require all members to sign as long as most members do 
and those who do not sign are not obligated to justify their omission (2012 SAR, Art 
42 (1)). The 2012 SAR always requires reasons for any rendered award, unlike the 
Model Law, which enables parties to agree otherwise (UNICTRAL, 1985 Art 36). In 
addition, any rendered award must contain the award date, the parties’ names and 
addresses, the names and addresses of the arbitrators and also meet a number of 
other requirements (2012 SAR, Art 42 (2)). These requirements are related to 
arbitrations taking place in the KSA, or where the 2012 SAR is the chosen 
applicable law to the parties’ dispute resolution. 
 
The 2012 SAR also requires an original copy of the award to be delivered to the 
parties of the dispute within fifteen days of it being issued and this award must not 
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be published, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties (Article 43). The 2012 SAR 
further requires a party whose arbitral award was issued in a language other than 
Arabic to supplement it with a translation from an accredited authority. Moreover, it 
is important to note that both the 1983 SAR and the 2012 SAR require parties to 
deposit the arbitral award with the competent court. However, the 1983 Regulation 
required the party to do so within five days of the date of issuance (Article 18), while 
the 2012 Regulation allowed the parties more time, enabling them to do so within 
fifteen days (ibid). When considering both timeframes, it is clear that the 1983 five-
day period was impractical because any extenuating circumstance could take place 
and prevent the party from doing so on time. The fifteen-day timeframe allows the 
party more time for translation and to deposit the award as required and, thus, 
makes the KSA arbitration practice more practical. 
 
Article 45 of the 2012 SAR enables disputing parties to reach a settlement by 
requesting the arbitration tribunal to record the terms of their settlement and issue 
the arbitral award, including these terms, thereby ending the arbitration 
proceedings. A similar provision is also provided by Article 30 of the Model Law 
which, again, shows the KSA’s attempt to modernise its arbitration framework 
through embracing international standards. The parties are able to request any 
clarification of the issued award within thirty days of its issuance, providing that 
proper notice of this request is communicated to the other party (Article 46). This 
provision does not clarify whether disputing parties are allowed to agree on a 
different timeframe, as provided by Article 33 of the UNICTRAL Model Law. The 
fact that the legislators of the 2012 SAR have adopted a similar provision to the one 
provided by the Model Law, then deliberately omitted the inclusion of this choice, 
demonstrates that they are not meant to agree. This, again, is a striking 
shortcoming in the new law that may jeopardise its attempt to attract foreign 
commerce, since it undermines the principle of party autonomy.  
 
Article 46 (2) further obliges the arbitration tribunal to clarify any ambiguities stated 
in the party’s clarification request within thirty days of receiving it and any 
subsequent clarification would be included in the original award. However, this 
might provide an opportunity for a party looking to delay the enforcement process, 
as they may submit trivial clarification requests in order to extend the adjudication 
time and disadvantage the other party accordingly. The 2012 SAR imposed an 
obligation on the tribunal to respond, which could be utilised by some parties as a 
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postponement tool. An alternative option would have been to follow the Model Law, 
which empowers the tribunal with the autonomy to decide whether such clarification 
requests are justified and respond to them or ignore them if they are merely time-
wasting requests accordingly (Article 33 (b)). 
 
Article 44 of the 2012 SAR introduced a unique provision that was not provided for 
in the 1983 SAR or the UNICTRAL model of 1985. This article obliged the tribunal 
to deposit the award and its accredited translation with the competent court within 
fifteen days of its issuance date. This requirement is very rigid and hinders the 
development of arbitration practice in the KSA because it may lead to undesired 
court intervention, even if the other party voluntarily complies with and enforces the 
award. The general practice of international arbitration demonstrates a common 
trend for the voluntary enforcement of arbitral awards with no need for the court’s 
involvement. For instance, a study conducted in 2008 shows that only 11% of 
awards require the intervention of courts, while the rest are voluntarily enforced by 
the parties (Alwyn and others, 2008). A similar result can be observed in the ICSID, 
where the UNCTAD reported that most states had honoured their obligation in this 
regard (UNCTAD, 2014). Therefore, the requirement introduced by Article 44 is 
very unusual and does not reflect the common consensus of ICA practices, which 
aims to increase the parties’ autonomy at the expense of the national courts’ 
involvement. The researcher believes that the main reason behind such an 
unprecedented provision in KSA arbitration regulations is the legislature’s desire to 
maintain some sort of sovereignty over arbitration by unnecessarily involving 
national courts. This would be understandable if one party refused to enforce or 
reject the award, in which case the court’s intervention would strengthen the 
arbitration tribunal’s award. However, the intervention of the court, regardless of the 
voluntary compliance of the party against whom enforcement is sought, shows that 
the arbitration tribunal’s powers are being undermined under this feature of the 
2012 Regulation. 
 
7.2.3. Issuing Arbitral Awards Timeframe 
The 1983 SAR made it compulsory for the arbitration tribunal to issue its award 
within 90 days of the start of the arbitration proceedings, providing that no other 
period was specified by the dispute parties in their agreement (Article 9). This 
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regulation also allowed for an extension to the 90 days’ deadline, if this extension 
was made by the supervising court or the arbitration tribunal itself (Article 9). 
However, if the 90 days passes and none of the above extensions have been made, 
the disputing parties (or one of them) would be able to start another independent 
proceeding before the court that is already in charge of reviewing such disputes. 
This article made arbitration practice in the KSA very ineffective and made the 
court’s intervention much more likely since either party could disadvantage the 
other by referring their dispute to the court as soon as the deadline was reached. 
This disadvantage could be seen most clearly in disputes involving major 
commercial corporations who did not want to be subject to the rulings of the court 
of another country’s legal system. Therefore, the 90 days’ deadline was not 
practical and even disadvantaged some parties who had complex arbitration cases. 
This is because arbitrators had to either rush to reach an award, which could 
possibly be wrong because they had had insufficient time to review all the evidence, 
or exceed the 90-day period and enable one of the parties to seek judicial 
adjudication. 
 
On the contrary, the 2012 SAR provides that the “... arbitration tribunal shall render 
the final award, ending the entire dispute, within the period agreed upon by both 
parties. In the absence of agreement, the award shall be issued within twelve 
months from the date of commencement of arbitration proceedings”, with the 
provision that the tribunal could extend it for a further six months (Article 40). This 
timeframe is more practical when hearing and deciding upon significant commercial 
cases than it was under the 1983 SAR. In this regard, participant 3 stated that the 
new law will diminish the possibility of errors in issuing awards, since arbitration 
tribunals will have enough time to study the case well before reaching a decision. 
The researcher views these time restrictions of both the new law and the old law 
from a distinct point of view, since some disputes can be settled quickly and, 
allowing them to go for twelve months with the possibility of extending them for a 
further six months, might be considered too lengthy and may disadvantage the 
party who is referring to arbitration from achieving a quick resolution of the dispute. 
However, in complex disputes, the new timeframe specified by the 2012 SAR 
seems to be reasonable. Therefore, it is crucial for parties to specify the timeframe 
of their arbitration in order to avoid the application of this regulation’s default time 
restriction. This being said, it is important to note that the arbitrator does not have 
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to take the full timeframe, but rather this is the maximum time that it must take to 
reach an award. 
 
7.3. Annulment of Arbitral Awards 
Unlike clarifications or amendment requests, which are heard by the arbitration 
tribunal deciding the dispute, a party’s claim for annulment is viewed by the 
competent authority originally in charge of hearing such claims (Article 46). Under 
the 1983 SAR, parties were empowered to make claims of annulment before the 
competent court of the first hearing and its decision was appealable to the 
competent Court of Appeal (El-Rayes, 2006). The same regulation did not specify 
the grounds upon which such claims of annulments could be made and parties, 
therefore, made these claims on any grounds they saw appropriate, even where 
such grounds were not necessarily valid (Al Fadhel, 2009). This uncertainty in the 
1983 Regulation meant that the enforcement of arbitral awards was at serious risk 
of losing its importance and finality because the KSA courts would be able to decide 
on the dispute despite the arbitral tribunal’s existing award (AL-Bjad, 1999). 
Fortunately, this is no longer the case; the 2012 SAR has restricted the hearing of 
annulment claims to the competent Court of Appeal and in international arbitral 
awards it is the competent Court of Appeal in Riyadh (Article, 8 (2)).  
 
The 2012 SAR also provides, in Article 50, grounds for the annulment of an arbitral 
award, including: a lack of arbitration agreement, a void arbitration agreement, an 
expired arbitration agreement, a parties’ lack of legal capacity, a parties’ failure to 
present defence, the wrongful composition of the arbitration tribunal and several 
more. Even if one or more grounds of annulment exists and the party does not 
submit the claim of annulment within 60 days of being notified of the award, this 
right will be considered waived and the award will be final (Article 51). This time 
window for making annulment requests is more realistic than the one provided in 
the 1983 SAR, which stipulated in Article 19 that dispute parties must make such 
claims within fifteen days of being notified of the award. The fifteen days’ period 
was too short and parties were not given enough time to evaluate the award and 
decide whether to make an annulment claim or not. This was another shortcoming 
of the 1983 SAR that made it unattractive for foreign commerce. This being said, 
after the claim of nullification is made, the award will be final if the competent 
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authority decides to uphold the award, but if its decision is to annul it, then this 
decision is appealable within 30 days of it being made (Article 51 (2)). 
 
Another important provision introduced by the 2012 SAR was Article 51, which 
enables the party that has already waived their right of annulment prior to the 
issuance of the award to do so after the award is issued. This means that the party’s 
waiver will not guarantee the automatic enforcement of the award upon its 
issuance, but a party may claim for the award’s annulment as long as this is done 
within 60 days of being notified of the award. However, the 2012 SAR did not 
consider the situation whereby the party may wave such a right following the 
issuance of the award. In other words, it is not clear what would happen if the party 
did waive such a right after the award was issued, but then before the enforcement 
of the award and within the 60 days’ annulment window, revoked the waiver and 
claimed for annulment. It is not clear from the regulation whether or not this is 
allowed. However, participant 2 commented on this issue and said: “I do believe 
that he is not able to do so because such a waiver would have already been 
communicated to the other party, arbitration tribunal and maybe the enforcement 
court”. The researcher believes that the party might be able to revoke such a waiver 
as long as he does so within the 60 days and the waiver could be communicated 
to the relevant parties. 
 
7.4. Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
After the award is rendered and the time for appeal has passed, the winning party 
would expect the other party to perform the award, either voluntarily, as is normally 
the case, or by a court order (Moses, 2017). Under the 2012 SAR, this stage would 
form the end of the arbitration tribunal’s powers and, as such, the enforcing party 
would have to take control of the enforcement process (Aleisa, 2016). Before 
expanding further on the 2012 SAR’s view of awards recognition and enforcement, 
it is important to highlight the position of the 1983 SAR in this regard. Article 20 of 
the 1983 SAR implementation rule of 1985 required the competent court’s 
ratification before the award became enforceable. This ratification process enabled 
the court to review the merits of the case and consequently undermine the 
arbitration tribunal award. This review may lead to the issuance of a different 
decision to the one made by the tribunal, as seen in the case of Jadawel 
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International (Saudi Arabia) v. Emaar Property PJSC (UAE)26. This ratification 
process was disadvantageous to the disputing parties since it deprived them of the 
main benefits of resorting to arbitration, such as effectiveness and speediness in 
the adjudication process. A number of cases revealed that dispute parties had 
suffered from delays in the enforcement process caused by this ratification 
requirement (Decision No. 18/1416, Decision No. 57/1414, 1994). 
 
This is no longer the case under the 2012 SAR, which provides in Article 52 that 
“subject to the provisions of this Law, the arbitration award rendered in accordance 
with this Law shall have the authority of a judicial ruling and shall be enforceable”. 
This is a remarkable development in the new regulation since it gives arbitral 
awards the same weight as judicial rulings and, as a result, arbitral awards are final, 
subject to any nullification appeals. This limitation on the court’s intervention 
increases the scope of the party’s autonomy, which is an important factor in 
modernising the KSA’s legal system in order to attract foreign commerce (Article 
50 (4)). The 2012 SAR further requires certain documents to be tendered before 
the execution order is issued, including an original or attested copy of the award, a 
copy of the arbitration agreement, an authentic translation of the foreign award into 
Arabic and evidence that the award was supplied to the competent court when it 
was issued, as per Article 44 (Article 53). The same regulation requires the 
competent court to ensure that the award does not clash with previously rendered 
judgments in the KSA, does not violate the KSA’s public policy or Sharia rulings 
and is effectively communicated to the other party. This being said, it is important 
to note that, where there is a partial infringement of the KSA’s public policy or Sharia 
rules, the award will be severed and the violating part of the award will be rejected 
(Chapter Five). 
 
After providing all of the required documents and fulfilling the enforcement 
requirements, the award, whether domestic or international, will be issued with an 
enforcement order. This will then be followed by the final stage of the enforcement 
of the order, which is carried out through the enforcement courts in accordance with 
the 2013 Enforcement Regulation (Aleisa, 2016). This regulation and its relation to 
the enforcement of awards will be considered in further detail in the next section. 
                                                 
26 See chapter Five for more details. 
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7.4.1. Saudi Enforcement Regulation 2013 
One of the most important developments introduced in the KSA in the last decade 
is the Saudi Enforcement Regulation 2013 (SER). This regulation came into force 
in 2013 to form the first unified Enforcement Regulation in the KSA’s legislative 
history; it is one of the most developed enforcement frameworks in the entire 
region27. Although the 1983 SAR and the 2012 SAR had a few provisions governing 
the enforcement of arbitral awards, these provisions were very limited. The process 
of enforcing awards, or the conditions of such enforcement, are stipulated in detail 
in the 2013 SER. With both local and foreign judgments and awards being governed 
by a single regulation that could be easily accessed by any interested party, the 
process of enforcing awards in the KSA has become much clearer and more 
reliable which, in turn, is likely to attract both local and international commercial 
actors. 
 
7.4.2. Enforcement of Local Awards 
Apart from criminal and administrative disputes, the enforcement judge is 
empowered to decide enforcement disputes, no matter how big and complicated 
they are. He is also empowered to seek the help of the police or another 
government agency to ensure the parties’ compliance with the enforcement judge’s 
decisions (Article 2, (3)). The power of the enforcement judge to enforce arbitral 
awards and decisions is crucial since the 2012 SAR obliged the enforcement judge 
to enforce all arbitral awards with an enforcement order unless the award violated 
Sharia rule or the KSA’s policy (Article 52, 2012 SAR). These grounds for refusal 
are very problematic when considering foreign awards, while for local awards the 
practice shows that such awards were completely in compliance with the KSA’s 
public policy and Sharia rules even before the 2012 SAR came in to force (El-
Ahdab, 2011). Furthermore, Article 9 of SER 2013 obliges the enforcement judge 
to enforce arbitral awards when being presented in an enforcement document. This 
shows that the SER 2013 has limited court’s intervention to the minimum possible 
level in locally rendered awards since such awards are not expected to violate 
Sharia or the KSA public policy; as such, their enforcement is compulsory. In this 
                                                 
27 See Chapter 3 for more details 
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regard, participant 2 states that “locally rendered awards get enforced as soon as 
they reach the enforcement judge, providing that all the necessary documents are 
provided”. This elucidates the benefits of arbitration being conducting in the KSA 
by Saudi arbitrators who are aware of Sharia rules, as well as the KSA’s public 
policy, as this guarantees a quick enforcement of their awards. 
 
If the issued enforcement decision does not satisfy one of the parties, they may 
appeal the Enforcement Judge’s decision and, as a result, the enforcement would 
be suspended (Article 10). The Court of Appeal’s decision will be final and parties 
will have to abide by its decision. Participant 2 asserted that “appeals are frequently 
made by the party against whom enforcement is sought to postpone the process of 
enforcement”. But he added that: 
“the process of appeal does not take much time now since the 
appeal will not consider the merits of the case but would focus on 
any mistake in the procedure followed by the enforcement judge or 
any violation of the 2013 Enforcement Regulation provisions”.  
This shows that the drafters of the 2013 SER realised the importance of party 
autonomy and, as such, confined the court’s role in enforcing arbitral awards if they 
are compatible with Sharia rules or the KSA’s public policy. This speed and lack of 
restrictions in enforcing locally rendered awards is likely to attract foreign 
businesses who seek enforcement in the KSA to adjudicate within its territory. 
 
7.4.3. Enforcement of Foreign Awards 
In addition to the New York Convention NYC and the other regional conventions 
that were ratified by the KSA, the Enforcement Regulation in 2013 is the most 
important legal framework for enforcing awards in the country (Chapter Four). This 
regulation has developed the practice of enforcing foreign decisions by providing 
clear provisions that deal with such enforcement. Drafters of this regulation have 
further provided in Article 14 that: 
“Judgments, judicial orders, arbitral awards, and attested documents 
issued in a foreign country shall be presented to the enforcement 
judge in charge of enforcement of foreign judgments to ascertain that 
the document fulfils the conditions required for enforcement and affix 
the seal of enforcement thereon’; and after making sure that the 
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conditions in the award intended to be enforced, the judge puts the 
seal of enforcement, including the phrase ‘judicial decision”.  
This seal of enforcement will inform the relevant authorities of the winning party’s 
right to enforce the award. 
 
Article 14 of the 2013 SER shows the legislature’s attempt to facilitate the 
enforcement of foreign awards by requiring a special judge, who is well aware of 
arbitral enforcement proceedings, to handle these awards in the enforcement court. 
These judges are chosen on the basis of their knowledge of the KSA’s international 
legal obligations in term of its ratified international conventions and bilateral treaties, 
as well as being able to uphold the principle of reciprocity (Aleisa, 2016). In this 
regard, Baamir, who is a well-known arbitrator and academic author, suggested 
that “Saudi Arabia needs specialised arbitration courts with highly trained judges 
and staff and these arbitration courts should be branches of the commercial courts” 
(Baamir, 2016, p 225).  
 
On the contrary, the researcher holds a different view which is based on what he 
witnessed during his visit to the enforcement court in Riyadh, when he saw special 
care being taken over the enforcement of foreign awards and judgments. This care 
was in the form of assigning specifically chosen judges with knowledge and 
experience of the international and local legal frameworks that govern the process 
of enforcing such decisions. Therefore, Baamir’s suggestion in this regard might 
further regulate the matter, but it would not have much practical benefit since there 
are already specialised enforcement circuits in the enforcement court performing 
the same function as Bamir’s proposed arbitration courts. The researcher, on the 
other hand, believes that what is needed is to separate the enforcement of foreign 
awards from foreign judgments, since assigning them to the same judge may result 
in them being treated the same. Instead of the current system, these enforcement 
circuits should be divided into those that deal with foreign awards and those that 
deal with foreign judgments because awards and judgments have different 
procedural rules for issuing and enforcing. For instance, the enforcement of a 
foreign award in KSA requires the competent court’s approval in order to be 
rendered enforceable, whereas the foreign judgment is enforceable without such a 
requirement. Alongside the many other differences between them, the researcher’s 
argument for separating their enforcement is likely to increase the consistency of 
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the enforced awards and develop the KSA’s legal framework for enforcing foreign 
awards in a way that will be more attractive for foreign commerce. 
 
7.4.4. Conditions for Enforcing Foreign Awards 
In order for these specialised enforcement court judges to enforce foreign awards, 
the principle of reciprocity must be established and, once it is established, the 
following requirements must be complied with (S11, Enforcement Regulation 2013). 
Firstly, the KSA’s courts must have no jurisdiction over the dispute and, if the KSA 
court jurisdiction could be established, then the enforcement would be rejected. 
Secondly, the award must have been rendered following proceedings in compliance 
with the requirements of due process and the award must be in its final form, as per 
the law of the seat of the arbitration. This means that, any breach of the law of 
procedure upon which the arbitration was conducted or any award still subject to 
appeal, will not be enforced. Thirdly, the award must not contradict a judgment or 
order issued on the same subject by a judicial authority of competent jurisdiction in 
KSA. This is a very important requirement since it might be very difficult for a foreign 
arbitrator to determine whether the issued awards contradict an already established 
judicial decision in the KSA. This is hard even for Saudi arbitrators, since not all 
judgments are published and, as a result, this requirement must be clarified to avoid 
any inconvenience to the party seeking enforcement. The issue might not be 
problematic in the future because, since 2014, the KSA has been publishing a 
number of reports containing court judgments. This has been continued year on 
year, so if these publications endure and as time passes, there will be enough 
precedents to refer to to ensure a lack of confliction in the KSA’s locally rendered 
judgments.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, the award must not contain anything that contradicts 
the KSA’s public policy (S11, Enforcement Regulation 2013). What exactly 
constitutes the KSA’s public policy has always been controversial for foreign 
arbitrators because it could mean many things. Therefore, this controversial 
principle will be discussed in more detail in the following section. This will then be 
followed by a detailed discussion of the principle of reciprocity, in order to help gain 




7.4.5. Public Policy 
The term public policy is considered to be one of the most controversial and 
complicated legal issues in the world because of its connection with states’ 
domestic legal systems, which regulate the social interest of the states’ 
communities, as well as the states’ interest in upholding their national policies 
(Aleisa, 2016). Therefore, the state’s public policy and its role in upholding it are 
connected with its sovereignty over its territory and the application of its legal and 
moral norms within its jurisdiction (Born, 2001). As a result, most domestic 
regulations and international conventions and treaties governing the enforcement 
of foreign decisions have identified the importance of public policy and allowed 
states to make reservations so as not to enforce any decision that violates its public 
policy (ibid).  
 
Due to its obvious importance, the KSA has made a reservation on the enforcement 
of foreign awards if they conflict with the KSA’s public policy, as per Article V of the 
NYC 1985. This was also stressed in both the 2012 SAR and the 2013 SER 
whereby, in many instances, the legislature emphasised the need for compliance 
with the KSA’s public policy (Article 38, 50 and 55, 2012 SAR). For this reason, the 
KSA has stopped enforcement courts from reviewing the merits of foreign awards 
or judicial judgments while, at the same time, empowering them to ensure that such 
decisions do not violate the KSA’s public policy (Article 50 (4) 2012 SAR). 
 
It is important to note that, prior to the introduction of the 2013 SER, the term public 
policy had no legislative definition and, as such, it was left to judges to determine 
what formed the KSA’s public policy and whether it had been breached. This 
resulted in a number of conflicting decisions whereby similar cases received 
different decisions from the Board of Grievance, the competent court in charge of 
enforcing foreign awards at the time (El-Ahdab, 2011). This contradiction was 
demonstrated in a case involving two Saudi parties which was arbitrated by non-
Muslim arbitrators due to the parties’ choice of arbitrator in their dispute in the USA, 
France and Austria. This arbitration was upheld by the Board in decision number 
43/1415 in 1995. However, in a different case, where both parties were also Saudi 
nationals who chose to arbitrate their dispute in Zurich, in accordance with the ICC 
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rules, the court made a contrary decision to the case above and decided that, on 
public policy grounds, the arbitration clause was null and void (Decision No. 
143/1412 in 1992). This decision was commented on by the Board of Grievance’s 
review committee as follows:  
“This dispute is subject to Saudi law and the arbitration clause 
providing for the settlement of the dispute by means of arbitration in 
Zurich under the rules of the ICC is null and void. Regardless of its 
contradiction with the Saudi law of arbitration and its Implementing 
Rules, this is an attempt to eliminate the jurisdiction of the Saudi 
judiciary over the dispute, which is against the public policy of Saudi 
Arabia” (ibid).  
This shows that the judiciary’s interest was considered to be part of the KSA’s public 
policy and that such interest is not defined such that it is difficult for parties to avoid 
violating it. This shortcoming created more controversies and prevented parties 
from enforcing their awards, delaying their rights of resolution (Wakim, 2008). 
 
The uncertainty over the KSA’s public policy has been reduced with the introduction 
of the 2013 SER, which defined public policy in Article 11 (3) of this regulation 
implementation rule as “Islamic Sharia rules”. Although this definition is a very 
important development in this regard. Still, the term ‘Islamic Sharia rules’ remains 
a very wide area that cannot be easily ascertained by foreign arbitrators (Seyadi, 
2017). Commenting on this issue, participant 2 stated that: “the KSA’s public policy 
is violated when Sharia rules are violated and the difference in the interpretations 
between the schools of jurisprudence will not affect the enforcement of a particular 
award”. He further added that “an award may be rejected if the award violates 
Sharia scholars’ ijma (common consensus) even if such violation may not be 
considered so from some scholars’ point of view”. This shows that Sharia rule is 
meant to include all the different Sunni views of Sharia and, where such schools 
have agreed on a particular ruling, any opposition from some scholars will be 
disregarded when determining what constitutes the KSA’s public policy.  
 
The matter was further elaborated on by participant 3, who stated of the KSA’s 
public policy: “from my point of view the rules that are well recognised and applied 
in the Kingdom even if not written, provided that they are derived from the 
Kingdom’s constitution, which is Sharia”. He believes that this could be ascertained 
by the judge and that such a matter would not have one right answer, but many 
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right answers, depending on the facts of the award. This statement reflects an 
outdated line of reasoning because it implies that the court will have to review the 
facts of the case, as opposed to the provisions made in the 2012 SAR. This line of 
thinking could be attributed to the long-standing application of the 1983 SAR, which 
instilled such reasoning in the minds of Saudi arbitrators and enforcement judges. 
 
A more realistic view was taken by participant 5, who believes that “the Kingdom’s 
public policy has been problematic for a long time and, despite the good introduced 
by the 2013 SER, it nevertheless created another dilemma by simply defining it as 
Sharia rule”. He believes that the KSA’s public policy entails more than Sharia rule 
since it involves the KSA’s social, economic and religious interests which must be 
upheld when enforcing an award. He claims that a clearer definition of public policy 
in the KSA will address all of these elements and how not to violate them. The 
researcher believes that the Sharia rules which form the KSA’s public policy will 
become much clearer as time goes by and more arbitral awards are enforced in the 
KSA. This is because different cases will trigger different issues which have to be 
addressed by the enforcement court which, in turn, will result in a clearer view of 
what constitutes the KSA’s public policy.  
 
Having said this, it is important to emphasise that there are currently positive signs 
that the KSA is willing to create more certainty in this regard. One of the most 
important signs is the KSA’s numerous regulations, which have been legislated in 
the past five years with the aim of creating a reliable legal system that would attract 
foreign commerce (Gulf Legislation Network, 2018). Such legislations demonstrate 
a continuous review of the legislative body in the KSA to the current regulations and 




Despite the fact that the KSA is party to a number of regional and international 
conventions for the enforcement of foreign awards, it has always reserved any 
enforcement of a foreign award with the principle of reciprocity. Alongside the 
reservation stipulated in s. 11 of the Enforcement Regulation of 2013, the KSA’s 
Government also presented its reservation when they joined the NYC (1958) on 
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19th April 1994. The KSA made a reservation on the enforcement of foreign awards 
with the need to prove the existence of reciprocity, as per Article I (3) of the NYC 
(1958) (see Chapter Four). 
 
This reservation has historically been a cause of uncertainty because it was not 
clear what would establish such a principle before the Board of Grievance, which 
was the competent court in charge of enforcing such awards (AL-Firyaan, 2007). 
Some practitioners argued that it was not clear whether the mere reference to the 
KSA’s ratification of any convention to which another state is also a party will suffice 
to establish the existence of the reciprocity of the other state (Ghaith, 2016). 
Otherwise, the party seeking enforcement will have to provide evidence of a Saudi 
judgment being enforced in that state, which is sometimes an impossible condition 
to meet. Unfortunately, this view was adopted prior to the 2012 SAR and the 2013 
Enforcement Regulation when the Board of Grievance was in charge of the 
enforcement of foreign awards. This resulted in a number of enforcement decisions 
from the UK and the USA being rejected, despite such countries being members of 
the NYC. This was demonstrated in case No. 115/D/A/15 in 2008, which involved 
a British award that was rejected for violating the KSA’s public policy and for failure 
to prove reciprocity. 
 
Since the introduction of the 2013 SER, this is no longer the case since Article 11 
(5) of its implementation rules provided that “The enforcement judge shall verify that 
the state in which the foreign award or order was issued, reciprocates with Saudi 
Arabia by an official statement from the Ministry of Justice”. Thus, the burden of 
proof for such evidence has been shifted to the enforcement court, which has to 
enquire from the Ministry of Justice whether reciprocity exists between the KSA and 
the country from which the award was rendered. This is problematic because the 
ministry has no officially accredited list of the state’s reciprocating its decisions 
(Aleisa, 2016). As a result, the ministry’s failure to provide an answer to the 
enforcement court is likely to cripple the enforcement process unless the party 
seeking enforcement can establish evidence of such reciprocity themselves, as was 
the practice before the 2012 SAR. Al-Ammari and Martin suggested a solution to 
this issue by stating that: 
“Arbitration awards issued by tribunals seated in countries that have 
ratified either of those conventions should satisfy the requirement of 
reciprocity since Saudi Arabia has ratified those same conventions 
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and has acquired similar reciprocal rights” (Al-Ammari and Martin, 
2014, p. 404). 
Al-Ammari’s view relies on the KSA’s appreciation of international conventions, 
which is evidenced in Article 94 of the 2013 SER which states that “The application 
of this Law shall not prejudice treaties and agreements concluded between the 
Kingdom and countries, international institutions and organizations”. This reflects 
the legislature’s desire to uphold the KSA’s international obligations and rely on 
international conventions to support the arbitration practice in the KSA, not the 
opposite.  
 
Such a view was further approved by the 2016 ICC award involving 18.5 million US 
dollars in favour of a UAE subsidiary to be enforced in the KSA. Despite the award 
being rendered in the UK, the KSA enforcement court approved it and issued an 
enforcement order for the party seeking enforcement. In this case, the requirement 
of reciprocity was satisfied simply by referring to the UK’s accession to the NYC 
(Ghaith, 2016). This is a huge development in the KSA’s arbitration practice since, 
before the 2012 SAR and the 2013 Enforcement Regulation, the UK’s accession to 
the aforementioned Convention did not satisfy the reciprocity requirement, as 
mentioned earlier. 
 
Another development in this regard was introduced by the 2017 amendment to the 
2013 Enforcement Regulation Implementation Rule. This amendment provides in 
Article 6 (1) that the burden of proving reciprocity is on the party seeking 
enforcement and as such enforcement courts will no longer be in charge of 
obtaining this evidence. This amendment is beneficial to the KSA’s arbitration 
practice since it removes the uncertainty introduced by the 2013 implementation 
rule. Such uncertainty is seen when trying to establish what would happen if the 
Ministry of Justice did not respond to the enforcement judge’s query of reciprocity, 
or simply did not have an answer. Now the burden is on the party seeking 
enforcement and the burden is not as onerous as it was prior to the introduction of 
the 2013 SER, because the party will simply have to show that the country in which 
the award was rendered is party to a convention that is also ratified by the KSA, in 
order to establish the principle of reciprocity. The NYC, the Arab League 
Convention and the Riyadh Convention are examples of the conventions that would 
establish reciprocity between the KSA and these conventions’ member states. 
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7.5. The 2012 SAR Implementation Act of 2017 
On Monday 22 May 2017, the KSA Council of Ministers passed the Implementing 
regulations of the 2012 SAR (Implementing Rule) in order to further develop 
arbitration practice in the KSA (Resolution No 34/M). The 2017 Act came five years 
after enacting the 2012 SAR, and ushered in a development that would create an 
attractive legal system for foreign commerce. Such an act had been long-awaited 
by arbitration practitioners, who had high expectations of its success in clarifying 
the continued uncertainty even after the introduction of the 2012 SAR. Areas of 
uncertainty included the arbitrators’ gender and religion, ascertainment of the KSA’s 
public policy boundaries and a number of other procedural matters. The 2017 Act 
consists of 19 provisions, including definitions of some of the terms used in the Act 
and the condition that it will be enforceable from the moment it is published in the 
KSA’s official gazette (ibid). 
 
The legislators of this Act clarify in Article 2 that the competent authority referred to 
in the 2012 SAR is the Appeal Court, which was originally in charge of reviewing 
such claims, except in circumstances provided for in Articles 9 (1), 12, and 40 (3) 
of the 2012 SAR. This matter was less clear under the 2012 SAR because it only 
stressed that the Court of Appeal is the competent court when it comes to foreign 
awards (2012 SAR, Art 8 (2)). However, when the matter involved a domestic 
award, it was not clear which court would have competence in this regard. With the 
introduction of this new article, the jurisdiction is now clearer for arbitration parties 
in the KSA. 
 
Article 3 of the 2017 act introduces another important development in relation to the 
summoning of the disputing parties. This new article enables parties to be notified 
of the arbitration proceedings electronically via email or other electronic means 
(2017 Implementation Rule). This is an important development, which is beneficial 
to the parties since they only have to communicate the notice by electronic means 
to the other party’s registered contact details. Furthermore, such communication 
will be legally binding in establishing that the other party has been notified of the 
arbitration proceedings and any subsequent decisions. Nevertheless, it may raise 
issues regarding the protection of the parties’ privacy and the potential for cyber-
attacks, which may influence the process of arbitration (Piers and Aschauer, 2018). 
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These issues will have to be dealt with as soon as possible in order to avoid the 
potential for the parties to be disadvantaged by them. 
 
The 2017 implementation rule further regulates the appointment of arbitrators 
through a number of provisions, such as the arbitrator’s ability to withdraw from the 
arbitration without justifying their withdrawal and the effect of having to appoint a 
replacement arbitrator in the arbitration process (Article 5 (1), 6). It also introduces 
additional guidelines on the appointment of experts and on imposing a timeframe 
on the court’s appointment of a sole arbitrator in case the parties fail to agree on a 
particular arbitrator (Article 12 (1), 10). This implementation rule also provides, in 
Article 13, that upon the dispute parties’ agreement, the arbitration tribunal may 
agree on the joinder or intervention of a third party. Although the 2012 SAR was 
silent on this issue, it was still understood that such a third-party joinder would be 
permitted with the consent of the disputing parties. This view was reinforced by 
participant 5 (participant 5). 
 
The implementation rule also clarifies the annulment process provided for under 
the 2012 SAR, by stating (in Article 18 (2)) the required documents that must be 
included with the annulment request. The same rule provides (in Article 17) that the 
party whose award was set aside at the request of one of the dispute parties, or 
who was refused enforcement by the competent court (the Court of Appeal), could 
appeal such a decision to the Supreme Court directly. This appeal process reflects 
an important development since it guarantees that the parties have recourse to a 
higher authority to appeal the competent court’s decision. In addition, the clear 
reference to the Supreme Court as the body responsible for hearing such a claim 
is crucial in developing the KSA’s legal body. Although it is common sense for the 
Supreme Court to hear appeals from the court of appeal since it is the only higher 
court in the hierarchy of the KSA judiciary system, a lack of reference to it in the 
2012 SAR was considered a deficiency – a deficiency now resolved by the 2017 
implementation rule. 
 
7.5.1. Failures of the 2017 Implementation Rule 
Although the 2017 implementation rule introduced developments clarifying some of 
the ambiguities of the 2012 SAR, it nevertheless failed to address some key issues 
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unaddressed in the 2012 SAR. The first issue that was left unclarified by both the 
2012 SAR and its 2017 implementation rule, was the failure to define international 
arbitration. This definition is important because most of the developed world’s 
jurisdictions impose slightly different rules for international arbitration compared to 
domestic cases (Tweeddale, 2007). On the contrary, the 2012 SAR failed to provide 
any important rule that could be applied differently to local or international disputes. 
Article 8 (2) is the only provision that provides some sort of distinction by stating 
that the Court of Appeal in Riyadh is the competent court for hearing ICA cases, 
unless the party chooses a different Court of Appeal in the KSA. This failure by the 
KSA legislation to define international arbitration in the implementation rule, despite 
its importance, could also be interpreted as a lack of political will to do so which 
may, in turn, form an obstacle for the development of an attractive arbitration 
framework. 
 
Another issue, which was highlighted in Chapter Six, is that the arbitrator’s gender 
and religion remain uncertain, even after the issuance of the 2012 SAR; therefore, 
the 2017 implementation rule was expected to address and clarify this issue. Prior 
to the 2012 SAR, it was explicitly required that the arbitrator be both Muslim and 
male, but these requirements were removed from the 2012 SAR (1985 
Implementation Rule, Art, 29 (2)). This 2012 Regulation instead required the sole 
arbitrator, or the chair of the tribunal, to have a university degree in either law or 
Sharia, dropping the faith and gender requirements (Article 14 (2)). This removal of 
the religious and gender requirements left the field open for different interpretations 
of the arbitrator’s qualifications, but there was an understanding that the 
implementation rule would impose some requirements in the same way that the 
1985 implementing rule had done with the 1983 Arbitration Regulation (1985 
Implementation Rule, Art, 29 (2)). Fortunately, the 2017 act does not impose such 
requirements. But still, the mere absence of a non-equivocal provision clarifying the 
position of both female and non-Muslim arbitrators leaves the scope open for them 
to be excluded on public policy grounds. The 2017 rule should have addressed 
these two issues and not have left them to the court’s discretion since this would 
invite unwanted court intervention, which might be a hindrance to the development 




To conclude, this chapter engaged in a critical analysis of the 2012 SAR and the 
2013 SER and compared them with the 1983 SAR in terms of award issuance, 
award challenge procedures and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards. In doing so, this chapter relied on international institutional rules to draw a 
comparison between the KSA’s arbitration practices and those of such esteemed 
legal frameworks. This analysis has revealed the importance of the 2012 SAR in 
developing the KSA’s arbitration regulations in terms of the voting procedures of 
issuing awards and what should happen if the arbitration tribunal fails to reach the 
majority vote required, which is something that was not touched upon by the 1983 
SAR. The 2012 SAR also saw an important development with regard to the time 
restrictions of issuing an award, which were very impractical under the 1983 SAR. 
It also provided detailed provisions on the procedure for challenging awards and 
the grounds on which this could be done, which was something that was poorly 
dealt with in the 1983 SAR. Such developments are now mostly in line with the 
Model Law provisions and create a legal framework that is arbitration-friendly for 
both national and international commerce. 
 
Furthermore, the process of recognising and enforcing arbitral awards was further 
developed by the 2012 SAR by, among other measures, which limited the scope of 
the court’s intervention, as opposed to the practice prior to its introduction. The 
2012 SAR and the 2013 SER have made the enforcement of arbitral awards much 
more accessible to foreign commerce and empowered the dispute parties with the 
autonomy to decide how they want to adjudicate their dispute. Although such 
autonomy is a remarkable development in the KSA’s arbitration practice, it is still 
limited in scope and such limitation might hinder the KSA’s goal of achieving an 
attractive legal system. This limitation is merely due to the vagueness inherent in 
the drafting of some of the 2012 SAR provisions, particularly those related to 
defining international arbitration, the arbitrator’s gender and religion, and the scope 
of the KSA’s public policy. The KSA’s legislator will have to clarify these ambiguities 
in order to enhance the arbitration regulation of the KSA and make it more reliable 
and attractive. 
 
This being said, it is notable that a number of academics expected these 
ambiguities to be dealt with by the 2012 SAR implementation rule (Al-Ammari and 
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Martin, 2014; Aleisa, 2016). However, this rule was enacted in 2017 and clarified 
some of the ambiguous provisions of the 2012 SAR, while failing to consider most 
of the serious uncertainties within it. This will, unfortunately, result in the KSA’s 
arbitration regulation attracting less commerce than it could otherwise have done if 
these uncertainties had been clarified by the 2017 implementation rule. In general, 
the 2012 SAR and its implementation rule have resulted in the remarkable 
development of the KSA’s arbitration framework. However, there is still scope for 


























Chapter Eight: the Enforcement of Foreign Awards 
Under the 2012 SAR – a Critical Analysis of Case Law  
 
8.1. Introduction  
The 2012 SAR has developed arbitration practices in the KSA by removing most of 
the ambiguities inherited from the previous regulations. These developments, and 
the extent to which they enhanced the arbitration framework in the KSA, were 
addressed in detail in the previous chapters. Therefore, it is now crucial to conduct 
a study of relevant cases, published for the first time in the KSA, in order to assess 
how the 2012 SAR is perceived and implemented in practice. This chapter 
considers how enforcement courts have enforced a number of foreign awards 
despite their lack of compliance with some of the requirements stated in the 2012 
SAR and the 2013 SER. It also considers the enforcement court’s flexibility in 
applying some of the provisions of the 2013 SER as opposed to the previous 
practices under the 1983 SAR. The analysis of these cases will be limited to the 
empirical materials obtained by the researcher since some cases have less material 
than others and accordingly a more limited analysis. This chapter will also consider 
the statistics published by the KSA Ministry of Justice, highlighting the importance 
of a developed arbitration framework in dealing with such cases in an effective and 
efficient manner. 
 
8.2. Case Law Analysis  
One of the most important targets of the 2012 SAR is the creation of an arbitration-
friendly environment for the purpose of attracting foreign commerce. As illustrated 
in Chapters Five and Seven, the enforcement mechanisms of foreign awards were 
a major deficiency of the 1983 SAR that led to creating a hostile environment for 
foreign commerce. This is particularly reflected in the KSA’s application of the 1983 
SAR and the New York Convention 1958, in which it relied upon the public policy 
reservation to reject the enforcement of some foreign awards. The principle of 
reciprocity was another issue facing international commerce when trying to enforce 
their awards in the KSA since establishing its existence was not an easy task. The 
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2012 SAR attempted to address these inherited deficiencies, but whether it 
succeeded in practice is to be examined in the analysis of case law below. 
 
8.2.1. Case No: 0785/2014 
8.2.1.1. Nature of the Dispute  
This dispute arose from a sale of goods contract signed on May 9th, 2009, between 
Claimant A, and the first respondent, B. This contract is related to the sale of 
garments and other export products by the Chinese claimant to the Saudi 
respondent, who had previous dealings with the claimant. Such dealings began in 
early 2008, where both parties conducted their business on an oral basis. In May 
2009, the first respondent bought more products from the claimant prior to payment 
for the previous business transaction. Before manufacturing the said garments, two 
confirmation of sales were signed by the claimant and the first respondent for the 
2008 and 2009 transactions. Following the signing of the contract, the claimant 
prepared the required goods but did not send them due to the first respondent’s 
failure to pay the sum due from the 2008 transaction. In 2010, the claimant and first 
respondent signed a letter of commitment on the basis that the claimant would 
resume implementation of both contractual obligations under the confirmation of 
sales. The letter of commitment included the second Saudi respondent C, 
guaranteeing any liability for the first respondent’s debt. After the first respondent’s 
failure to meet their contractual obligation, the claimant relied on the arbitration 
clause of their contract to bring an arbitration case before the Chinese arbitration 
commission. This commission relied on the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission’s rules of 2012 (hereafter referred to as “the 
arbitration rules”) as the procedural law governing the dispute.  
 
8.2.1.2. Summary of the Arbitration Proceedings 
After continuous delay by the respondents to appoint an arbitrator or authorise the 
chairman of the arbitration commission to do so, the chairman of CIETAC28, in 
accordance with article 27, item 3 of the arbitration rules, assigned a panel of three 
arbitrators to form the arbitration tribunal. On November 28, 2013, in Beijing, the 
                                                 
28 Hong Kong Arbitration Centre 
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constituted arbitration tribunal began hearing the case as scheduled. The 
authorised attorneys and both respondents appeared at the hearing and presented 
their statement and defence.  In their adjudication, the claimant asked for the 
following: a) the first respondent to pay the contract’s balance of 4,414,137 Yuan; 
b)  the first respondent to pay interest of 482,612.31 Yuan, as per the annual 
interest rate 6.56% of a loan at the People’s Bank of China over the period of 2011 
to 2013, during which time the claimant’s money was due; c) the second respondent 
to assume joint liability for the debt owed by the first respondent; d) both 
respondents to bear all arbitration fees incurred in this case.  
 
The second respondent, however, argued that he should have no obligation to 
assume the liability as he is not bound by the arbitration clause. The attorney 
argued that, although his client’s name was printed out in the field for entering the 
concerned parties of the letter of commitment signed in 2010, it is nevertheless the 
first respondent’s name that was printed in the field for declaring the undersigned 
letter of commitment. Therefore, the second respondent’s signature was just a 
representation of the first respondent, since the letter of commitment had only one 
acceptor and that would be deemed to be the first respondent. Secondly, the first 
respondent and their attorney alleged that the claimant submitted a confirmation 
letter which had the amount of money due from the parties’ contract, which was 
forged. This was because the original letter was lost by the claimant and, as a result 
of the first hearing, it was thought that it was beyond recovery, but the letter in 
question was later found. However, the first respondent’s attorney argued against 
taking such a letter forward as evidence, since the claimant had asked for it to be 
withdrawn in the first hearing. The first respondent also argued that the claimant’s 
request for interest lacked any lawful or factual basis. Finally, the first respondent 
argued that the claimant’s request for paying the arbitration costs of this case lacked 
any lawful or factual basis. 
 
8.2.1.3. Arbitration Tribunal Award  
The Arbitration Tribunal arrived at the following decisions: 
The Arbitration Tribunal considered the first respondent to have failed to provide 
any corresponding evidence to prove their claim that the confirmation letter was 
false. It also stated that, since the original letter was later found, the decision was 
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left with the tribunal to decide whether to accept it or not. To ensure the fairness of 
the hearing and instead of taking the confirmation letter as a basis, the tribunal 
confirmed the debt owed to the claimant by another means. To ascertain the 
amount of debt still due to the claimant, the tribunal relied on the amount stated on 
the letter of commitment and on the amount of another shipment of goods that 
followed it, minus what had already been paid by the respondent. Since the first 
respondent had failed to provide any evidence that such an amount had been paid, 
the tribunal supported the claimant’s claim of 4,414,137 Yuan.  
 
The tribunal decided to support the claimant’s claim for the amount of interest 
requested. The tribunal stated that, because the amount of debt ascertained by the 
tribunal corresponds with what was already claimed by the claimant and, relying on 
the claimant’s method of calculating the interest rate, which left no room for 
criticism, the first respondent was required to pay the aforementioned interest rate. 
 
The Arbitration Tribunal stated that the arbitration costs should be reasonably 
shared by both parties in accordance with article 50 of the arbitration rules. This 
meant that the claimant would assume 20% and the first respondent 80%. The 
arbitration tribunal rejected the claimant’s other requests. 
 
8.2.1.4. Enforcement of the Award 
The claimant, via their Saudi attorney, requested the enforcement of the award 
despite the respondent’s attempt to annul the award at the Board of Grievance for 
infringing the KSA’s public policy. This infringement claim was on the basis that the 
award contains an element of Usurious interest, which is prohibited under Sharia 
rules. The award was partially enforced by the KSA’s enforcement court on the 
amount of the debt, 4,414,137 Yuan, as per article 21 of the 2012 SAR and payment 
of interest rejected in the enforcement decision (Enforcement Order No: 
38454477/2017). The respondent also raised a number of other grounds for 
annulling the award, such as not agreeing to the arbitration panel and not being 
well represented in the arbitration hearing, but these claims were rejected by the 





As it appears from this case, it is important for parties to choose the right 
substantive law for their contract, since it will have a significant effect on the 
success of their dispute resolution. This award would have been worthless to the 
claimant had the 2012 SAR not been introduced since prior to the introduction of 
this law, awards containing an element of interest were rejected outright by 
enforcement courts on public policy grounds (143/T/4 of 1412 H (1992)). This partial 
enforcement decision also shows the importance of applying internationally 
recognised legal principles, such as the severability of an award in the KSA’s legal 
system. This openness to international legal standards is likely to increase foreign 
commerce interest in the KSA’s arbitration framework while, at the same time, 
preserving the KSA’s national sovereignty.  
 
Finally, it is noteworthy that this award was rendered by non-Muslim arbitrators in 
a dispute involving a Muslim party, which was a problematic issue that could have 
breached public policy under the 1983 SAR (Article 12). Thus, the enforcement of 
such awards by the KSA courts shows a more flexible way of construing the KSA’s 
public policy, as opposed to the situation prior to the introduction of the 2012 SAR. 
It is hoped that such flexibility will lead to more disputes being settled and enforced 
in the KSA, which would help achieve the KSA’s goal of attracting foreign 
commerce.  
 
8.2.2. Case No: 19366/MCP 
8.2.2.1. Nature of the Dispute  
The dispute arose out of a sale contract dated 23/07/2012, entered into between 
the Lebanese claimant A and the Saudi Arabian respondent B. Under the contract, 
A, the seller, agreed to deliver to B, the buyer, 6000 metric tons of plain wire rods 
for a total price of USD 4,032,000. The claimant submitted that, under the contract, 
the purchase price was to be paid by the respondent in two instalments; the first 
was the pre-payment of 20% of the total purchase price, to be made by 25/07/2012 
at the latest. The second, for the remaining 80% of the purchase price, was to be 
made within 48 hours of the receipt of certain documents at the counter of the 
buyer’s bank account in the KSA. The claimant, who did not deliver the plain wire 
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rods to the respondent, contended that the latter failed to make the pre-payment as 
contractually agreed, and made a damages claim in the amount of USD 
465,392.64, for the damages allegedly caused by the non-performance of the sale 
contract by the respondent.  
 
The claimant commenced arbitration proceedings by filing a request for arbitration. 
The claimant’s proceedings were based on an arbitration clause in the party’s 
contract for the settlement of any arising dispute by the ICC in Geneva and under 
its rules. The clause also provided for the arbitrator to be appointed by the ICC in 
accordance with its rules and that the losing party would bear costs of such 
proceedings. 
 
8.2.2.2. Summary of the Arbitration Proceedings 
Following the claimant’s request for arbitration, transmitted to the ICC secretariat 
who, in turn, informed the respondent that they had 30 days to file a response to 
the request for arbitration. Since the respondent failed to file a response, the ICC 
secretariat informed the parties that the arbitration would proceed and the 
arbitration tribunal would decide any question of jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6 (3) 
of the ICC rules (ICC Rules, 2013). The parties were also informed that, due to the 
dispute parties’ non-appointment of a sole arbitrator, a sole arbitrator would be 
nominated, unless informed otherwise. The ICC secretariat also noted that the 
arbitration language was not agreed upon by the parties and, as such, the sole 
arbitrator would decide on it pursuant to Article 20 of the ICC rules (ibid). On 
14/08/2013, a sole arbitrator was appointed who, in turn, decided that the language 
of arbitration would be English due to the contract being drafted in English and that 
both parties, during the course of their dealings, communicated in English. 
 
The arbitration evidentiary hearing took place in the sole arbitrator’s office, where 
the claimant was represented during the hearing by their counsel, whereas the 
respondent did not participate in the evidentiary hearing, despite having been 
informed of it and invited to attend. The claimant’s witnesses were heard via a video 
conference and confirmed their written statements, as well as answered questions 
posed by the arbitrator and the claimant’s counsel. The claimant provided the 
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requested information on the 16th June 2014, while the respondent failed to reply, 
the same as he failed to reply to any request since the beginning of the proceedings. 
 
In this case, the parties, whose places of business were in different countries, 
entered into a sale contract governed by Swiss law and did not explicitly exclude 
the application of the CISG29. In their choice of law clause, the parties neither 
referred to national Swiss law, nor to the Swiss law code of obligation. Thus, the 
question arises as to whether reference to Swiss law tacitly excluded in the 
application of the CISG. During the evidentiary record, the sole arbitrator 
considered that there was no element showing the parties wanted to exclude the 
application of the CISG. The sole arbitrator noted in this respect that a number of 
Swiss courts, as well as leading scholars, are of the view that a reference to a 
national law is, in itself, sufficient to exclude the application of the CISG. 
Nevertheless, the sole arbitrator decided to apply the CISG and, for matters not 
covered by it, he would apply Swiss substantive law. 
 
8.2.2.3. Arbitration Tribunal Award 
The sole arbitrator in this case was satisfied that the respondent was under a 
contractual obligation to make a 20% pre-payment by 25/07/2012. This obligation 
was shown in the evidentiary hearing to have not been fulfilled and, as such, the 
arbitrator found the respondent in breach of their contractual obligation for the 
payment of the 20% pre-payment as of 26/07/2012. So, the question was then 
whether the claimant was entitled, following the respondent’s breach of obligation, 
to avoid the contract and sell the goods to a third party. The disputing parties had 
expressly agreed in their contractual document that breach of the pre-payment 
would entitle the claimant to avoid the contract. On this basis, the arbitrator asserted 
that the claimant was entitled to and he avoided the contract. 
 
In this case, the claimant contended that they made three substitute transactions 
for a total quantity of 4,695.58 MT and that they were unable to resell a quantity of 
1,304.42 MT. In their contract, the parties did not exclude or modify rules of the 
CISG on damages. Therefore, it was significant to determine whether the claimant 
was entitled to claim damages for each of the substitute transactions according to 
                                                 
29 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
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CSIG provisions (Articles 74, 75, 76). The claimant contended that they were 
entitled to damages corresponding to the difference between the sale price in the 
sale contract with the respondent and the price in the substitute transaction. Article 
75 of the CISG requires that four conditions be fulfilled: (a) the contract is avoided; 
(b) a substitute transaction has been entered into; (c) the substitute transaction was 
made in a reasonable manner; and (d) the substitute transaction was made within 
a reasonable time after avoidance (CISG, 1980). The arbitrator provided that all of 
these conditions were met by the claimant in this case and ascertained damages 
the claimant was entitled to claim based on the substitute transaction – USD 
312,632.16. 
 
The claimant also contended that they were entitled to damages for the remaining 
goods that it was unable to resell. Article 76 of the CISG requires that three 
conditions are met: (a) the contract is avoided; (b) the party claiming damages has 
not made a purchase or resale under Article 75 of CISG; and (c) there is a current 
price for the goods at the time of the avoidance (ibid). The sole arbitrator considered 
all these conditions to have been met by the claimant. 
 
Based on the above facts, the arbitrator decided that the respondent owed the 
claimant an amount of USD 419,117.74, plus interest at a rate of 5% per annum 
until full payment is delivered. The arbitrator decided for all of the arbitration costs 
to be paid by the respondent, plus interest at the rate of 5% per annum, from the 
date the award was rendered, until full payment was received. The respondent was 
also asked to pay the legal fees and costs, plus interest at the rate of 5% per annum, 
from the date of this award, until full payment is received. The arbitrator rejected all 
other requests and claims. 
 
8.2.2.4. Enforcement of the Award 
This award was partially enforced by the KSA’s enforcement court in Riyadh on 
02/12/2016, with enforcement order No: 28158542, despite the respondent’s 
attempts to annul the award for lack of representation in the arbitral hearings and 
for containing a Usurious interest that breaches public policy grounds. The 
enforcement judge also asserted that the respondent’s request to review some of 
the case’s merits is rejected since such issue is outside the scope of his jurisdiction 
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and any issue to deal with the merits of the case should be dealt with by the Swiss 
courts and not the KSA enforcement courts. Therefore, the enforcement order was 
for enforcing the incurred damages of USD 419,117.74, arbitration costs of USF 
56,000 and legal costs of GBP 1,748, the interest being severed in this case. The 
enforcement judge asked for the respondent’s full compliance with the enforcement 
order within five days of being notified of it, failing which, they would be subject to 
procedural sanctions stipulated in the 2013 Enforcement Regulation. 
 
The respondent did, however, appeal the enforcement judge’s decision to the KSA 
Court of Appeal on the following grounds: the enforcement judge did not review 
whether the foreign award had followed the requirements stipulated in Article 5 (2) 
of the 2013 SER. These requirements include the parties’ proper representation 
and defence in the arbitration hearing and that this has been infringed as per the 
respondent’s allegation. Secondly, the award could not be severed because Riba 
was not the only infringement of public policy, indeed, the entire amount was mostly 
based on some form of Riba, which is against the KSA’s public policy. Thirdly, the 
arbitrator applied the CISG rules, which are not what the parties agreed on, as 
Article 22 of their contract cites Swiss law to be the applicable law. Finally, the 
arbitrator decided for payment of damages to be paid to the claimant, when such 
payment was indeed for the difference in prices after the goods were sold to a third 
party. The respondent claimed that such payment conflicts with the solutions 
agreed on by the parties, which are the extension of payment time or the 
cancellation of this initial bill and notifying the respondent. The Court of Appeal 
stated that, ensuring compliance with the requirements of Article 5 (2) of the 
enforcement regulation is within the jurisdiction of the enforcement judge and, as 
such, asked the enforcement judge to hear the party before deciding on what he 
deemed appropriate. The enforcement judge’s decision was the same as his initial 
decision and, accordingly, Enforcement Order No: 28158542 was issued.  
 
8.2.2.5. Comments 
This case, similar to the previous one, shows the importance of the severability 
principle, which has protected the claimants’ rights in the enforcement of arbitral 
awards. Under the 1983 SAR, such awards would have been rejected and the party 
seeking enforcement would find itself in a position where it cannot enforce the 
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award. This was evidenced in Case No: No. 115/1429 in 2008, where an arbitral 
award involving payment of interest was rejected on the basis that Usurious interest 
is forbidden under Islamic law, even if it forms a small part of the award. Such an 
award was based on the Board of Grievance’s decision No: 116, which stressed 
that an arbitral award shall not include the payment of sums that are contrary to 
Islamic law, regardless of the percentage of such a sum on the overall payment. 
Therefore, the introduction of the severability principle and limitation of the court’s 
power to review such awards in the 2012 SAR, has made it possible for arbitral 
awards containing public policy-infringing elements to be applied, where such 
elements are being severed from the enforcement. The enforcement of this award 
also raises a very important issue regarding a non-Muslim arbitrator adjudicating a 
dispute between Muslim parties. Although both the dispute parties are companies 
and hence have no religion, they are both located in Muslim majority states. It would 
be interesting to hear the court’s view on this particular issue, since the 1983 SAR 
and Sharia rules, as applied in the KSA, forbid Muslim parties from referring their 
dispute to a non-Muslim arbitrator unless one of the dispute’s parties is non-Muslim 
(Saleh, 2012).  
 
The researcher believes that enforcement of this award shows the KSA’s total 
respect for party autonomy in choosing their arbitrator and focus only on preserving 
its sovereignty through severing the enforcement of any infringing elements of an 
internationally rendered award. This award is likely to result in conflicting decisions, 
whereby some enforcement judges would enforce an award totally rendered by a 
non-Muslim sole arbitrator in a dispute between Muslim parties, while others would 
not.  The enforcement judge in this case appears to have followed the Hanafi school 
of jurisprudence, which permits such appointment, whereas other enforcement 
judges may follow the Hanbali school’s view and reject enforcing the award 
because this school is the official school of jurisprudence in the KSA. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher believes that the cases of partial enforcement 
analysed in this chapter may be the beginning of a trend towards complying with 
the demands of international commerce, which could be developed further to 
include full enforcement. However, this may not be foreseeable in the near future, 
due to the enforcement courts’ jurisdiction over enforcing arbitral awards. Although, 
this trend may develop and special committees in charge of enforcing arbitral 
awards might be created in order to avoid the strict application of Sharia rule. This 
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is seen in the practice of banking dispute committees, which issue decisions 
involving Usurious interest that is contrary to the essence of the country’s 
constitution and public policy. Such committees were created for the purpose of 
removing the Sharia court’s jurisdiction over disputes involving banks, which had 
previously resulted in their failure to enforce their contractual agreements due to 
the existence of interest (Case No. 1464/1/s of 1996). The KSA’s allowance of 
interests to be imposed on loans in its banks, and such loans being enforced by the 
aforementioned committee, was mainly an attempt to protect its banks’ interests 
(Royal Order No 37441, 2012). Therefore, the KSA’s current desire towards 
attracting foreign commerce may develop its practice and lead to the full 
enforcement of foreign awards in spite of interest. The development of Islamic 
economics may also lead to a change in Islamic fiqh. Such a change may redefine 
what constitutes Riba in Islamic law and what may be considered to be mere 
compensation.  
 
8.2.3. Case No: 360262842 
8.2.3.1. Nature of the Dispute  
This case is related to the dispute between claimant A, a Saudi company and 
respondent B, a British national, regarding a contract of services. In this contract, 
the respondent agreed, in accordance with the contract terms, to provide the 
claimant with certain services in return for the payment of a specified amount as 
fees. These services were to be provided in phases and, after each phase, the 
payment would be made prior to moving to the next one. Following the second 
phase, the claimant terminated the contract due to an allegedly repudiatory breach 
by the respondent. Both parties agreed in their contract for English law to be 
applicable for all disputes or differences that may arise between the parties during 
the term of their contract or thereafter. They also agreed for a single arbitrator to be 
nominated by the parties and, in case of their failure, the sole arbitrator to be 
nominated by the ICC. 
 
8.2.3.2. Summary of the Arbitration Proceedings 
The claimant commenced arbitration proceedings as per the arbitration clause in 
the disputing parties’ contract and a sole arbitrator was mutually nominated by the 
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parties. This sole arbitrator was in charge of hearing this case and the disputing 
parties’ counter-claims. The seat of arbitration was London. During the arbitration 
hearing, the claimant requested the return of various sums of money paid by it to 
the respondent in relation to the first phases of the overall service and claimed an 
alleged repudiatory breach of the contract. The respondent denied the claimant’s 
right to recover the money and made a counterclaim for the sums due for the 
remaining phases of the contract. The respondent also claimed damages for the 
claimant’s repudiatory termination of the contract and for an injunction restraining 
the claimant from using the services already provided in the first phases, as well as 
damages for unlawful use of these services. In addition to these submissions by 
the parties, the sole arbitrator heard oral evidence from factual and expert 
witnesses called by both parties. Following the hearing, both parties provided the 
arbitrator with written and oral closing submissions, which was followed by the 
issuance of the award. 
 
8.2.3.3. Arbitration Tribunal Award 
The sole arbitrator issued the following award after having carefully read and 
considered the documents and evidence put forward by the parties. Firstly, the 
respondent had breached the contract for service, but such a breach is not 
repudiatory. Secondly, the respondent is entitled to retain all the sums paid to it by 
the claimant under and in relation to the contract of services and, as such, the 
claimant’s claim for their return was dismissed. Thirdly, the respondent’s 
counterclaim for payment due from the remaining phases succeeded, with a total 
amount of USD 267,579.28. Such payments were asked to be paid immediately by 
the claimant, with additional interest. The sole arbitrator dismissed all other 
counterclaims. 
 
8.2.3.4. Enforcement of the Award 
The respondent, through his attorney, requested the enforcement of the award in 
Enforcement Order No: 360262842 from the enforcement court in Riyadh. The 
respondent requested enforcement of the award excluding the Usurious interest 
element, which is contrary to the KSA’s public policy. The claimant made a request 
to the enforcement court to stop the enforcement of the award on the following 
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grounds. Firstly, the award is not final in its country of origin since it was issued by 
a sole arbitrator and was not registered with the competent court in the UK. 
 
In this regard the, claimant argued that article 66 of the English arbitration law 
requires arbitral awards to be registered with the competent court in a provision 
similar to the one provided for in article 44 of the 2012 SAR. Secondly, the award 
was not stamped by the English Ministry of Justice, as per the requirement of article 
11(4) of the enforcement regulation but, instead, it was stamped by the English 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce. Thirdly, the principle of reciprocity was not 
established by the respondent who was seeking enforcement and there was no 
evidence of the UK’s willingness to enforce the KSA’s locally rendered awards. 
Finally, the award had Usurious interest, which is against Islamic Sharia rules and, 
as such, should be unenforceable for infringing the KSA’s public policy. 
 
The respondent replied to these arguments a week later and before the same 
enforcement judge and at the Saudi Enforcement Court in Riyadh. In his response, 
he asserted that the arbitral award was final and this is proved in the award draft 
that states it is final and rendered in accordance with the English Arbitration Act, 
1996. This finality is also proven by Article 85 (1) of the English Arbitration Act, 
which provides that arbitral awards are final and obligatory for the dispute’s parties. 
Also, the sole arbitration nomination was in accordance with the parties’ arbitration 
clause and, as such, they mutually chose the arbitrator.  
 
Secondly, there is no law that requires the judiciary to make an Executive Erder 
final, and this is proved in the relevant legal frameworks to the enforcement of this 
Executive Order, which are the New York Convention of 1958, the English 
Arbitration Act of 1996 and the Saudi Arbitration Regulation of 2012. In regard to 
Article 66 of the English Arbitration Act, which clarifies how to enforce arbitral 
awards in the UK and names the conditions for such, this is irrelevant since the 
enforcement here is in the KSA and, as such, the SER is the only relevant legal 
framework. Thirdly, the need for the official stamp of both the Foreign Ministry and 
the Ministry of Justice, as per article 11(4) of SER, are referring to the Saudi 
ministries and not to the ministries of a foreign country in which the award was 
rendered. Accordingly, the award was officially stamped by both the Saudi Ministry 
of Justice and the Foreign Ministry. Fourthly, the principle of reciprocity exists 
between the KSA and the UK on the basis of their ratification of the New York 
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Convention, 1958, and they both comply with its provisions. Both countries’ 
accession to the New York Convention were confirmed by the KSA Ministry of 
Justice, which reveals that such accession means their compliance with such a 
convention’s provisions. Therefore, unless the claimant has evidence to the 
contrary, such compliance with the Convention is enough to ensure the existence 
of reciprocity. Finally, the award has some infringing elements relating to the KSA’s 
public policy, but such elements were not put forward for the enforcement to the 
KSA’s enforcement courts and, therefore, there is nothing in the enforcement 
request that would infringe the KSA’s public policy.  
 
Following the respondent’s response, the Enforcement Judge made an 
enforcement order for the respondent’s enforcement request and ordered the 
claimant to comply with such an enforcement order within five days. Alternatively, 
the claimant would be subject to penalties, as per the SER of 2013. 
 
8.2.3.5. Comment 
The enforcement of this award shows that the 2013 Enforcement Regulation is 
attractive enough for foreign disputes since it guarantees the parties’ rights, in as 
far as the KSA’s public policy is complied with. This award sets another precedent 
for satisfying the principle of reciprocity by mere reference to the KSA’s accession 
to an international convention that the country from which the award was rendered 
is also a party to the same convention. This was not the case prior to the 
introduction of both the 2013 SER and the 2012 SAR, since a similar award from 
the same country (the UK) was rejected on the grounds of a lack of reciprocity, 
despite the continuous referral by the party seeking the enforcement to both 
countries’ accession to the New York Convention (Case No. 115/D/A/15 2008). 
Furthermore, the manner in which this award was enforced shows that there is 
flexibility when dealing with foreign award’s infringing elements to the KSA’s public 
policy. Such flexibility is seen in the court’s reliance on the party enforcement’s 
request in this case, rather than the award itself. Even if it relied on the award, the 
enforcement judge would have exercised severability to partially enforce the award, 
as seen from the above cases. This development in the KSA’s practice of enforcing 
foreign decisions is likely to attract foreign commerce while at the same time 
ensuring the KSA’s protection of its sovereign rights. 
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8.2.4. Case No:37286586 
8.2.4.1. Nature of the Dispute  
This case is related to the dispute between claimant A, an Egyptian company, and 
respondent B, a large Saudi commercial corporation, regarding a contract of 
services. In this contract, the claimant agreed, in accordance with the terms of the 
contract, to provide the respondent with certain services in return for the payment 
of a specified amount of fees. The latter refused to make a payment for a service 
obtained from the claimant and, accordingly, the claimant referred the dispute to 
arbitration as per article 9 of the party’s contractual agreement. Both parties had no 
objection to the chosen arbitrators, agreeing for the arbitration tribunal to decide on 
the matter. 
 
8.2.4.2. Summary of the Arbitration Proceedings 
The arbitration tribunal commenced its proceedings in 2010 in Cairo and both 
parties were given the chance to present their case, which they did through their 
appointed lawyers. The arbitration tribunal followed the procedure of the parties’ 
chosen applicable law which, in this case, was the Egyptian Arbitration Law of 1994. 
The arbitration tribunal reached a decision on this case which was, in turn, 
communicated to both parties at their registered addresses. The materials available 
to the researcher do not show any further details on the evidence or arguments 
submitted by the parties, but do show that proper procedure was followed and that 
neither party raised any complaints regarding the process through which the award 
was issued.  
 
8.2.4.3. Arbitration Tribunal Award 
The arbitration tribunal decided in favour of the claimant and requested the 
respondent to pay the claimant compensation of 1,127,205 Saudi riyals. It also 
decided for the arbitration fees, which were 105,000 Egyptian pounds, to be paid 
by both parties equally. This award was later approved by the Egyptian Court of 
Appeal in Cairo and stamped, in 2014, by the KSA’s Foreign Ministry and Ministry 
of Justice. Again, the material available regarding the case does not offer any more 
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details as to how the award was issued and whether such a decision was 
unanimous or not. 
 
8.2.4.4. Enforcement of the Award 
The claimant made a request for the enforcement of the award to the KSA’s 
enforcement court in 2015, supplying them with the award and the stamps of both 
Saudi ministries, in addition to proof of the Egyptian Court of Appeal’s approval. 
However, the enforcement judge stated that there is no evidence that this award 
was final and enforceable and the award does not state so, which means that it 
infringes article 11 of the enforcement regulation of 2013 and its implementation 
rule of 2013. Therefore, the party seeking enforcement was asked to complete their 
application request, which in turn was declined by the party on the basis that the 
Egyptian Arbitration Law stated, in Article 52, that arbitral awards that are rendered 
in accordance with the provisions of this law are enforceable and cannot be 
challenged and this is enough to establish that this rendered award is final. The 
same party also argued that the KSA Court of Appeal does not give proof of the 
finality of awards and the same is practised by the Egyptian courts. Furthermore, 
the party against whom enforcement is sought has already attempted to challenge 
the award and its challenge was rejected, implying that the award is final and that 
there is no need for any further proof.  
 
The enforcement judge then revisited the request and stated that, since the award 
is stamped by the two Saudi ministries and both parties have been represented 
before the arbitration tribunal, in addition to the fact that Egypt is party to the Riyadh 
Convention, which establishes the principle of reciprocity, an enforcement order for 
the payment of 1,127,205 Saudi riyals was to be provided to the claimant, in 
addition to the equal share of the arbitration fee, which is 105,000 Egyptian pound. 
 
8.2.4.5. Comments 
The enforcement of this award elucidates interesting arguments, as presented by 
the party seeking the enforcement, in order to establish that the award was final. 
The fact that Article 11 of the 2013 Enforcement Regulation failed to determine 
precisely what makes an award final, has left the field open for enforcement judges 
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to do so. Therefore, this decision is of great importance in establishing the principle 
if the award fails to do so in clear terms. However, since judges in the KSA are not 
bound by any precedent, a different judge may refuse to accept the aforementioned 
argument as sufficient basis for establishing finality. Consequently, the party 
seeking the enforcement of an arbitral award needs to avoid such complexity by 
ensuring that the arbitration tribunal clearly mentions that the rendered award is 
final. Prior to the 2012 SAR, the enforcement circuit was in charge of verifying that 
the award is final in its home country (The Board of Grievance Circular No. 7). This 
was problematic because there were no clear channels for doing so and the 
process was likely to make the enforcement lengthy unless the party seeking 
enforcement produced such proof. Therefore, the enforcement judge’s initial 
decision of requiring proof of the award’s being final shows that ambiguity still 
exists. However, the general trend of flexibility in enforcing awards is very likely to 
overcome such ambiguities, although there are no guarantees.  
 
Furthermore, it is arguable that the grounds upon which the enforcement judge 
decided the finality of the award, and accordingly issued enforcement orders, are 
not strong enough to establish such finality, since an alternative judge may require 
the party seeking enforcement to exercise its right of amendment and ask the 
arbitration tribunal to clearly state that the rendered award is final. In addition, the 
Saudi ministries’ stamps do not imply that the award is final, but merely that the 
award is authoritative; the stamps are simply a matter of administrative procedure. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the judge has relied on Egypt’s accession to the 
Riyadh Convention to establish the existence of reciprocity, which leaves no doubt 
that it is no longer a difficult task for both judges and enforcing parties to ascertain 
the existence of reciprocity between the KSA and the country from which the award 
was rendered. This is a very major development that ensures the easier 
enforcement of foreign decisions, which would help in creating an attractive legal 
system for international commerce.  It also highlights another step in the trend 
towards the KSA’s desire to meet the needs of international commerce. It is very 
likely that this step will lead to other steps that ease the KSA’s basic requirements 
for enforcing arbitral awards. This flexibility in establishing the reciprocity 
requirement will reverse the generally held view of the KSA’s legal system as a 
closed system, as opposed to other developed legal systems. 
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8.2.5. Case No:37286586 
8.2.5.1. Nature of the Dispute  
This dispute is related to the payment of a loan that was given by claimant A, an 
Omani national, to respondent B, a Saudi national, in the form of a promissory note. 
Upon the respondent’s failure to pay what was due at the required time, the claimant 
brought an action before an arbitration tribunal in Oman, as per the agreement of 
the loan. This dispute was arbitrated and a decision issued that sought enforcement 
in the KSA in accordance with the KSA SER of 2013. 
 
8.2.5.2. Summary of the Arbitration Proceedings 
The Omani arbitration tribunal was formed in 2013, following the claimant’s request 
and in accordance with the party’s agreement. The tribunal then attempted to 
communicate the hearing time and location to both parties but, unfortunately, the 
Saudi respondent failed to show up to any of the hearings. He did not communicate 
any sort of defence to the arbitration tribunal due to receiving no notifications of 
such hearings in the first place. This was mainly due to the arbitration tribunal’s 
inability to find a valid address for the respondent to communicate hearing notices. 
Therefore, the arbitration tribunal reached a decision in the absence of the 
respondent or any of his representative and applied the parties’ chosen law which, 
in this case, is the Oman Commercial Law of 1990. 
 
8.2.5.3. Arbitration Tribunal Award 
The arbitration tribunal provided its award after hearing the claimant’s claim and in 
the absence of the respondent’s representation. The tribunal decided on the right 
method for effectively communicating the defendant’s notice, as per Article 1 of the 
Omani ministerial order no: 467/ 2013.30. This includes communicating through 
authorities or through publishing such a notice in the country’s official newspaper 
at the claimant’s expense. The arbitrators in this case communicated such notice 
by publishing the notice in one of the leading Omani newspapers and, since the 
                                                 
30  Article 1 of the Omani ministerial order no: 467/ 2013 states that, if the respondent’s address is not 
known, which makes it impossible to communicate direct notices, it is up to the arbitrator to decide on the 
best method of communicating such notice. 
 219 
respondent failed to appear despite this notice, their right to defend their case was 
considered waived. The arbitration also stated that, since the documents presented 
clear evidence of a promissory note being made to the claimant by the respondent, 
the fact that the respondent failed to fulfil his requirement and pay that money 
despite the promissory notes fulfilling all required conditions for such notes, the 
respondent in this case is liable to make such payment as per the party agreement. 
Consequently, the arbitration tribunal’s decision was for the respondent to pay 
78181,06 Omani riyals in fulfilment of the promissory note that was made between 
him and the claimant. The tribunal also decided that the cost of publishing the notice 
in the newspaper had to be paid, totalling an amount of 312 Omani riyals. 
 
8.2.5.4. Enforcement of the Award  
The claimant sought enforcement, in the KSA, for the payment of a loan, as per the 
promissory, for the total amount of 78181,06 Omani riyals, in addition to the price 
for publishing the notice in the newspaper, of 312 Omani riyals. The respondent, 
on the other hand, made a counterclaim for non-enforcement of the Omani 
arbitration award on the basis that he was not represented in the hearing, which is 
one of the mandatory requirements under the 2012 SAR which would invalidate 
any arbitral award. The enforcement judge issued a decision for enforcement of the 
award and responded to the respondent’s claim for lack of representation by merely 
referring to the parties’ applicable law, which would consider the publication of a 
notice in the newspaper to be sufficient in ensuring that the notice has been served 
if the respondent’s address is not known by the arbitration tribunal. Consequently, 
the enforcement judge ordered the respondent to pay, within five days of being 
notified of the enforcement decision, in order to avoid being subject to additional 
penalties and to ensure compliance with such an order. The respondent did not 
comply within the required period of time and, accordingly, the enforcement judge 
put his name on the travel ban list, in addition to other penalties. Several weeks 
later, the claimant applied to the enforcement judge to lift all penalties after a 
settlement was reached between the parties for the payment of the promissory 




This case is very interesting, since it shows the enforcement judge’s lack of 
interference in the way the dispute was arbitrated, as opposed to the situation prior 
to the introduction of both the 2012 SAR and the 2013 SER. This is particularly 
evident when considering the fact that the newspaper in which the notice was 
published is an Omani newspaper and that the party against whom the enforcement 
is sought is a Saudi national living in the KSA. So, the communication might be 
seen to have been ineffective, unless it was published in one of the KSA gazettes. 
If such a case was to be enforced prior to 2012, the party against whom the 
enforcement was sought would have been able to challenge the award for lack of 
communication of notices and hearing dates that resulted in the lack of 
representation in the arbitration hearings. The Board of Grievance in charge of 
enforcing such awards would have been able to consider the dispute’s merits from 
the start and may have reached a contrary decision to the one reached by the 
arbitration tribunal. 
 
This was demonstrated in the case of Jadawel International v Emaar Property 
PJSC. In 2004, an arbitration hearing was commenced by Jadawel before an 
arbitral tribunal of three members located in the KSA. Jadawel was seeking 
damages of US $1.2 billion due to Emaar’s breach of contract on a construction 
project. The arbitration process, on its own, was too lengthy and took approximately 
two years but, in the end. an award was issued in favour of Emar, Jadawel’s claim 
was dismissed and he was asked to pay the legal costs. Emar submitted the award 
to the Board of Grievances in order to get it enforced. However, the board held a 
different view whereby they reviewed the case’s merits and decided not only to 
decline the enforcement award, but to reject the award and issue an enforcement 
decision in favour of Jadawel. So, the fact that it is no longer possible for 
enforcement courts to review the merits of a case is a very significant step towards 
developing the KSA’s legal framework to be more attractive to international 
commerce, since it guarantees that the parties’ autonomy in choosing the 
applicable law to their dispute resolution is upheld. At the same time, it protects the 
state’s interest in enforcing only the awards that do not clash with its public policy 
and mandatory rules. 
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Another important issue raised by this award, is the respondent’s lack of 
representation in the arbitration hearings. Although, the parties’ chosen procedural 
law considered the publication of notices to be effective communication and, as 
such, the respondent was considered to have waived his right to attend, this award 
would have been decided differently if the enforcement was sought before 2012, 
since it would have been rejected for failure to comply with the KSA’s procedural 
law. This was evidenced in Case No: 93/1422/2001, where the award was rejected 
on the basis of a lack of compliance with the 1983 SAR and its rules of 1985. 
Therefore, it is clear that the 2012 SAR has increased the autonomy of the parties 
to choose the procedural law applicable to their disputes, even if it contradicts the 
2012 SAR. Such increased importance to the parties’ will is also a step towards 
creating a more attractive arbitration system to international commerce. 
 
8.3. The Enforcement of Foreign Awards in the KSA  
The development of the KSA’s arbitration system to be more compatible with 
internationally recognised standards is very important. This is particularly the case 
when considering the number of awards seeking enforcement in the KSA and the 
amount of money involved. These numbers were published by the Ministry of 
Justice in June 2018, stating that, since 2015 the enforcement court has received 
more than 100 enforcement requests for foreign awards, amounting to billions of 
Saudi riyals. Out of these requests, the enforcement court had enforced 92 foreign 
awards up to the date of the Ministry of Justice’s announcement (Ministry of Justice, 
2019). When looking at the number of enforced foreign awards since 2015, it is 
apparent that there is an increase in the number of enforced awards and the amount 
of money involved. This reflects increased the reliability of the KSA’s enforcement 
framework, which has gradually increased since the enactment of the 2012 SAR 
and the 2013 SER. The numbers show that, in 2015, only nine foreign awards were 
enforced for the total amount of 209,918,031 Saudi riyals (Ibid). In the same year, 
the total amount of enforced awards was 656 awards, for the total amount of 
329,176,898 Saudi riyals. The fact that, out of these hundreds of awards, there 
were only 9 foreign awards, shows that, following the enactment of the 2013 SER 
and 2012 SAR, the reliance on arbitration as a method of resolving disputes within 
the KSA has attracted both local and foreign parties. In 2016, the number of 
enforced awards in the KSA was 745, representing a total amount of 102,446,619 
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Saudi riyals. Out of these awards, the enforcement courts enforced 31 foreign 
awards for the total amount of 345,352,156 Saudi riyals (Ibid). 
 
It is remarkable to see that the number of foreign awards enforced in 2016 tripled 
compared to the previous year. This is indicative of greater efficiency and 
effectiveness on the part of the enforcement courts, as well as increased flexibility 
when dealing with foreign awards. Such flexibility is mostly in the form of exercising 
severability to partially enforce foreign awards, rather than in rejecting the whole 
award on the basis of some infringing element of it to the KSA’s public policy. This 
was clearly seen in the cases discussed in this chapter which show, more than 
once, that a foreign award was partially enforced despite the party against whom 
the enforcement is sought attempting to get it rejected on public policy grounds. 
 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice’s figures show that the number of awards 
enforced in 2017 was almost double what was enforced in 2016. The enforcement 
courts enforced 1255 awards in 2017 for a total amount of 1,165,786,261 Saudi 
riyals. Out of these awards, there were twenty three foreign awards, which is less 
than the amount of foreign awards in 2016 (Ministry of Justice, 2019). This could 
be attributed to the disputing parties increased reliance on the KSA as the law of 
the seat in order to avoid any potential complications when enforcing an award in 
the KSA. This was shown in the total amount of enforced awards in 2017, which 
was more than the total number of enforced awards in both 2016 and 2015 put 
together.  
 
So far in 2018 (final figures released June 2019), the enforcement courts enforced 
709 awards for the total amount of 721,224,831 Saudi riyals. Out of these enforced 
awards, there have already been twenty five foreign awards, which is an increase 
when compared with 2017. If the enforcement of the awards continues in the same 
pattern, the end of 2018 may show that the amount of enforced awards in this year 
exceeds the figure for 2017 number of enforced award. These numbers indicate 
that there is a lot of money involved in the KSA arbitration process and, as such, 
having a reliable legal framework to govern the process is imperative to the 
development of the KSA’s legal and economic affairs. This being said, it is important 
to highlight that these numbers only cover the period between the beginning of 2015 
until the date in which these data were obtained on June 2018. 
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Commenting on these developing numbers and their impact on attracting foreign 
commerce, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Justice, Shaikh Abdulaziz Slaleh 
Al Suhaiman stated that “The recent increase in the number of enforced awards 
and foreign awards, especially in Saudi enforcement courts, is mainly due to the 
2013 Saudi Enforcement Regulation’s efficiency and speed” (Okaz Newspaper, 
2018). He further stated that the merits of the 2013 Regulation have made the 
enforcement of foreign awards much clearer and brought them in line with 
international standards. This, according to him, has resulted in foreign commercial 
entities being attracted towards referring their disputes to the 2012 SAR or to any 
other alternative legal framework, knowing that the 2013 SER will guarantee them 
an efficient and fast enforcement process. He further stated that these enforced 
foreign awards hail from different countries such as Switzerland, France, the UK, 
the US and Asian and regional states (ibid). Shaikh Abdul-Aziz also asserted that 
the number of enforced awards shows the KSA’s complete fulfilment of its 
obligations under regional and international conventions for the enforcement of 
foreign awards. He believes that the enforcement of foreign awards is likely to 
facilitate more investment and commerce between the KSA and the countries from 
which such awards were rendered (ibid). This shows the Ministry of Justice’s full 
awareness of its expected role in facilitating the enforcement of foreign decisions 
in order to enhance the KSA’s chances of attracting international commerce. It is 
hoped that such awareness is linked with actions for such facilitation in the form of 
removing some of the ambiguities of the 2012 SAR provisions that may influence 
the enforcement of both local and foreign awards (see Chapter Six). 
 
8.4. Conclusion 
This chapter critically analysed the practical side of the 2012 SAR and the 2013 
SER, with particular focus on the enforcement of foreign awards in the KSA’s 
jurisdiction, based on five foreign awards which sought enforcement in the KSA. All 
were either fully or partially enforced by the KSA’s enforcement courts, despite 
some being controversial. An example of these controversies is the enforcement 
judge enforcing case No: 37286586, despite a component of Usurious interest in 
the award, which is one of the elements that would give rise to a public policy 
consideration. The fact that such an award was partially enforced shows a clear 
change of attitude in the KSA’s enforcement of foreign awards since judges before 
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the introduction of the 2012 SAR would have rejected the enforcement of this 
arbitral award on public policy grounds.  
 
The analysis of these five awards shows a robust compliance by enforcement 
judges with the 2013 SER, which prohibits them from considering the merits of the 
dispute in spite of some parties’ attempts to force them to do so, in order to either 
reject the award or lengthen the process of enforcement. This was seen in Case 
No: 19366/MCP, where the enforcement judge rejected the request by the party 
against whom enforcement was sought for a review of some of the dispute’s merits.  
 
It is also clear from the above analysis that enforcement judges are willing to 
consider the established principle of reciprocity by merely proofing the award-
rendering country’s ratification of a convention that is also ratified by the KSA. This 
is seen in case No: 360262842, where the reciprocity requirement was established 
by the UK’s ratification of the New York Convention which is also ratified by the 
KSA. Another example was also highlighted in Case No: 37286586, where Egypt’s 
accession to the Riyadh Convention was considered sufficient basis for establishing 
reciprocity since the KSA is also a member of the same Convention. Establishing 
what constitutes the principle of reciprocity has been an ongoing issue for decades 
and, therefore, the enforcement judge’s flexible approach in establishing it is likely 
to be an important factor in developing the KSA’s enforcement framework to be 
attractive to international commerce. This is particularly important when considering 
the quantity of enforcement orders received annually by the KSA’s enforcement 














Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 
9.1. Introduction 
This thesis critically assesses the 2012 SAR and the extent to which it develops the 
arbitration framework of the KSA to make it attractive for international commerce.  
In addition, it studies the religious and cultural influences on the KSA’s legislative 
attitude and how such factors have restricted the development of the KSA’s 
arbitration regulations. This concluding chapter discusses the main findings of this 
study, following this with the author’s recommendations for developing the current 
arbitration framework with the purpose of enhancing the KSA’s attempts to 
modernise its legal regulations, relying on a critical study of the 2012 SAR.  
 
9.2. Findings 
In order to directly link the research findings with the aforementioned research 
focus, the findings of this thesis have been divided into the followings themes.  
 
9.2.1. Sharia Law and the KSA Legal Practice 
This thesis reveals that certain legal practices were considered to be in violation of 
Sharia due to cultural reasons, rather than Sharia rulings, such as those related to 
women’s rights. It also shows that, gradually, there appears to be a departure from 
the Hanbali school of juristic thought, in Islam, as the only applicable school in the 
KSA, and the inclusion of other Sunni schools of jurisprudence. Finally, the present 
research highlights an imperative need for further research in the area of interest, 
and Riba, under Sharia rules in order to cope with developments in Islamic finance 
and other related Muslim state’s practices.  
 
9.2.2. The Doctrine of State Sovereignty and Party Autonomy 
The doctrine of state sovereignty has always been of major concern to the KSA 
government and its legislative bodies resulting in a rigid interpretation of its public 
policy which hinders its attempt to create a modern and reliable legal system for 
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foreign commerce. The KSA has attempted to ease its rigidity by gradually 
embracing international standards and strengthening the scope of party autonomy 
at the expense of the court’s intervention (see Chapters Five and Six).  
 
9.2.3. The Extent to Ehich the 2012 SAR Succeeded in Developing the 
KSA Arbitration Practice.  
This research also finds that the 2012 SAR has succeeded in updating most of the 
ambiguous provisions in the 1983 SAR, including the clear statement of the 
grounds upon which an award might be challenged. This was an area that was not 
covered by any predecessor regulation in the KSA (Article 50). The 2012 SAR has 
additionally introduced the principle of severability into the KSA’s arbitration 
practice for the first time. It has, nevertheless, failed to address some of the more 
important issues that were inherited from the predecessor regulation, including 
those related to the arbitrator’s qualifications and certain public policy requirements.  
 
9.2.4. The Effectiveness of the Enforcement of Foreign Awards Under 
the 2012 SAR and the 2013 SER 
The 2012 SAR only considers the enforcement of awards in a very limited manner, 
its greatest focus being the award as a document and the process it should follow 
until it reaches the enforcement courts. Most of the 2012 SAR provisions in this 
regard are related to the enforcement of domestic awards and failed to provide 
sufficient details for foreign award enforcement. This could be related to the 
legislators’ prior knowledge of the issuance of the 2013 SER, which covered, in 
great detail, the enforcement of all decisions in the KSA. The 2013 SER provided 
certain requirements for enforcing both foreign awards and judgments in the KSA.  
It has, however, failed to effectively engage with the issue of public policy, which is 
one of the main deficiencies inherited from the predecessor regulations.  
 
9.3. Recommendations 
With the above findings in mind, the following recommendations are proposed for 
further research and action: 
 
 227 
This study reveals several ambiguities in the 2012 SAR that require clarification and 
further development if the KSA is to achieve its goal of creating an attractive and 
reliable arbitration system for international commercial activities. The following 
recommendations suggest some steps that could be swiftly implemented by the 
KSA’s government in order to stoke the interest of foreign commerce in the legal 
system of the KSA. 
 
9.3.1. Embrace the Hybrid Theory of ICA 
As stated in Chapter Four, the KSA adopts a jurisdictional view of ICA which argues 
for state supervision over arbitrations conducted within its territory. It is clear that 
the KSA feels the jurisdictional theory provides a comfort zone for introducing the 
amendments it needs, since it guarantees that any delegation of the state’s power 
over how disputes are to be conducted in its territory is the state’s choice and could 
be rebutted by it when it sees fit (see Chapter Four). This is why the KSA is slowly 
easing its control over the process of private dispute resolution while, at the same 
time, being cautious of losing control over them (see Chapters Five and Six).  
Therefore, there is a need to adopt a hybrid view which recognises both parties’ 
rights in exercising their autonomy over their private dispute and the KSA’s right to 
protect its sovereignty. 
 
9.3.2. Clarify Ambiguities in the 2012 SAR 
The researcher recommends the introduction of a new implementation rule to 
address contentious issues relating to the 2012 SAR. The suggested 
implementation rule should clearly address the issues surrounding an arbitrator’s 
qualifications, such as their gender and religion. It should also consider the 
impracticality of some of the 2012 SAR timeframes, as well as all other issues 
considered in Chapters Six and Seven.  
 
9.3.3. Develop the Consultative Council’s Role in the KSA Legislative 
Process 
The Consultative Council’s role in the legislative process in the KSA is limited to 
providing consultations which will be considered by the KSA’s monarch. This limited 
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role has resulted in the slow development of the KSA’s legal regulations in general 
and arbitration regulations in particular. Therefore, the researcher advocates for the 
empowerment of the KSA Consultative Council in its ability to issue binding 
regulations, provided that such regulations receive the King’s approval.  This would 
ensure that the Consultative Council could expedite the process of new regulations 
where needed while, at the same time, protecting the King’s role in the legislative 
process (the Basic Law, 1992). The implementation of such a process in the KSA 
will lead to the development of the KSA’s legislative image in a way that would 
attract foreign commerce.  
 
9.3.4. Codify the General Principles of Sharia  
The researcher recommends the establishment of a unified code based upon the 
general principles of Sharia, as extracted from across all Sunni schools of 
jurisprudence. Unlike the Majallah, the proposed codification would not focus on 
codifying Islamic rulings in detail, but act as general principles that could be referred 
to in order to ascertain Sharia views on the matter. This would limit the judges’ 
ability to interpret the principles of Sharia since some judges are not qualified to 
explore the main sources of Sharia. Instead, the general principles would have to 
be collected by the Senior Scholar’s Council, enabling judges to rely on such 
codified principles to issue their judgments.  
 
9.3.5. Redefine the Scope of the KSA’s Public Policy 
The author strongly recommends the introduction of new provisions covering all 
aspects of the KSA’s public policy. This new provisions ought to be drafted in a way 
that would enable both parties and arbitrators to predict what violates the KSA’s 
public policy. This ability to predict a particular state’s public policy would increase 
its certainty and reduce the number of awards which infringe it (Ghodoosi, 2016). 
The wording of such provisions should be drafted in explicit statements such as, “It 
is against the KSA’s public policy to…”, or “the commission of ... is considered to 
go against the KSA’s public policy”, or “an arbitration should… in order to comply 
with the KSA’s public policy”. These suggested provisions should avoid reference 
to general terms, such as ‘Sharia rules’ or ‘KSA sovereignty’ or from referencing 
unascertainable terms. On the contrary, the award’s elements which normally 
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infringe Sharia principles, such as Riba, should be clearly stated as a ground for 
breaching the KSA’s public policy.  
 
9.3.6. Reconsider the Scope of Riba in the KSA’s Legal Practice 
The present research shows that awards with an element of interest tend to be the 
most common triggers for the rejection of enforcements and courts often strike such 
awards down as being against KSA’s public policy. Yet, the concept of interest and 
damages remains uncertain in the KSA’s legal practice, since interest is confused 
with Usury and treated as such (see Chapter Two). This dynamic creates a lack of 
accuracy because the concept of interest is wider than Usury, which is related to 
an agreed automatic increase in order to achieve a profit. Interest encompasses 
more forms of compensations in ICA, such as damages for incurred loss or profit. 
Therefore, the scope of Riba should be clearly defined, alongside all other types of 
compensation that are not necessarily under its scope. 
 
9.3.7. Create a Binding System of Precedents 
As is clear from the discussions in Chapters Five and Six, judges’ decisions in the 
KSA are inconsistent, which affects the reliability of the KSA’s legal system as a 
whole. The lack of decisions that are binding on future judges empowers judges in 
the KSA with unlimited discretion to evaluate the rules of Sharia and reach 
decisions based on what they, as individual judges, see fit. This is a very 
unattractive practice for foreign commerce, since it is important for them, as part of 
the evaluation of their business hazards, to be able to predict the law of the state 
they have targeted for investment (Gazzini and others, 2012). Therefore, the author 
recommends that KSA legislators create a system of binding precedents, whereby 
judges’ decisions are binding on future ones, bearing in mind the usual hierarchy 
of courts.  
 
9.4. Further Research 
Due to the limited scope of the present project’s research questions, the author has 
either touched briefly on some important issues or not been able to address them. 
Therefore, he recommends future researchers discuss these areas further as part 
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of future PhD researches, or as the subject of future publications. These areas have 
been divided by the researcher into the following titles:  a) the development of 
Islamic finance and its influence on some of the prohibited practices in the KSA’s 
arbitration framework; b) the KSA’s 2030 vision on developing its arbitration 
practice and how it can be reconciled with the doctrine of state sovereignty; c) the 
KSA culture’s influence on developing both legal regulations and Sharia 
interpretations within the state; d) the role of women in developing the KSA’s legal 
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